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Abstract
During the 1930-1980s, the north-east territories were 
one of the main priorities of Soviet state economic 
policy. The strategy of northern development was built 
upon centralized redistribution of both human and fi-
nancial resources to the northern territories aiming at 
industrial development of the North and exploitation of 
mineral wealth such as oil, gas, coal, gold, etc., bearing 
export revenues for the national budget. These objec-
tives were achieved by planned populating of the area, 
both voluntary and forced, and the creation of a state-
guaranteed system of northern benefits. As a result, 
during a relatively short period of time, a large number 
of people moved and settled in the North. 
However, with the USSR’s disintegration, the govern-
ment perspective on the North changed significantly. 
The introduction of market-based principles and neo-
liberal logic of economic functioning revealed that 
the economic, urban and demographic organisation of 
the Russian North designed under the state-planning 
system did not suit market conditions. Following a 
neo-liberal agenda, federal authorities intended to re-
organize the far northern frontiers and implement new 
patterns of population mobility and settlement of the 
North. 
This work studies the state’s approaches to northern 
development, focusing on the (re)settlement issue in 
particular, and evaluates how these approaches work 
in practice. It focuses on administrative migration as-
sistance programs and their implementation results on 
the example of two northern regions, Murmansk Ob-
last and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (district, 
YNAO hereafter). 
By looking at the tensions between policy-planning 
and policy-implementation, this study aims to find the 
reasons for the unexpected outcomes which were not 
initially considered in the programmes. Empirical find-
ings from field research demonstrate the lack of feed-
back mechanisms between programme-designers and 
implementing institutions, and shed light on the tre-
mendous regional diversity within the Russian North, 
which was not properly considered at the stage of pol-
icy planning. 
This study therefore contributes from the ground to 
a refined understanding of - to say it in James Scott’s 
words (1998) - how certain measures, planned by cen-
tral states to improve the well-being of the population 
and provide continuous development, achieved the 
objective or failed. This refers particularly to the ap-
plicability of economic approaches to population dis-
tribution in the North, which was developed during the 
Soviet Union along political and social principles and 
was succeeded by the contemporary Russian state.
Key words: Russian North, Soviet and post-Soviet 
northern development, resettlement, migration-assist-
ance programmes, northern restructuring, viable com-
munities, anthropology of the state, the World Bank 
Northern Restructuring Project.
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7Preface
The steering of population distribution continues to be 
one of the tools used by various states for what has 
been probably the most massive development project 
in the Arctic ever: the industrial exploration and open-
ing up of the Eurasian North. From northern Norway 
all the way to the Bering Strait, this region is home to 
forty indigenous minorities for which living with their 
environment has been everyday life for centuries and 
millennia (e.g. Konstantinov 2005, Stammler 2005, 
Vitebsky 2005). Yet, more than 95% of the population 
of the vast Eurasian North are non-indigenous northern-
ers. For many of these people, from blue-collar work-
ers to decision makers, the Russian Arctic continues 
to pose extreme challenges for industrial development 
and human inhabitation (Stammler 2010). In the 20th 
century, these challenges were approached systemati-
cally by the Soviet Union and its Russian successor 
state. As early as 1928, when industrialisation in the 
Russian North started just east of the Finnish border, 
resettlement was seen to be necessary for ”the planned 
opening up of uninhabited or sparsely inhabited areas 
and the use of their natural resources” (CCUSSR 1928, 
§ 4, art. 23). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
state once again took this intention as a starting point, 
but this time for an agenda in the opposite direction: 
for controlling and steering the downsizing of what be-
came categorised as a ’surplus’ population in the Arctic 
according to a new post-Soviet idea of lean northern 
development. As this work convincingly shows, this 
has not only involved creating incentives for people to 
leave the North, but it is a part of a larger development 
idea for which demographic engineering continues to 
be one instrument.
 Nuykina shows in this work how ’seeing like 
a state’ (Scott 1998) in the case of Russian northern 
resettlement implies a lot of historical awareness: the 
Russian state now resumes responsibility for those who 
had been induced generations ago to leave their more 
temperate places of origin to work in the North. Rus-
sian resettlement programmes currently have a compo-
nent that provides opportunities for the outmigration of 
those people who had given their working lives to the 
ideas of Soviet industrial development; but this should 
be seen as only one part of the state’s attempts to steer 
population movement in the North in general. Particu-
lar categories of people are still attracted to move to the 
North to work in industry, even though the extractive 
industry increasingly relies on commute work (Eilm-
steiner-Saxinger 2010). On the opposite end, this work 
shows convincingly how there are immense gaps be-
tween abstract considerations, plans and programmes 
designed in Moscow and the lived experience of relo-
cating to and from the North. Following the state in-
ducement to move is a process of making oneself at 
home, and maybe eventually responding to incentives 
to relocate back to more temperate areas again. 
Scholars have previously highlighted that peo-
ple, including forced migrants, are not just victims or 
passive recipients of state policies (Pilkington 1998, 
Pilkington & Fisakli 1999), but actively shape them 
through their feedback and can therefore be conceived 
of as agents rather than only recipients of policies. 
Nuykina’s work shows what this actually means in 
practice, for example, when she refers to people’s crea-
tivity in ’interpreting’ the regulations and principles 
of contemporary Russian resettlement programmes 
from the north (chapter 4). From such responses we 
see that human agency can have expressions of such 
diversity that it is hard to imagine how laws could ever 
close all possible gaps for what Humphrey (1998) has 
called ”manipulating resources”. In such a context, this 
work speaks to the inherent tension between laws that 
claim to be standardised throughout the whole country 
and valid for all citizens, and human practice on the 
ground, which has a sheer endless diversity to respond 
to such standardised models of development. 
The INNOCOM1 project that provided the frame-
work for this work studied processes of mobility and 
locality as induced by the Soviet and Russian State 
in the two northern Russian regions covered here: 
Murmansk Oblast (Region) and Yamal-Nenets Au-
tonomous Okrug (YNAO). The main focus was on life 
histories of non-native northerners living in industrial 
cities there, their sense of place and their movement 
and settlement decisions (Stammler & Eilmsteiner-
Saxinger 2010). A short overview of the insights from 
1 Assessing senses of place, mobility and viability in industrial northern communities (MOVE-INNOCOM), funded by the 
Academy of Finland, 2006-2010, decision number N118702, in the framework of the ESF BOREAS programme, IPY project 
# 436.
8that project may be useful here to understand how the 
policies analysed in Nuykina’s work are being dealt 
with on the ground, in people’s individual lives. 
When they relocated to the North, hardly any of 
the then newcomers thought that they would stay for 
long, but life developed differently for most of them. 
That is why we hear over and over again: ”We came 
for a year, and stayed for ever”. Social anthropologi-
cal research in the INNOCOM project has traced the 
process of temporality becoming permanent and has 
examined what this change means for inhabitants of 
northern industrial cities and for life in these cities (Bo-
lotova & Stammler 2010). We found that the process 
of how a new place of human inhabitation becomes 
permanent is among the decisive factors for commu-
nity viability. Important traits of this process are the 
physical and emotional involvement of residents in 
the construction of the built environment, as well as 
the increasing attachment to the surrounding un-built 
(natural) environment through practices there (e.g. ber-
ry and mushroom picking, hunting, fishing). As most 
people perform these practices in groups, permanent 
interpersonal ties evolve that help to make a commu-
nity viable. Understanding this process has larger im-
plications for urban anthropological research, namely 
for the factors that make integration of northern city 
inhabitants with diverse origin more likely, and what 
leads more to disintegration, e.g., when a keystone in-
dustry in town closes down. Interestingly, a permanent 
or temporal atmosphere of a place on the community 
level is not necessarily causally linked to the ideas of 
inhabitants on the individual level. In other words, a 
Russian Arctic industrial city such as Novyi Urengoi 
(YNAO, Russia’s 36-year-old gas capital) may seem 
to be very permanently established, yet hardly any in-
habitant would plan to live their entire life there. Many 
develop intimate links, practical as well as emotional, 
to their northern cities. Nevertheless, most of them still 
have the idea of a ’historical homeland’ to which they 
also belong. As one woman said: ”we are like migra-
tory birds: when the summer comes we move to our 
previous places of origin, and as soon as we get there, 
we can’t wait to move back home, back to the North”. 
This seems like a beautiful rephrasing of Ulrich Beck’s 
(2000) theoretical models of what we might call ’home-
land pluralism’, which means that people can have a 
sense of belonging to several places simultaneously, 
and these places occupy different parts of their person-
ality and different components of their identities. 
A general conclusion from this is that migration 
and relocation analysis should go beyond the dichoto-
mies of ’place of origin vs. host place’. The simultane-
ity of belonging to different places is a continuum with 
numerous grey scales. This can help explaining why 
many inhabitants of cities like Kirovsk in the Mur-
mansk Region or Novyi Urengoi feel they belong very 
explicitly to the North, and if they move away from 
there, they might move to completely different places 
from which they have not originated. At the same time, 
however, an increasing number of pensioners stay in 
the North, something that was not intended for these 
northern cities at all. As social scientists we know that 
the diversity of possible human life trajectories is in-
credibly rich, and therefore policies result in unexpect-
ed consequences, as Nuykina shows well in chapter 4 
of this work. Many people have developed such strong 
senses of belonging that even if they move away, they 
keep coming back to their northern cities; they develop 
multiple homelands, and commute back and forth, as 
the quote above shows. 
As a result, northern industrial cities have changed 
significantly in their outer appearance, their quality of 
life, and their affordances as places of identification. In 
the 1940-1980s, the ideology of inhabitants and policy-
makers was still more temporary. Houses were built to 
last for only a limited time; inhabitants lived in these 
temporary conditions for years or even decades and did 
not bother to invest in proper furniture, dishes, cutlery 
or cars. The acquisition of many creature comforts was 
somehow ’saved’ for the future when they would fin-
ish working in the North and would move back to the 
South. Then recently this changed, and people have 
started to refurbish their apartments, buy cars in the 
North, build dachas2, and exhibit many other signs 
of permanent residency. Simultaneously, some city 
authorities have begun to invest more than earlier in 
making their cities look nice. They paint the houses in 
bright colours, install bright public lighting for the long 
winters, create parks and recreation zones, invest in 
cultural infrastructure, etc. Some cities, such as Novyi 
2 A summer cottage and garden plot around it at the outskirts of town, see http://dacha.webnode.com/about-us/ for an interesting 
project outcome that explores the place-dimension of dachas in the North.
9Urengoi, run big PR campaigns for the promotion of a 
common city identity. 
All of these recent efforts illustrate an attitude to-
wards northern resource towns of ’living in the here 
and now’, yet our research revealed that this does not 
necessarily mean that people intend to live in the North 
for their entire lifetime. After all, as one informant 
remarked: ”no matter how permanently you establish 
yourself here, you can still sell all this stuff any time 
and leave if you want and have somewhere to go”. De-
velopments and processes like this let us only sense the 
multiple facets of the phenomenon of resettlement in 
the Russian North and what it means for the population 
that has become the vast majority of Arctic residents.
Within a project that studies such processes, it was 
clear from the outset that understanding the overarch-
ing political framework for resettlement in the Russian 
North would have to become the focus of a separate 
baseline study. Thus, it was a perfect match that a stu-
dent in political sciences from one of the field regions 
(YNAO) became interested in the topic as well as in 
the anthropology of the state. Not only did the project 
get the baseline study for in-depth anthropological 
analyses of mobility and locality in northern industrial 
cities, it also contributed to capacity building from the 
field, helped to make a Western research project rel-
evant locally, and advanced a young intellectual’s ex-
cellence. Throughout the project, Nuykina developed 
an enthusiasm and dedication to this work that goes 
far beyond the usual student’s motivation. She took the 
suggestion to take the analysis of resettlement policies 
to the ground very seriously and embarked on her first 
fieldwork endeavour in both case-study regions even 
though for a thesis the policy analysis alone would 
have been sufficient. 
It should be noted that - as throughout all INNO-
COM research - Nuykina’s research in the regions fol-
lowed a qualitative social science method, where the 
goal was to understand principles of people’s respons-
es and local variations of overarching policies. This 
complements well the quantitative research done on 
the topic by geographers and demographers within the 
study of Arctic resettlement (Heleniak 2008). When 
she introduced the results at our final project confer-
ence3, it was for these insights into the principles of the 
policy-people interface that several scholars highlight-
ed how relevant the general findings from this work are 
even beyond the Russian North. Consequently, the de-
cision was made to again intensively review and com-
ment on the text that had already served as the basis 
for the thesis. In the version published now as an Arc-
tic Centre Report, Nuykina has considered the com-
ments made by two reviewers and turned the text into 
a stand-alone publication that the project team is proud 
to recommend as informative and worthwhile reading 
for students and scholars of state-induced population 
movement, the anthropology of the state, community 
viability and northern development in general.
Florian Stammler
Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
3 The Role of the State in Population Movements: The Circumpolar North and Other Periphery Regions, Rovaniemi, Oct 26-28, 
2009, www.arcticcentre.org/boreasconf
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Introduction
Between 1955 and 1975, almost eight hundred new 
towns (Engel 2007: 285) were built in the Russian 
North as part of the giant Soviet development project 
for its northern periphery. Leading to an influx of 
millions of non-indigenous people to the North, this 
project, called “Conquest of the North” (Osvoenie 
severa), was destined to fuel the Union and prove 
Soviet domination over an environment perceived as 
hostile and uninhabited. Since the end of the Soviet 
Union, northern communities, established by this de-
velopment ideology and consisting of relocated to the 
North non-indigenous population from all over the 
Soviet Union, have been inherently unsustainable. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the open-
ing up of the Russian economy towards global mar-
kets in the early nineties revealed that the socio-eco-
nomic and demographic organisation of the Russian 
North, as designed under the state-planning system, 
was not suitable to the market conditions introduced. 
New calculations based on principles of cost-efficien-
cy, competitiveness, and rationality, put emphasis on 
the expense of maintaining economic activity and 
living in the harsh northern environment, as well as 
‘overpopulation’ of northern territories. Following 
the neo-liberal agenda, federal authorities strove to 
reorganise the far northern frontiers according to the 
needs and requirements of the market-oriented econ-
omy in order to create a basis for economically viable 
industries and cities. 
In the economic sphere, the Russian government 
promoted the privatisation and restructuring of enter-
prises, closure of non-profitable industries, dismiss-
als and early retirement, and shift-labor and seasonal 
workers instead of full-time employees. This reorgan-
isation of the production sector caused a reshaping 
of the socio-demographic landscape of the North and 
created new patterns of population distribution. In the 
social sphere, the reforms of the nineties intended to 
cut social programmes and special northern benefits, 
reduce public expenses, transfer social responsibilities 
from city-forming enterprises (around which indus-
trial cities had been built in previously hard-to-popu-
late areas) to municipalities which created additional 
pressure on local and national budgets. Changes in the 
demographic sphere included closing and downsizing 
communities, facilitating out-migration, state regula-
tion of settlements, and mobility through different re-
settlement programmes as demanded by the Russian 
government as well as citizens who could not leave the 
North at their own expense. By providing migration-
assistance, the national government expected to solve 
the problem of northern ‘overpopulation’. The state’s 
approach to the North, however, was not simplistically 
geared to ‘depopulate’ the place, but more to regulate 
the population structure by pushing out economically 
non-productive population and attracting the required 
labour force at the same time. Resettlement from the 
Russian North, therefore, provided an example of a so-
cial engineering scheme. It was the state which, in the 
first place, had induced people to move to the North to 
exploit northern resources and hence ensure national 
security. After the crash of the Soviet system, when the 
economic conditions changed and it became costly to 
maintain a permanent population in distant regions, the 
central government considered itself obligated to take 
responsibility in moving ‘surplus’ population back to 
the ‘mainland’. 
Despite the measures taken and the various schemes 
implemented, the question of northern resettlement is 
still relevant, both for the residents and for the state. 
According to the Ministry of Regional Development, 
as of the year 2008, more than half of one million 
northern citizens (or 215,500 families) had applied for 
participation in the federal relocation programme and 
were expecting migration assistance sponsored by the 
state (Committee for Problems of the North and the 
Far East 2008). The relevance of the issue and the rais-
ing interest of the central government in relocation is 
shown though the increase of the programme’s funding 
and continuous discussions about resettlement and its 
problems in the mass media (Sorochenko 2000, Hol-
ley 2004, Chubatyuk 2006, Petuhov 2008) and among 
political leaders (Putin 2004, Oleynik 2007, 2008, 
Medvedev 2008). Relocation is one of the main ques-
tions the State Duma Committee for the problems of 
the North and the Far East constantly works on, since 
this issue is closely linked to the future development 
of the Russian North (Committee for Problems of the 
North and the Far East 2007, 2008).
The topic of northern administrative resettlement 
has attracted the attention of Russian as well as west-
ern scholars (Pivovarov 1995, 2002, Thompson 2002, 
2004, 2008, Heleniak 2009a, Hill & Gaddy 2003; Hill 
2004; Round 2005; Khlinovskaya-Rockhill 2009, Bo-
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lotova & Stammler 2010) and has contributed to the 
broader discussion of the role of the state in popula-
tion movements in the circumpolar regions and state-
induced migration in general (Oliver-Smith 1991, 
Cernea 2000, de Wet 2009). The economic approach 
(Pivovarov 1995, 2002, Hill & Gaddy 2003, Hill 2004) 
considers relocation as a necessary step towards ef-
ficient and competitive market economy. The authors 
of this theoretical direction review the economic ge-
ography of the country and argue that the economic 
and human organisation of the space inherited from 
the Soviet Union limits the state’s capacity to ensure 
economic growth. According to this perspective, the 
resources of the North should be developed by reduc-
ing the dependency on huge fixed pools of labour and 
shifting to more technologically intensive methods of 
extraction and temporary work schemes that do not re-
quire a large permanent population or extensive urban 
infrastructure (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 213). The spatial 
perspective on northern demography (Heleniak 2008, 
2009a, 2009b) provides a general framework on popu-
lation characteristics and change, as well as migration 
patterns in the Russian Far North, with the particular 
focus on place-specific social capital having both a 
push and pull role in making the decision to migrate. 
It also describes Russia’s shifting policy towards the 
population of its northern territories in the example of 
the World Bank restructuring project and the federal 
resettlement programme. Social and anthropological 
analysis (Thompson 2002, 2004, 2008, Round 2005, 
Khlinovskaya-Rockhill 2009, Bolotova & Stammler 
2010) looks at non-economic motives influencing peo-
ple’s desire to continue living in the region and their 
responses to administrative resettlement. It shows how 
the non-indigenous population brought to the North by 
the Soviet state gradually developed a sense of belong-
ing to the place, social ties, experiences of adapting to 
the harsh arctic conditions and a collective creating of 
living space, feeling of home, attaching them to the 
area (Stammler 2010). The authors criticise the admin-
istratively-induced relocation programmes for not tak-
ing into account the strategies, identities and people’s 
histories that are all deeply rooted in the region. They 
suggest more a culturally nuanced reading of the situ-
ation which needs to be taken into account by those 
steering the development of the region (Round 2005: 
723).
This work complements existing studies by ap-
plying theoretical insights from the anthropology of 
the state, migration theories and neo-liberal econom-
ics for evaluating the performance of resettlement 
programmes. It describes development principles the 
central administration has taken towards its northern 
territories and how these approaches have been imple-
mented in practice; arisen implementation problems; 
complex relations between the federal and regional 
levels of power vertical as well as interaction between 
the structural constraints and migrant agency. 
More particularly, this study aims to reveal the 
causes of failure of administratively-induced resettle-
ment in the Russian northern periphery. It is important 
to agree from the beginning on how we define suc-
cess vis-à-vis failure, since aspects examined generate 
various understandings of programme outcomes. In 
an analytical sense, policy failure can be said to oc-
cur when policy does not achieve its stated objectives 
(Castells 2004: 207). This work investigates to what 
extent resettlement policy has fulfilled its ambitious 
plans, in which ways it has affected people’s life and 
the development of northern regions. As this analysis 
shows, policy failure or success can not be defined as 
absolute. Relocation policy has achieved some, but not 
all, of the stated objectives and produces a space for 
unexpected consequences which were not initially in-
tended in the programmes. By focusing on both federal 
and regional state agencies and also northern citizens, 
we identify two analytical dimensions as being cen-
tral in our evaluation of policy achievements, namely: 
“state-state” and “state-society” perspectives. Through 
referring to the examples from the ground we seek to 
provide a refined understanding on why certain meas-
ures planned by the central authorities to improve the 
well-being of the population and provide continuous 
development brought little success.      
The post-Soviet relocation policy declared that re-
location is beneficial for the Russian state, because it 
reduces government costs for subsidizing the North 
and for northern residents, as it provides migration as-
sistance for the economically vulnerable population to 
move to regions with warmer climate conditions. The 
state defines the economically vulnerable population as 
economically disadvantaged, unemployed, pensioners 
and disabled (Federal Law 125-FZ from 25 October 
2002). Based on policy analysis and field work, we ar-
gue, however, that relocation schemes induced by the 
federal government do not work as they were intended 
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and, moreover, became reinterpreted in the process of 
realisation. 
This work consists of five chapters, which present 
an overview of relocation problem in the Russian 
North from a theoretical, empirical and analytical posi-
tion. On a general scale it aims to contribute to a more 
comprehensive discussion on the state’s role in shap-
ing territorial population distribution and its success in 
regulating migratory movements. The first chapter pro-
vides a thematic framework of the resettlement prob-
lem, summarizes the Soviet and contemporary policy 
approaches of the central government to the North, 
looks at the challenges and trends of post-Soviet north-
ern development, and describes the rationale beyond 
administrative out-migration projects. The second 
chapter provides a literature review of key concepts 
and underpinnings used for analyzing empirical mate-
rial, namely, it focuses on the neo-liberal perspective, 
migration theories and anthropology of the state. The 
third chapter describes particular resettlement pro-
grammes, schemes and implementation mechanisms, 
instruments of programme governance, target popula-
tion groups. The fourth chapter evaluates how efficient 
the measures of ‘state-inducement’ were and highlights 
implementation achievements, structural difficulties 
as well as grassroots responses to the policy. The last 
chapter synthesizes the main findings of the analyzed 
cases. We examine the reasons for the programmes’ 
limited implementation results and unintended strate-
gies developed by beneficiaries as well as northern de-
velopment in general. Chapter 5 demonstrates in detail 
how the state operates on federal and regional levels 
and how it produces interaction of different state layers 
within the vertical structure. Through the lens of the 
anthropology of the state, it shows that the state is not 
monolithic but a multi-faced actor that may have dif-
ferent interests and priorities.    
Reference resources used in the study include 
theoretical and topic-relevant literature, local newspa-
pers, reports, working papers, legislative acts, statisti-
cal information, and expert interviews from the field 
work. The study is based on a Russian-language and 
English-language literature review, including Russian 
legislation on resettlement issues and northern devel-
opment, and original empirical materials. It uses both 
quantitative and qualitative data; the latter is applied to 
determine the factors behind migration decisions and 
to examine the changing role of the Russian state in 
populating northern territories and regulating people’s 
mobility.  
The research focus of this work is a comparative 
analysis of relocation experiences in northern com-
munities of Murmansk oblast (European Russia) and 
YNAO (North-West Siberia). The comparative method 
is also used to find out similarities and differences in 
policy design and realisation of two resettlement pro-
grammes: the relocation programme under the Federal 
Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Restructur-
ing Project, as well as between Soviet and post-Soviet 
development strategies. Qualitative data analysis is 
used to describe and explain the different sides of re-
settlement process from two points of view: the state 
as a multiple actor, and the programme participants. 
Special attention is given to implicit practices people 
develop in response to the state’s measures. Linking 
material from fieldwork with the broader Russian con-
text provides relevant insight from the ground. 
We should acknowledge that the results of this re-
search are very much limited by the cases we based 
them on. The performance of resettlement policy and 
migration motives could be different in the far distant 
northern regions of the Russian East and economical-
ly depressed territories. Fieldwork for this study was 
conducted in Murmansk oblast, Yamalo-Nenets Au-
tonomous Okrug (YNAO) and, additionally, the city 
of Moscow in the year 2008.  Murmansk oblast and 
YNAO started as industrial outposts in the North and 
economies of both regions are heavily dependent on 
resource extraction. Still, they have a different history 
of population growth, different socio-economic char-
acteristics, migration tendencies, and even the ‘remote-
ness’ of these places is perceived differently. 
Murmansk oblast produces nearly 100 percent of 
Russia’s apatite concentrate, 41.2 percent of all its 
nickel, 13 percent of its copper, and 9.8 percent of its 
ferrous metal ores (Vuorinen 2008: 54). It is one of the 
first Russian northern regions which has been indus-
trialized. In a way, it represents an experimental case 
where Soviet development principles were first ap-
plied. Finishing the railway that connected central Rus-
sia and the Kola Peninsula in 1916, and exploitation of 
the first deposits in the 1930s caused migration inflow. 
Early settlers came from southern agricultural territo-
ries and Leningrad oblast, to which the Murmansk Re-
gion was administratively subordinated at the time. It 
was both voluntary and involuntary migration contain-
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ing GULAG prisoners and a forcedly relocated popu-
lation (spetspereselentsy) that created the early city 
communities of Khibinogorsk and Monchegorsk - the 
first urban centres. Currently, about 92 percent of the 
population of Murmansk oblast lives in mono-industri-
al towns and cities (Murmanskstat 2007). Because of 
the developed transport infrastructure, the ice-free port 
of Murmansk, and its close proximity to the Finnish 
and Norwegian borders, the region is well-integrated 
into international and domestic life, which is different 
in the case of YNAO. 
YNAO is located in the centre of Russia’s Far 
North. Because of its mineral wealth, the region has 
become one of the economic engines of the Russian 
economy. Development of YNAO heavily relies on 
inter-regional and international migration in order to 
supply labour to local enterprises. Industrialisation of 
the place started in the 1970s with the discovery of oil 
and gas deposits. Most of the population growth, espe-
cially after 1979, resulted from in-migration and only 
a small portion was due to natural increase. The early 
incomers were young specialists arriving to the region 
under the agitation of the communist party from Dag-
estan, Kurgan, and Bashkortostan as well as Ukraine 
and Belarus. In 2007, the population of YNAO reached 
538,600 inhabitants (Yamalstat 2007) against 857,000 
in Murmansk oblast (Murmanskstat 2007). But only 
27 percent of the population was born in this northern 
region, the second-lowest share in Russia, and 30 per-
cent were born outside of Russia, the highest share in 
the country. Today, YNAO is Russia’s most important 
supplier of natural gas, with more than 90 percent of 
the country’s natural gas and 12 percent of oil produc-
tion originating there. Despite the Okrug’s economic 
significance, the Moscow administration perceives 
Yamal as a more remote place than Kola region. The 
transportation system in YNAO is not well-developed 
compared to Murmansk oblast and many settlements 
can be accessed by air only. 
Selection of these cases was preconditioned by the 
framework of the MOVE-INNOCOM project. In the 
first case, our research was carried out in the mining 
town of Apatiti, being famous for its science centre and 
academic activity, and the regional capital Murmansk 
city in October 2008. For two weeks we worked in the 
library archive, reviewed local newspapers, collected 
statistical information, and interviewed officials of 
municipal and regional administrations, including ex-
perts working in resettlement implementation offices, 
as well as journalists of the city newspaper “2x2”. As 
the second case site, the gas-production centre of Novy 
Urengoy and the district capital of Salekhard were cho-
sen. During one month working in YNAO and Mos-
cow city in November-December 2008, we conducted 
semi-structured expert interviews with regional and 
municipal authorities, officials of resettlement imple-
mentation offices, participated in a session of the State 
Duma Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern 
problems on resettlement policy, had meetings with 
World Bank officials responsible for implementation 
of Northern Restructuring Pilot Project and the repre-
sentative unit of YNAO region in Moscow. 
It needs to be said, however, that the results of the 
field work can not pretend to be representative and ob-
jective for all Russian northern regions, since they were 
conditioned by our position in the field. It was more 
difficult to obtain information concerning programme 
outcomes and to get access to the administrative agen-
da that was responsible for programme implementation 
in Murmansk oblast, because we came to the region 
without having previously-established contacts. The 
questionnaire was modified in the course of carrying 
out our study, but in general, five main subjects were 
addressed: the necessity of the relocation programmes, 
changes in policy design, policy implementation, sto-
ries of resettling people, and relations between local 
offices and the central government. 
Along other intentions, this work seeks to contrib-
ute to a balanced understanding of the consequences of 
the state relocation policies in their influence on the vi-
ability of industrial communities in the Russian North. 
By bringing together understandings of Soviet and 
contemporary policy approaches towards the north-
ern development (chapter 1), logic and mechanisms of 
depopulating the area (chapter 3), policy performance 
and its achievements (chapter 4 and 5), including so-
cial feedback, we would like to finish the analysis with 
some suggestions how to improve relocation project’s 
outcomes and offer our position on the relocation prob-
lem.
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1 The role of the Russian state in 
northern resettlement policy
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a thematic 
background for the following discussions on the trends 
of Russian northern development and, in particular, 
socio-demographic restructuring of industrial com-
munities. This chapter identifies the policy approaches 
and practices shaping Russia’s northern development 
policy, explored in greater details in the subsequent 
sections. It introduces the concept of the Russian North 
from economic, geopolitical and social perspectives 
and outlines Soviet and post-Soviet approaches on the 
northern development, especially related to population 
mobility and settlement. This section explains ideas 
driving resettlement policy-making and forming condi-
tions for (de)populating the northern periphery. It also 
provides historical review of populating the northern 
periphery and description of Soviet and current migra-
tion patterns. The third section of the chapter looks at 
the economic and political rationale behind state-pro-
jected resettlement and answers the question of why 
the Russian North has to be depopulated. Finally, it 
provides a general overview of the relocation schemes 
being implemented in the Russian North, namely the 
Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank Northern Re-
structuring Project.
1.1 Defining the Russian North
The concept of the Russian North has been well-stud-
ied by Russian and Western theoreticians. Its interpre-
tation is based on one or a combination of geographic, 
economic, political and socio-cultural aspects (Slavin 
1961, 1972, 1982, Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006, 
Stammler-Gossmann 2007). The definition of the Rus-
sian North offered by Soviet scholar Samuel Slavin 
includes four characteristics: first, its location to the 
North of the long-standing settled and economically 
developed areas and its remoteness from large indus-
trial centres; second, harsh climate conditions; third, 
extremely low population density; and, forth, a greater 
expenditure of man-hours in the exploitation of natural 
resources than would be required for exploitation of 
similar resources located farther South (Slavin 1972: 
38-39). Slavin’s understanding of the Russian North 
emphasizes the distance from the core (geographical 
dimension) and the high costs of the Russian North 
(economic dimension) as a main characteristics af-
fecting northern development in general. In this sense, 
economic remoteness is of greater consequence than 
physical isolation influencing development paths. In 
addition to economic and geographical dimensions, 
the North is perceived as a social construct, as an area 
which has a specific role and function for Russian so-
ciety (Stammler-Gossmann 2007: 57). The North is a 
home for indigenous and non-indigenous population, 
“living” the North every day. 
Russian legislation defines the North as the high-
latitude part of the Russian Federation territory, char-
acterized by harsh natural-climatic conditions and 
higher expenses in production of outputs and maintain-
ing population (Federal Law N 78-FZ from 19 June 
1996). For purposes of planning, economic develop-
ment, and statistics the Russian government defines 
two different types of “North” – the Far North, and 
regions equivalent to the Far North (Rosstat 2006: 
190-197). Analyzing the Russian North in this work, 
we particularly refer to the far northern territories that 
comprise sixteen federal subjects, including the sides 
of this case study: Murmansk Region and YNAO. In 
2006, 53 percent of the total territory of the Russian 
Federation was defined as belonging to the Far North, 
a region that contains 5.6 percent of the country’s total 
population (Heleniak 2009a: 33 Fig 1.1).
The perception of the North as well as the bounda-
ries of the region has been altered over the years ac-
cording to changing development priorities. When the 
term first came into official use, it was defined through 
the Soviet policy towards indigenous peoples of the 
North (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 9). Understand-
ing of the North was reviewed with introduction of the 
northern compensation system in 1932, intended to 
attract a labour force for newly-established industries 
and retain the workers in the region (Stammler-Goss-
mann 2007). Since then the area of the Russian North 
has been determined by the policy of northern incen-
tive payments and special benefits which were partly 
inherited by the Russian government. This included 
higher salaries, lower retirement age, better supplies of 
goods, paid holidays and paid travel expenses. 
Michael Bradshaw argues that the patterns of 
northern development in Russia both during the So-
viet and Post-Soviet times have been conditioned by 
priorities of the core (Bradshaw 1995). Underlining 
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the importance of the North, theoreticians and policy-
makers emphasize its richness in natural resources and 
significant regional contribution to the national eco-
nomic growth.
“When we talk about the North – it is two thirds 
of the resource potential of the country, a quarter of 
tax revenues and sixty percent of all currency earn-
ings. Each worker in the North brings almost three 
times more to the state revenue than an average 
working citizen.” (Oleynik 2008).
Besides its value for domestic economy, the Rus-
sian North has a central role to play in international 
circumpolar arena, being geographically the largest 
arctic territory and an important global actor in energy 
markets and geopolitics. Therefore, the question of 
present and future directions of northern development 
has growing significance, not just at the national level, 
but also on a global scale.
The analysis of this study focuses on development 
principles and federal approaches to the northern pe-
riphery, particularly underlying socio-demographic 
and economic dimensions. Since the scope of northern 
development is broad and depends on the perspective 
applied, for the purpose of this work we particularly 
consider demographic changes, social processes and 
economic situation. The latter is examined from an 
administrative dimension emphasizing how political 
leaders see the economic value of relocation and what 
role economic factors play in policy-making.
1.2 State approaches towards 
Russian northern development
 
1.2.1 Soviet development approach
The Soviet leaders saw the northern regions “as a key 
part of the country’s geography, an untapped resource 
to be integrated and exploited to the benefit of the na-
tional economy. Soviet mythology presented the North 
as the land of the future, where the Soviet man would 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Regions of the Russian Far North. Source: Heleniak 2009a.
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demonstrate his ability to tame and subdue nature. And 
so, under the slogan “the conquest of the North” (Os-
voenie severa), the Soviet authorities set about coloniz-
ing this vast realm” (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 
26).
The direction of northern development was driven 
by the state’s economic interests in exploiting raw ma-
terials, as well as by the idea that industrial activities 
and population should be equally distributed across 
the Russian territory for ideological and national secu-
rity reasons (Hill & Gaddy 2003). It was strategically 
important to make the Soviet Union self-sufficient in 
mineral resources and independent from the West-
ern economies. However, there was no integrated re-
gional plan for developing the northern frontier; rather 
northern development proceeded from the discovery 
of resources that pushed industrialisation further and 
further to the North and Far East. To realise the So-
viet ambition of large-scale modernisation, it needed a 
massive relocation of workers to become permanently 
settled in the North. 
In the 1930s, the Russian North experienced the first 
wave of resettlement through the organised require-
ment of specialists and contract workers, which, how-
ever, did not provide sufficient human resources for 
labour-intensive production. Bolotova and Stammler 
note (2010: 197) that even though physical force was 
not applied to command these labourers to relocate to 
the North, it was a completely state-induced relocation. 
“Many of those who came voluntarily (namely Kom-
somol (The Communist Union of Youth) members, 
specialists in mining, constructors, and NKVD secret 
police staff) did not have much choice of where to 
go. They were sent by the authorities to a place where 
workers were needed at that particular time.”.
In the early period of northern development, forced 
migration to the North was a significant component 
in encouraging population growth. Labour shortage 
was compensated by the use of spetspereselentsy, the 
former peasants forcedly deported from central and 
southern regions, and workers from the labour camp 
GULAG (Sokolov 2004, Kiselev 2008). “GULAG and 
its pool of slave labour became fundamental tools in 
Soviet industrialisation. At its peak in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, GULAG accounted for an estimated 15-18 
percent of all Russian industrial output and industrial 
employment” (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 86). 
From the end of the fifties, individual intentional 
migration became the major form of movement to the 
North. Second-wave northern incomers were often 
1963, Bolshakova I.I., Smirnov V.S. 1972, Babin N.S.
Figure 1-2 Soviet agitation posters.
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members of the Komsomol organisation, driven by 
patriotism, romanticism and enthusiasm. They were 
working at construction of new northern cities, trans-
port infrastructure, electrification of territories, and ex-
traction of mineral resources. Along with Komsomol, 
the distribution system of institute graduates was es-
tablished. Soviet agitation encouraged young profes-
sionals and graduates to move to strategically impor-
tant or/and remote areas in order to serve the socialist 
state and national interests (Fig. 1-2).
As a result of active pro-Northern campaigns and 
the system of material and non-material northern ben-
efits (Epshtein 1968) the migration inflow to these 
territories gradually increased. For example, the total 
number of inhabitants in Murmansk Region in 1926 
year was 32,100 people (Table 1.1), mainly rural popu-
lation. Between 1926 and 1991 years this number in-
creased 36 times and at the end of Soviet epoch there 
were 1,159,000 people living in the oblast.
Table 1-1 The dynamic of population 
growth in Murmansk Region, 1926-2008. 
Source: Murmanskstat 1994, Murmansk-
stat 2008.
A new policy to influence spatial allocation of people 
based on the principal of labour rotation was imple-
mented in the 1970s. The rotation system implied turn-
over of the work force and the labour policy was based 
on the system of fixed term employment contracts and 
long-distance commute work (vakhtovaya rabota). “It 
was expected that, after having worked for a period in 
the North, the migrants would return “home”” (Blak-
kisrud & Honneland 2006: 27). 
Qualitative research (The World Bank 1998, 
Thompson 2002, Bolotova & Stammler 2010) shows 
that northern incomers did not consider their stay in the 
North as permanent. “Migrants typically viewed their 
residency in the North as short-term, and most came on 
three-year contracts; a northern sojourn was a means of 
saving money, accessing deficit goods (cars, furniture, 
and even a flat), and perhaps experiencing an exoti-
cally different lifestyle, but most planned to return to 
temperate zones within a few years” (Thompson 2002: 
273-274). 
“Temporality” can be also observed in the way 
northern industrial towns were established. Many of 
towns located in the Northwest and Northeast founded 
in the 1970s as commuters’ camps (vakhtovie poselki) 
serving northern industries with working force and 
then developed into permanent settlements with vi-
able communities. It is important to note that the So-
viet development strategy of West-Siberian Fuel and 
Energy Complex originally planned industrialisation 
and urban growth as a linked processes. “Cities were 
planned as bases, or concentration points for social 
infrastructure, and as supply or residential centres for 
extractive industries in isolated areas” (Hill & Gaddy 
2003: 91). Thus, as industrialisation was progressing, 
northern cities were enlarging, gradually becoming a 
place for permanent habitation. The joint experience of 
constructing new cities and overcoming hardships cre-
ated social cohesion and a sense of belonging to such 
places among early incomers (Bolotova & Stammler 
2010, Stammler 2010). Northern residency, thought to 
be temporary for some, became in many cases to be 
until retirement or beyond. Having been brought to the 
North by the state in the first place, these people have 
made these places their true home.
*, ** The data reflects the territorial bor-
ders of Murmansk region at the time of 
data collection.
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1.2.2 Russian development approach
With the demise of the Soviet regime, the approach 
to northern development and regional distribution of 
population has altered significantly. The introduction 
of market-oriented principles, along with economic 
rationality, revealed the cost of the North and its over-
population in relation to its economic capacities (Hill 
& Gaddy 2003). “After seven decades of intensive So-
viet colonisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation 
of the North, the new Russian authorities inherited an 
infrastructure and settlement patterns poorly suited to 
the market economy” (Blakkisrud & Honneland 2006: 
25). The reforms of this transitional period aimed at ad-
justing northern development to meet neo-liberal agen-
da by cutting down federal subsidies to the northern 
industries, restructuring enterprises through divesting 
social assets (and other measures that permit industrial 
rationalisation), introducing market-driven contractual 
labour practices, downsizing and closing non-viable 
communities, and reducing the federally subsidized 
supply of food and fuel to the northern regions (The 
World Bank 2001). 
The democratic government took attempts to re-
think Soviet welfare provisions and to reorganise the 
exclusive socio-economic treatment of northern resi-
dents based on the system of special benefits and privi-
leges. Arguing that the Soviet benefits (l’goti) scheme 
is difficult to administer, is incompatible with a market 
economy, and  impedes the liberalisation of the public 
service sector, Russian authorities launched a process 
of monetizing of l’goti which converted the benefits 
into cash allowances (Wengle & Rasell 2008).  When 
the law came into force in January 2005, monetisation 
reform has faced with mass protests across the coun-
try, mainly because people were losing their privileged 
social status as l’gotniki. “Besides its material value, 
the in-kind benefits system included symbolic capital 
that became an important source of pride and identity 
among recipients, with Soviet society coming to be-
lieve that the l’gotniki deserved and were legitimately 
entitled to these special privileges” (Wengle & Rasell 
2008: 741). Therefore, eliminating northern compensa-
tions system in a certain sense meant eliminating the 
northerners’ high position in society.
Post-Soviet Russia does not have an integrated 
northern strategy to identify broad political and socio-
economic objectives and challenges for the North; 
rather, northern policy is spread across a variety of 
fields, from interregional migration to energy policy. 
The existent programmes apply centralistic principles 
of development, to some extent reflecting the Soviet 
mode of governance5 characterised by prescribing de-
tailed and fixed standards that leave little leeway in 
implementation, and combine it with neoliberal logic, 
which promotes cost effectiveness and rationalising 
budgetary expenses. The state still provides welfare 
provisions to its citizens through different social pro-
grammes; however, the moves to limit consumption 
of welfare services and to make recipients bear greater 
responsibility for their well-being are key aspects of 
neoliberal governmentality (Lemke 2001 cit. in Wen-
gle & Rasell 2008: 748). 
Centre-periphery relations are a crucial element 
influencing on the elaboration and implementation of 
northern policies, since the development of the North 
is still very much driven by the interests of the fed-
eral centre, leaving limited space for local interference. 
There are two opinions on the perspectives of northern 
development presented in Russian political discourse. 
On the one hand, the Far North is viewed as a place for 
permanent habitation which has to be developed ac-
cording to the needs of its indigenous and industrial 
population as well as its economic potential. Advocates 
of a permanently populated North reason that the North 
should be further infrastructurally developed and pro-
vided with comfortable living conditions (Gryzlov 
2007, Medvedev 2008). On the other hand, the North 
is considered as a resource base which should be gov-
erned according to federal economic priorities and na-
tional demand in revenues. This requires restructuring 
northern communities and the relocation of surplus 
population, along with the greater use of commuting 
labour force. For example, the former governor of Tyu-
men Region, Sergey Sobyanin, has pointed out that the 
North does not need large-scale settling. 
“Population distribution by the “checkrow method” 
was necessary in the early stages, when the northern 
territory was developing and its infrastructure grow-
ing. Therefore, those who live in the North should be 
the ones who can not leave it: an indigenous popula-
5 Mode of governance in this context is understood as combination of different instruments of political steering (Treib, Bähr, 
Falkner 2005).
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tion and the population employed in regional indus-
tries. The only way for the North to be competitive is 
to focus on extraction of natural resources” (Sobyanin 
2004).
This latter approach was taken as an underpinning 
by the World Bank experts and Russian federal author-
ities who addressed the issue of northern resettlement 
in the middle nineties. The details and implementation 
of relocation programmes in great depth will be exam-
ined in the third chapter.
1.3 Different perspectives on why the 
northern population should be resettled
Administrative relocation programmes were elaborat-
ed in the situation of economic stagnation and overall 
uncertainty concerning the future of the North. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition 
of the Russian economy away from centralised con-
trols have set in motion a number of processes that 
have weakened Russia’s capacity to sustain past levels 
of northern development and, by extension, popula-
tion (Heleniak 1999: 156). Extensive northern devel-
opment, designed by Soviet economists according to 
the principles of centrally-planned economy in market 
economic conditions was no longer profitable without 
massive state subsidising. Following neoliberal agen-
da, new democratic government has taken the course 
on restructuring northern periphery through reduction 
in both the number of residents and budgetary expen-
ditures. Since 1995, national, regional and corporative 
resettlement projects have been introduced, the main 
idea of which was to optimise population size in the 
North and to create economically reasonable distribu-
tion of population (Federal Law N 78-FZ from 19 June 
1996). 
An economic rationale of relocation initiatives 
emphasises that because of geographical remoteness, 
long distances between settlements and harsh climate 
conditions, the expenses of living in the Russian North 
are much higher compared to the central and southern 
territories. This includes transportation expenses, the 
cost of supplies, costs associated with the cold such as 
use of cold-resistant materials and extra energy con-
sumption, plus social and human costs. It is asserted 
that each resident of the North costs the Russian state 
four times as much in subsidies as a ‘regular citizen’ 
living in European Russia (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 125). 
According to the World Bank calculations, the total 
federal and local government budgets and extra-budg-
etary funds allocated to support the northern popula-
tion have been accounted for 3 percent of GDP annu-
ally (The World Bank 2001). Thus, it was considered to 
be a cheaper option for the national budget in the new 
market situation to assist people in relocation than to 
maintain them in the North.
Advocates of resettlement projects point out an 
overpopulation of the Russian far northern territories 
of 14 to 30 percent compared to other northern latitude 
regions (The World Bank 2001, Pivovarov 2002, Hill 
& Gaddy 2003). According to the official estimation, 
the absolute overpopulation of the Far North at the be-
ginning of 1990s reached 14 percent, which includes: 
3 percent unemployed population of working age, 5 
percent pensioners and 6 percent people prescribed to 
resettle due to health problems (Government resolution 
N 700 from 10 July 1995). Most of the circumpolar 
cities were established during the Soviet times as result 
of a labour-intensive industrialisation project which 
required permanent pools of labour in the northern 
periphery. With the eradication of a centrally-planned 
economy, progress in technologies, and higher reliance 
on foreign markets, industries operating under north-
ern conditions met with the necessity to shift from 
labour-intensive methods to labour-saving technolo-
gies, as well as from full-term employment to part-time 
jobs or shift-labour. The restructuring of town-forming 
northern enterprises and general economic decline has 
resulted in early retirement and growing unemploy-
ment among northern residents. Consequently, it has 
increased the demand for housing, health services, 
pensions and social services. Along with lower local 
revenues, reduction in federal transfers and the higher 
cost for heat and energy due to price liberalisation, 
municipal budgets experienced a growing pressure. 
The proposed solution to alleviate the consequences of 
social and economic transition required shrinking the 
northern municipalities, closing economically-declin-
ing settlements as well as out-migration measures, tar-
geting socially vulnerable categories of the population: 
mainly unemployed, retired and disabled persons, who 
can not contribute to the economic life of the region 
but demand institutional care and social welfare (The 
World Bank 2001). Thus, by building or subsidising 
apartments in target areas in the South, the Russian 
state have intended manageable out-migration of non-
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productive population, reduction the number of north-
ern inhabitants and, as a result, solving the problem of 
surplus population in the northern periphery.  
The demographic reason for relocation stresses the 
ageing of the population living in the Russian North. 
The analysis of human development shows that with 
the general tendency of changing population size in 
the northern cities, there is fairly constant growth of 
elderly citizens. During the short period between 1989 
and 2001, the working population age 25-39 years de-
clined by 32 percent, while the pension-age population 
increased by 35 percent (Heleniak 2003: 338).
Very similar policy approach was developed in 
some northern regions, particularly focused on mecha-
nisms of relocation (Busalov 1998). Regional admin-
istrations have argued that resettlement positively ef-
fects on viability of northern municipalities in terms 
of long-term socio-economic consequences, such as 
lowering unemployment rate by relocation of econom-
ically passive population, positive impact on social-
microclimate in the northern settlements, improvement 
of criminal atmosphere in the northern towns, setting 
up regulations over migration processes and making 
them controllable, decrease in unemployment com-
pensations and retraining of specialists, etc. In general, 
advocates of depopulation of northern periphery have 
argued that administratively supported relocation is 
socially and economically reasonable. For example, 
municipal administration of Noyabrsk in YNAO cal-
culated that budgetary costs for maintaining 8,5 thou-
sand of surplus population in the town can be reduced 
by 1,066 milliard RUB (in the prices of 1997 year). At 
the same time, the total budgetary expenses for sup-
porting relocation of the same number of northerners, 
including financial assistance for settling down in the 
recipient region can be amounted 553,1 milliard RUB 
(Busalov 1998: 50).
Due to the liberalisation of prices and high infla-
tion in the 1990s, formerly established social guaran-
tees and northern benefits lost their attractive value 
and “pull in” effect for in-migration to the North. As 
a consequence, between 1989 and 2006, there was an 
out-migration of 17 percent of the population from the 
Russian Far North, or one in every six persons (Hele-
niak 2008: 30). However, not everyone wishing to 
move was able to leave. The economic crisis, money 
depreciation, bankruptcy of enterprises and unemploy-
ment deny a large number of citizens the opportunity to 
leave the North and to return to the main land at their 
own expense. A citizen of Vorkuta city says:
“They just closed the mines and there was no-
where to work. But you can not leave either, because 
there is no money at all. It turned out that we are 
here forever” (Holley 2004). 
In order to support the most vulnerable categories 
of northern population that have got stuck in the region 
due to reforms of transition, the Russian state elabo-
rated complex measures of administrative assistance 
aimed targeted encouragement of migration from the 
North. In state-leading discourse these measures have 
been considered as direct obligation of the state, its 
responsibility to help people in moving to the South 
since it was the state which brought them to the North 
in the first place.
Thus, the combination of economic, geographical 
and demographic forces mentioned above provides a 
basis for substantiating the implementation of resettle-
ment programmes. While underlining the importance 
of economic factors, social, psychological and cultural 
aspects have been poorly taken into consideration by 
policy-planners. However, at the individual level, these 
motives very often become a crucial element affecting 
people’s migratory behaviour and decisions to move or 
stay in the North. Our study reveals a complex picture 
of socio-cultural factors strongly influencing on suc-
cess of policy implementation and outcomes.
1.4 Resettlement programmes
Considering diversity of regional and corporate relo-
cation projects the research focus of this survey con-
centrates on federal initiatives - the resettlement pro-
gramme implemented under the Federal Law 125-FZ 
and the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project - 
and the local differences that have emerged in the proc-
ess of policy performance. 
Before describing northern relocation programmes, 
it is necessary to clarify that post-Soviet resettlement 
is not directly linked to migration policy, as it can be 
expected, but is carried out within the framework of 
the national housing policy. This structural feature can 
be explained by the importance of private housing in 
Russian culture and social sphere. Privately-owned 
housing in Russia is perceived by population as a 
symbol of well-being, stability and economic wealth. 
To a certain extend it ensures secured future of differ-
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ent generations of the household. Moreover, reserved 
dwelling is a significant factor in an individual’s deci-
sion to relocate (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999) as inter-
regional mobility in Russia as well as attachment to 
the place, among other factors, is conditioned by avail-
ability of private property. A survey conducted by the 
World Bank experts on motives for migration from the 
North which had been obtained through six hundred 
interviews in four recipient regions showed that fam-
ily reasons and solving the housing problem were the 
leading arguments (The World Bank 1998: 22). The 
analysis of reasons for choosing some particular region 
fully confirmed the return character of migration from 
the North to the places of previous residence as well 
as importance of social and family ties: 62 percent of 
respondents marked “my parents, relatives, friends live 
(lived) here, another 21 percent of respondents marked 
“I lived here in my childhood, before moving to the 
North” (The World Bank 1998: 23). On the other hand, 
respondents marked the important role of dwelling: 
16 percent of migrants have moved to the central and 
southern Russia because “dwelling was reserved here”, 
7 percent of the total “managed to obtain a free dwell-
ing” and 8 percent found housing relatively inexpen-
sive, so they “managed to buy it at a reasonable price”. 
Finding a job appeared to be an insignificant reason 
for moving to a particular place. Only 6 percent of mi-
grants chose resettlement on the basis of employment 
opportunities in the recipient regions. The relative lack 
of priority attached to finding a job can also be shown 
by the fact that more than 60 percent of all respondents 
first found a place to live and only then found a job 
(The World Bank 1998: 23-24).
During the Soviet era, both the government and 
state-founded enterprises were responsible for provi-
sion of dwelling to the citizens and workers. Centrally-
organized distribution of housing was accompanied by 
long queues of many years. As previously mentioned, 
inhabitants of the Far North were treated as a privileged 
group with better prospects of receiving a separate flat. 
Not least of all reasons, housing factor motivated peo-
ple to move to remote northern areas. Post-Soviet au-
thorities have continued to be involved in solving the 
problem of housing shortages and have taken over ob-
ligations in subsidizing dwellings for certain categories 
of citizens, including northerners. Therefore, reloca-
tion from the North in practical terms means receiving 
a grant from the government for purchasing a dwelling 
in the central or southern areas. 
The federal resettlement policy is regulated by 
the Federal Law 125-FZ “On housing subsidies for 
citizens’ migration from the Far North and equivalent 
regions”. It applies the same mechanisms to all far 
northern regions and the territories equivalent to the 
regions of the Far North. Our empirical research has 
shown, however, that success of policy implementa-
tion varies from territory to territory. Some regions, 
like the YNAO, have been very active in promoting re-
settlement and supported the federal relocation policy 
by allocating additional funds and initiating regional 
migration-assistance projects (Busalov 1998). In other 
regions, for instance in Murmansk oblast, resettlement 
of northern residents has not had primary importance 
and was realized to the degree defined by the central 
government. The second programme examined in this 
work – the World Bank Restructuring Pilot Project - 
started in 2002 in three arctic territories: the Susuman 
Municipality of the Magadan Region, Norilsk city and 
Vorkuta city and was abolished in 2009. 
The main difference between these two approaches 
is that the World Bank programme explicitly consid-
ered resettlement being part of broader restructuring 
processes. The World Bank project intended to liber-
alise the northern economic environment, restructure 
it according to the free market conditions and make it 
viable in terms of self-sufficiency and competitive ca-
pacity. It also purposed reviewing the northern pattern 
of social and demographic development and to assist 
the Russian government in re-approaching regional 
development and gradually deregulating the national 
economy (The World Bank 2001). Thus, the World 
Bank project aimed not only solving social-economic 
issues in the North, but also setting a broader agen-
da for northern development. In spite of differences 
in strategic objectives, there was a tendency towards 
convergence of policy mechanisms applied in both 
programmes: resettlement schemes developed under 
the World Bank pilot project framework were further 
adopted by federal relocation policies.  
In general, contemporary Russia is torn between 
different development paradigms and path dependen-
cies that at times stand in contradiction to one another. 
On one hand, there is the influential past with its all-
pervading state power and economic and human geog-
raphy inherited from the Soviet planning system. On 
the other hand, neoliberal ideas took root in Russia dur-
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ing the Yel’tsin period and continue to live on, while, 
in addition, contemporary Russia has returned to a 
more centralistic mode of governance that takes away 
autonomy from the regions and reasserts an authority 
over the remote territories of the country. This is espe-
cially true for the northern regions experiencing both 
socio-demographic transformation and economic tran-
sition. Neoliberal paradigm has been taken as a guiding 
principle for defining priorities of post-Soviet north-
ern development; the emphasis has placed on optimi-
sation of population size living in the Far North and 
equivalent regions by creating conditions for retaining 
qualified labour and out-migration of persons unable to 
work (Busalov 1998). The plan of northern restructur-
ing includes downsizing northern settlements, closing 
economically non-perspective communities, assisted 
outmigration schemes, cutting federal subsidising 
(The World Bank 2005a, 2005b). With that, there is a 
strong tendency within the Russian state of centralising 
competences and authorities as well as strengthening 
greater control over its entities from above (Young & 
Wilson 2007). A complex combination of state-induce-
ment and market-based development is analysed in the 
present study of relocation policies aimed to address 
‘overpopulation’ of the North and create economically 
viable settlements by means of state-sponsored pro-
grammes.
2 Theoretical perspectives on 
state-induced relocation
This study places the analysis of northern relocation 
policy in relation to three theoretical frameworks, no-
tably the anthropology of the state, the neoliberal para-
digm and migration theories, which describe complex 
relations between the state and the society, as caused 
by migratory movements and policies. The task of this 
section is to outline theoretical underpinning which 
allows our fieldwork findings to be comprehensively 
explained. By bringing together these three theoretical 
perspectives, we intend to create theoretical basis for 
understanding how resettlement in post-Soviet Russia 
has taken place at different levels, what impact it pro-
duces, and how the state’s attempts of regulating hu-
man settlement and mobility have been transformed in 
the process of implementation.
2.1 Anthropology of the state
The anthropology of the state studies every day prac-
tices of the state bureaucrats and their clients as well as 
public cultural representations and performances of the 
state through which the state comes into being (Sharma 
& Gupta 2006). One of the central questions it raises is 
how the state policies influences social processes and 
how society both explicitly and implicitly responds to 
the state’s measures. “The state itself can be imagined 
as reaching down into communities, intervening, in 
a “top down” manner, to manipulate or plan society” 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 983). “It has the capacity to 
influence social life to the extent that allows state man-
agers to develop the ‘infrastructural power’ of the state, 
which in turn infiltrates, controls, supervises, polices 
and regulates modern societies” (Hay, Lister & Marsh 
2006: 8). 
The purpose of state-induced development practic-
es is to rationalize and reorganize the social system so 
that it has to become more predictable and controllable 
(Scott 1998). Through introducing special programmes 
and regulations, the policy-makers intends to create a 
particular migratory behaviour, which would answer 
economic and geopolitical interests of the state at the 
particular historical moment. In the case of the Rus-
sian North, government policies gave rise to formation 
of two dominant migration trends. During the Soviet 
epoch the state moved people to the northern fron-
tier in order to exploit national mineral resources and 
strengthen its position in the region. In contrast, the 
post-Soviet movements were mainly towards southern 
direction, resulted from the state liberalisation reforms 
and various relocation programmes encouraging mo-
bility (Heleniak 1999).
In practice, however, population engineering 
schemes introduced by the state often do not achieve 
planned results. The social studies of migration poli-
cies emphasize the gap between institutional objectives 
and the actual policy outcomes (Cornelius et al. 1994). 
“This does not mean that state policies do not matter – 
they do influence migratory patterns in important ways 
– but often not in the ways policy-makers say that they 
intend” (Castells 2004: 205-206). 
Among the factors causing failure of government’s 
efforts in controlling human mobility two could be 
mentioned as particularly influential, such as: bureau-
cratic belief in rational planning of social processes 
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and economic belief in market behaviour based on 
neoclassical cost-benefit calculations. “Together these 
two beliefs add up to the idea that migration can be 
turned on and off like a tap by appropriate policy set-
tings” (Castells 2004: 208). Both these beliefs ignore 
the importance of informal practices, experiences and 
socio-cultural contexts which generate diversity and 
dynamics of the migratory process. “Formal schemes 
of order are untenable without some elements of the 
practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss” (Scott 
1998: 7). As in the case of Northern relocation projects, 
large-scale planning carries out in isolation from the 
grassroots processes and undervalues regional specifi-
city. Even though regions of the Russian North have 
similar characteristics, still they differ in history of 
populating and industrial development, geographical 
location, transport connections to the main land, eco-
nomic activity, etc. Thus, performance and relevance 
of resettlement programmes changes from region to re-
gion as well as their outcomes, which will be examined 
more closely in following chapters.  
Frequently, social modelling refers to abstract indi-
viduals generalised in their necessities and their actions 
and it does not take into account the skills and experi-
ence of ordinary people; moreover, it undermines an 
individual’s capacities (Scott 1998). This brings us to 
the second gap inherent in social engineering projects: 
the gap between policy objectives and people’s needs 
and desires (Shrestha 1987).
Another dimension of anthropology of the state 
analyzes state-society relations through governmental 
practices and focus on the principles of verticality and 
encompassment that provide a basis for establishing 
and legitimating the state’s authority over the regions 
(Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 982). On the one hand, the 
state is considered as an organisation “above” civil so-
ciety, community and family. In the top-down manner 
it aims to organize and regulate the social processes 
and relations between actors. From the other hand, the 
state is positioned within an ever-widening series of 
circles that begins with family and local community 
and ends with the system of nation-states. These two 
characteristics create an image of the state that has 
control over the localities and is structurally embedded 
into the everyday practices of communities (Ferguson 
&Gupta 2002: 982-3). 
The question is how the state reproduces itself at 
the grassroots level and through what procedures and 
mechanisms? Ferguson and Gupta show that vertical 
encompassment of the state is supported by routine 
bureaucratic practices, state representational mecha-
nisms, instruments of surveillance and regulations, 
and by cultural and symbolic devices that are rooted 
in local activities. “The state makes itself present with 
power structures that overarch its constituent entities. 
By doing so, they (the states) help to secure their le-
gitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent 
themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other 
institutions and centres of power” (Ferguson & Gupta 
2002: 982). 
Thus, the state itself produces spatial hierarchies 
which make it legitimate and authoritative, and with 
that, in the light of neoliberal principles and processes 
of globalisation, the state’s claims of verticality and 
encompassment are being challenged. First, the neo-
liberal regime insists on reviewing the role of the state, 
its traditional functions and the scale of interventions. 
Second, the nation-state is questioned by transnational 
governmental actors addressing local problems (Fergu-
son & Gupta 2002). Both tendencies can be observed in 
the case of Northern relocation analysed in this work.
2.2 Neoliberal perspective
Neoliberalism refers to the works of Friedrich von 
Hayek and the group of economists and philosophers 
which made a considerable contribution in promoting 
ideals of competitive market, deregulation and individ-
ualism in opposition to the state interventionist theo-
ries, namely Marxism and Keynesianism. Neoliberal 
perspective on development is based on pursuing eco-
nomic needs and objectives, rationalisation of human 
geography by building up social processes around eco-
nomic sector, measuring results of development prima-
rily by economic variables, reduction of the welfare 
spending, and re-examination of state functions. Mar-
ket competition, it is argued, best defines and serves 
the “public interest”, because individuals can best 
express their choices through the market; individual 
freedom and prosperity are maximized as funds are al-
located efficiently, people can purchase what they want 
at prices determined according to supply and demand, 
and wealth generated by private effort “trickles down” 
to the benefit of all (Hildyard 1998: 5).
Neoliberal rationale for relocation policies is 
brightly described in the book of Fiona Hill and Clif-
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ford Gaddy “The Siberian Curse: How Communist 
Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold.” As the authors 
point out, “for reasons of economic efficiency, Russia 
needs to shrink distances and grow warmer by having 
people move back to the western and southern regions 
of the Russian Federation and away from Siberia” 
(Hill & Gaddy 2003: 196). It argues that development 
of Russia should be aimed towards a competitive mar-
ket economy and sustainable growth, which cannot be 
achieved under the present economic and human geog-
raphy resulting from Soviet industrialisation projects. 
Because of previous non-market distribution of la-
bour and capital across Russian territory, post-Soviet 
Russian North and Far East have been experiencing a 
misallocation of people and production excluded from 
national and international markets. Therefore, follow-
ing Canadian experience, the Russian North should 
be considered predominantly as a resource base and 
should be developed towards resource extraction and 
not settlement (Hill & Gaddy 2003). Regarding the 
necessity of relocation from the Russian North, Fiona 
Hill mentions that “many who live in Siberia do not 
want to move at all, and leave behind families, friends 
and the places where they have grown up and worked” 
(Hill 2004: 329). The author does not explain the rea-
sons why those resisting resettlement reject relocation 
efforts. We believe, however, that response practices 
are an inherent part of policy implementation, there-
fore we seek to fulfil this gap in present survey.
Similar set of ideas were elaborated in Russian aca-
demic literature. Yuri Pivovarov develops the notion of 
the contraction of Russia’s economic oikoumene under 
the influence of market economy mechanisms (Pivo-
varov 1995, 2002). He criticises the northern strategy 
of urban development as designed by Soviet planners 
who did not take into account objective economic fac-
tors. The new economic environment of the 1990s re-
vealed the non-competitiveness of industrial produc-
tion, the overpopulation of circumpolar territories and 
the expense of northern life in general. To accomplish 
better efficiency, Pivovarov suggested concentrated 
economic development, which requires shifting the 
core of Russian regional development from newly 
industrialised regions to the central and southern ter-
ritories containing about 80 percent of the country’s 
economic capacity. The shift in regional development 
should be accompanied by relocation of both popula-
tion and production forces from the North-East to the 
South-West, and by further development of the old 
industrial urbanized territories of European Russia 
whose capacity is still not exhausted but should be bet-
ter used (Pivovarov 2002: 69). The author stands for a 
targeted elaborate development of comparatively few 
regions, east of the Ural Mountains that are rich in oil, 
gas, gold, diamonds and other resources of national 
importance. Instead of permanent northern settlements 
Pivovarov advocates utilisation of shift labour resourc-
es, working in the North on the fly in –fly out basis. 
Neoliberal approach towards northern development 
has been thoroughly criticised both by Russian (Mel-
nikova 2006, Voronov 2006) and Western academics 
(Lynch 2002). First, because of long distances and the 
climatic and geographical conditions conditioning eco-
nomic and social processes, a purely neoliberal model 
of development is unsuitable for the Russian North 
and Russia in general. “There are specifically Russian 
aspects of economic geography that tend to make the 
costs of production in Russia a multiple of what they 
are almost everywhere else in the world. Under these 
circumstances, the Russian state must play a central 
role in economic development” (Lynch 2002: 31). 
Second, opponents of neoliberalism question the 
idea of shrinking economic geography. It is argued that 
“contraction unavoidably means the expulsion of eco-
nomically developed territory from Russia’s economic 
space, and also the further polarisation of regions by 
level and conditions of life, and even greater contra-
dictions within regions; not only their disintegration, 
but also the emergence of antagonistic contradictions” 
(Bandman cit. in Melnikova 2006: 38). Pro-northern 
advocates promote an active state involvement in re-
gional policy, further development of social and pro-
duction infrastructures as well as improvement of life 
conditions for the northern population (Oleynik 2007, 
2008). They insist on overcoming the understanding of 
the North as a ‘resource base’, since its mineral wealth 
is naturally limited. Instead, the North should be fully 
integrated in the spiritual, cultural, military-strategic, 
industrial, social and financial space of Russia (Dugin 
2000). 
Third, depopulating the northern territories raises 
the question of sovereignty. In order to assert sover-
eignty and to prove its right to the territory and arctic 
resources, the Russian state has to claim the northern 
periphery as an integral part of the country populated 
by Russian citizens. For the same reason, during the 
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1950s the Canadian federal government forcibly relo-
cated Inuit people from northern Quebec to the high 
Arctic (Dussault & Erasmus 1994). It is argued, there-
fore, that Russia needs a populated Far North as an im-
portant condition for maintaining the region’s strategic 
geo-political position. Moreover, with the future pros-
pects of increasing North-South out-migration, nation-
al authorities should contemplate reiterated settlement 
of the northern areas (Dugin 2000).
2.3 Migration theories
Spatial mobility can take different forms, including 
all kinds of territorial movements, both temporary 
and permanent, and over various distances. This work 
concentrates on internal migration and resettlement in 
particular. The former term is defined in terms of “peo-
ple’s movement from one area of a country to another 
for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new 
residence” (International organisation for migration 
2004: 32). Migration always involves a change in per-
manent residence, caused by different combinations of 
push and pull factors influencing an individual’s and 
household’s decision to move, as well as by variety of 
personal reasons. 
Resettlement is commonly studied within the 
framework of international refugee law and policy as a 
mechanism for refugee protection (The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 2004). The empha-
sis is placed on involuntary nature of resettlement as 
consequence of development-inducing programmes 
(Cernea 2000), environmental or human-created dis-
aster event, ethnical conflicts, etc. In the context of 
northern policies, we define resettlement as movement 
of northern population to the South under the admin-
istrative programme of Russian government or the 
World Bank. The distinctive feature of resettlement 
from displacement is compensation for resources lost 
or left behind, assistance with housing and other serv-
ices provided in the new area by the state or company 
(de Wet 2009). In our case, federal authorities provide 
housing subsidies to long-term residents in exchange 
to their northern flats. Relocation from the Russian 
North under state policy has been stated as voluntary; 
people are not physically forced from one territory to 
another and they can choose whether they want to par-
ticipate in the relocation programme or not. The person 
or household individually decides to which destination 
he or she wishes to move – the main condition, how-
ever, was that the new place of residence should be lo-
cated outside the North. The post-Soviet Russian state 
has not displaced people forcibly, but has supported 
out-migration through financial incentives and migra-
tion assistance. Those who do not want to relocate but 
are induced into moving, however, may see the whole 
resettlement policy as involuntary. This is especially 
true for citizens living in economically-depressed com-
munities undergoing official abolishment. Russian au-
thorities do not give much choice to these people: they 
either agree to leave on the determined conditions or 
stay in the place without public services and support. 
This is what Bolotova and Stammler describe as state 
inducement (Bolotova & Stammler 2010). 
Since no single migration theory can explain all 
migration movements we selected particular aspects 
which seem to be of special importance and relevance 
to the present research: push and pull factors, length of 
residency, place-specific social capital, and migration 
networks. We also examine the centred explanations 
of migration, structuralist argument as well as institu-
tional dimension of migration processes and, specially, 
the role of the state in regulating and controlling migra-
tion flows.
From a theoretical point of view, the cost-benefit 
perspective on migration was elaborated in neoclas-
sical economics, which stresses economic variables 
causing and effecting migration processes, like income 
between the outgoing and incoming regions, though 
underestimates social-cultural factors (Sjaastad 1962, 
Todaro 1969). At the micro level, an individual decides 
to move because he or she believes that migration will 
increase his or her living standards (individual utility). 
Potential migrants reasonably estimate the expenses 
and benefits of moving and migrate to an alternative 
location where net returns are expected to be higher 
(Borjas 1990). Migration, in this paradigm, conceives 
as rational individual choice for income maximisation.
In contrast to this centred paradigm, the structural-
ist argument was developed under the influence of the 
Marxist political economy and focuses on the macro-
economic processes that produce socio-spatial inequal-
ities and constrain the life chances of individuals as 
members of specific social groups in particular places 
(Pilkington 1998: 13). This approach places the study 
of migration in the wider context of political, economic 
and social structures (Castells & Kosack 1985), and 
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an historical context encouraging or retarding human 
mobility. Migration is seen not as the aggregate con-
sequences of individuals exercising rational choice but 
as the result of and response to structural changes. An 
individual as migratory agent can not be completely 
rational in making a decision to migrate because he is 
preconditioned by objective factors that can not be in-
dividually controlled, for example in-migration control 
policy (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 83).
Third theoretical perspective, linking “structures” 
and “agencies”, emphasizes intermediary social phe-
nomena such as family, household, and social networks 
that support and drive migration. The ‘new economics 
of migration’ considers migration as a collective deci-
sion taken by families or households, not only to maxi-
mise expected income but also to minimise risks to the 
family’s well-being (Stark 1984, Taylor 1986). Thus, 
migration decisions are often made not by individuals 
but by families (Castells 2004). Pilkington & Fisakli 
(1999) argue that household strategies are central to 
the migration processes because they are not oriented 
towards one particular objective, but intend to provide 
stability and future prosperity for the whole family. 
Northern resettlement practices examined in this study 
have been developed by families and for the family’s 
own interests and practical needs. Participation in re-
location programmes, in many cases, has become a 
household strategy for improving life conditions of ex-
tended family rather than relocation itself.
The migration network theory states that the proc-
ess of migration and particularly adaptation to the new 
place of residence are facilitated when supported by 
the informal and formal migrant networks based on 
personal contacts as well as institutionalised commu-
nities representing northerners in the host regions, for 
example YNAO diaspora in St. Petersburg. “Migrant 
networks comprise a set of interpersonal ties that con-
nect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in 
origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, 
friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et 
al. 1993: 448). Network connections, in a way, consti-
tute a form of social capital that can be used to gain 
access to material such as housing, subsidies and non-
material resources like, for example, information (Tay-
lor 1986, Massey 1990). 
To conclude, in practice, “structure” and “agent” 
are deeply interconnected, and, because of that, migra-
tion can not be clearly defined, whether it is voluntary 
or forced (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999). For example, 
those who voluntarily migrated to the former Soviet 
Republics or to the Russian North under the Soviet 
development plan now perceive their resettlement as 
“duty to the country” and not as individual self-interest 
in economic and professional advancement. Therefore, 
it is important to apply qualitative social science re-
search that looks in depth into the complex motiva-
tions behind migratory decisions (Pilkington & Fisakli 
1999: 89). 
According to Ravenstein, migration is caused by a 
series of unfavourable conditions encouraging (push) 
an individual to leave one place and favourable factors 
attracting (pull) him to an external location. Explaining 
migration patterns, both within and between nations, 
Ravenstein stated that: the primary cause for migra-
tion was better economic opportunities; the volume of 
migration decreases as distance increases; migration 
occurs in stages instead of one long move; population 
movements are bilateral; and migration differentials 
such as gender, social class, and age influence a per-
son’s mobility (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). The theoreti-
cal framework of push and pull forces was further de-
veloped and considered more factors (Lee 1966, Bogue 
1969). Lee concludes that migration needs to be viewed 
within a framework of factors associated with area of 
origin, area of destination, intervening obstacles, and 
the migrants themselves (Lee 1966). He argued that 
variables such as distance, physical and political barri-
ers, and having dependents can impede or even prevent 
migration. Lee pointed out that the migration process 
is selective because differentials such as age, gender, 
and social class affect how people respond to push-pull 
factors, and these conditions also shape their ability to 
overcome intervening obstacles. Furthermore, person-
al factors such as education, knowledge of a potential 
receiver population, and family ties can force or retard 
migration.
Migration has a cumulative inertia (Gordon & Mol-
ho 1995) and “the probability of an individual staying 
in a particular place increases with increasing length of 
residence” (Speare 1970: 456). The latter is a crucial 
factor influencing migration decision in both cases of 
this study: the longer people live in the North, the less 
likely they are to leave. On the other hand, the more 
recently a person has arrived in the region, more like-
ly he or she is to move due to the lack of attachment 
to place and place-specific social capital (Heleniak 
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2009a). The latter summarises “the actual and poten-
tial resources embedded within, available through, and 
derived from the network of relationships possessed 
by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
1998: 243). “Place-specific social capital compiles the 
ties of friends, neighbors, family members, business 
connections, and familiarity with a place that a person 
develops by virtue of having been born in or having 
lived in a region for a longer period of time” (Heleniak 
2009a: 32). Recent literature emphasises how social 
capital invested in a place can act as both push and pull 
factors in migratory movements to and from the region 
(Heleniak 2009a, Bolotova & Stammler 2010).
The institutional approach on migration points out 
set of forces encouraging and channeling migration 
flows, such as, for instance, resettlement programmes 
and government restrictions in one’s ability to move 
freely or to choose the place of residence. The state can 
prohibit or reverse migration, redirect people’s move-
ments, encourage population influx as well as stimulate 
depopulation of certain regions. The government influ-
ences distribution of population through direct poli-
cies, explicitly designed to mold migration behavior, 
and indirect measures. Direct policies are those that 
prescribe residence and movement patterns. They in-
clude bans on urban immigration, travel restrictions, 
and resettlement programmes (Oberai 1983: 11). Indi-
rect practices do not focus on migration issues in the 
first place, but intend to influence on socio-economic 
conditions making one area more attractive for living 
and working than other. Thus, indirect actions bring 
far-reaching and continuous effects on human mobil-
ity, as they reach broader population groups. 
There is a question, debated in the literature, how 
necessary is state involvement in controlling migra-
tion? Advocates of government interventions stand for 
regulatory measures to control human mobility and to 
moderate consequences of migration. Akin Mabogunje 
reviews economic, environmental, social, administra-
tive and political arguments in order to indicate the im-
portance of state policies (Mabogunje 1981) to manage 
human mobility and settlement. He stresses out that 
regulation policy is essential for efficient use of physi-
cal, human and natural national resources as well as for 
protecting national economic and political interests. 
The economic argument of institutional approach 
stresses inequity between the regions in the distribu-
tion of income and welfare which have had an impact 
on the spatial misdistribution of population. Thus, the 
efficiency in the use of natural resources does argue 
for government intervention to reach desired popula-
tion redistribution and reduce spatial disparities. The 
administrative argument concerns state intervention in 
the growing costs of maintaining isolated, small, and 
depressed settlements. The pattern of population distri-
bution in many cases is “immature” in which there is 
a mismatch between the distribution of resources and 
population. Therefore, it is argued, government must 
induce movement of people to areas where their labour 
will be productive (Mabogunje 1981). This later posi-
tion is very much shared by the Russian policy-makers 
responsible for northern resettlement projects.
The opposite approach argues against institutional 
interference to influence territorial population dis-
tributions (Stohr 1981, Oberai 1983). First, because 
state planning violates basic human rights: it restricts 
the freedom of the individuals to move and to choose 
their own residential and working location. Second, it 
disturbs an automatic equilibrium mechanism which 
would otherwise balance the spatial distribution of 
population with economic opportunities. Third, it is of-
ten very costly and administratively difficult to imple-
ment relocation projects. Because of the complexity of 
the factors which govern population distribution, those 
projects often bring poor results. The strength of this 
later argument will be further demonstrated by the ex-
ample of state-induced resettlement policy in the Rus-
sian North.
To conclude, all the above mentioned theoretical 
ideas have influenced on our analytical view and the 
interpretation of the fieldwork material presented in the 
following chapters. Neoliberal rationale was taken as a 
starting point in reviewing both economic and human 
geography of the Russian northern periphery as well as 
a principal basis for designing resettlement policy. The 
guiding role in adapting neoliberal principles and es-
tablishing market-friendly regime in Russia have been 
in the hands of the global financial organisations such 
as the World Bank. The influence of the international 
actor over nation-state has had critical importance in 
ensuring pro-market policy environment favourable 
for the economic sector thought creating new restruc-
turing strategies. In case of northern development, it 
meant rethinking the policy of populating the high lati-
tude areas in particular. 
From the other side the northern relocation policy 
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is a classical example of state inducement, when the 
state has intended planning society through introduc-
ing special programmes. In order to understand the 
mechanisms of social engineering and complex rela-
tionship between the state and the citizens we apply 
the anthropology of the state as the second theoretical 
perspective. 
Analyzing Soviet and contemporary mobility pat-
terns we also touch upon migration theories explaining 
motives and principles of human movements from one 
place to the other such as, for example, push and pull 
law. The question which goes through the text as the 
red line is whether migration is an answer to structural 
imposing or a result of rational choice. By answering 
this question we purpose to contribute to the theoretical 
debate between agent-centrism and structuralism. 
3 Northern resettlement 
programmes: from design to 
implementation
Since the middle of the 1990s, different federal projects 
encouraging human mobility from the Russian North 
have been developed, namely: Own House; Building 
Houses in the Territory of the Russian Federation for 
the Citizens Moving out from the Far North Territories 
and Equivalent Regions; Housing; and the World Bank 
Northern Restructuring Pilot Project. As the names in-
dicate, relocation policies have been realised under the 
roof of housing programmes. Following the logic of 
Soviet social engineers, new democratic government 
has declared strategic necessity to control the proc-
esses of settlement and migration at the state level. 
Rational regulation of population flows out of the Far 
Northern regions and equivalent territories has been or-
ganized through construction or purchasing housing in 
the regions with congenial natural and social-economic 
life conditions. 
In parallel with the pushing out economically pas-
sive citizens, it has created special conditions aimed to 
attract skilled labor and working-age population to the 
North included higher salaries and northern benefits 
package. By means of economic incentives, Russian 
state not only assisted out-migration, but stimulated in-
migration to the area at the same time. The ‘pushing 
away’ and the ‘pulling in’ policies, therefore, are two 
complementary sides of one ‘population regulation ap-
proach’. 
This third chapter describes the principles of the re-
settlement programmes, details of design, implementa-
tion arrangements, instruments of programme govern-
ance, main implementation outcomes. In this chapter 
we introduce three implementation schemes encourag-
ing northerner’s resettlement, specifically housing con-
struction scheme, guarantee letter scheme and housing 
certificate scheme, through which participants of relo-
cation projects were receiving apartments in the South. 
It reviews the legislative basis for regulating resettle-
ment policies and provides fieldwork-based examples 
showing how citizens have responded to state-induced 
regulations.
3.1 General overview of resettlement pro-
grammes
On 25 October 2002, The Federal Law 125-FZ “On 
housing subsidies for citizens’ migration from the Far 
North and equivalent regions” was introduced. This 
law provides a legal framework for current northern 
relocation policies and defines the mechanisms for pol-
icy realisation. It applies the same relocation scheme to 
all far northern entities and the territories equivalent to 
the regions of the Far North. The Federal Law 125-FZ 
determines who is entitled to apply for migration as-
sistance, conditions for receiving federally-sponsored 
housing grant, the algorithm of calculating housing 
subsidies, and the principle of distribution of subsidies 
among beneficiaries. The principles of the Federal pro-
gramme will be discussed further in this chapter.
The different angle on northern demographic res-
caling is presented in the Northern Restructuring Pilot 
Project, financed from a loan extended by the World 
Bank and regulated by a number of government resolu-
tions. It aimed to improve self-sufficiency of municipal 
budgets and facilitate out-migration of socially vulner-
able groups. Every stage of the project implementation 
required approval by the federal government both in 
terms of funding and realisation mechanisms (Govern-
ment resolution N336 from 22 May 2002; Government 
resolution N306 from 22 June 2004; Government reso-
lution N772 from 31 December 2005). The project im-
plementation started in 2002 and generated structural 
changes in state approach towards relocation. Initially 
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it was designed for a four-year period, but, due to the 
slow rates of project implementation the programme 
was suspended for nearly two years and then was abol-
ished in 2009 (The World Bank 2010). 
Compared to the Federal Law 125-FZ, which en-
compasses all northern regions, the World Bank pro-
gramme covered three arctic territories – the Susuman 
Municipality of Magadan Region, Norilsk city and 
Vorkuta city (Fig. 3.1) – that represent the diversity of 
the economic and social environment of the Russian 
North.
All three sites were established as mono-industrial 
cities during Stalinist times as a result of forced move-
ment of GULAG workers. Previous presence of indig-
enous peoples on the land did not play a role in indus-
trial and urban growth. The economic development of 
Susuman was driven by the gold industry, Norilsk by 
nickel, and Vorkuta by coal. During the transition pe-
riod, all three cities struggled for survival and suffered 
significant industrial downscaling, which caused social 
tension, unemployment, economic vulnerability of 
population and a decline in living standards. The aim 
of the World Bank project has been similar in all three 
cases: assisting the out-migration of selected groups 
of the non-working population, as well as downsizing 
and transforming these cities into self-sufficient com-
mercial bases for industrial production (The World 
Bank 2001). Focusing on creating economically viable 
communities of working population in the remaining 
industry, it planned to resettle up to 6,000 people from 
the Susuman Municipality, 6,500 citizens from Vorkuta 
and 15,000 people from Norilsk. Instead of a perma-
nently settled population, the World Bank project sug-
gested a model of a commuting labour force moving 
between the North and more temperate regions (The 
World Bank 2001).
On the general level, the World Bank project’s 
development objective was to test a set of actions in 
assisting northern municipalities to cope with the ef-
fects of economic transition. These actions particularly 
include: voluntary out-migration assistance schemes 
for people whose economic perspectives are limited, 
and measures that will allow municipalities to realize 
potential economic benefits resulting from a decreased 
population (The World Bank 2001: 2). It was expected 
that the development patterns elaborated and tested by 
the World Bank programme will be extended to other 
northern communities in order to make them more 
viable. Viability, defined by the World Bank experts, 
primarily referrers to self-sustained economic devel-
Figure 3-1 Geographic dimension of the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project. Source: The 
World Bank 2010.
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opment reflecting stability in the economic productiv-
ity and average material wellbeing of the population. 
Viable communities, in this context, are those that are 
prosperous economically (The World Bank 2001).
In contrast to the federal programme which specifi-
cally and largely focuses on resettlement measures, the 
World Bank Pilot Project consisted of five interlinked 
components. First, the Migration Assistance Compo-
nent provided a one-off migration allowances issued 
through housing certificates. The out-migration sup-
port package for socially vulnerable groups included a) 
a housing subsidy for purchasing a dwelling in the cen-
tral regions of Russia, b) transportation of household 
belongings, c) reimbursement of travelling costs, and 
d) legal assistance and information about housing pos-
sibilities, regional specifics, job opportunities, and the 
healthcare system in the host region. Second, the Lo-
cal Restructuring Support Component aimed to econo-
mize and reorganise northern settlements in terms of 
changing municipal infrastructure. It applied technical 
measures based on institutional reforms in housing and 
utility services management and in the demolishing of 
dilapidated and abandoned housing stock as well as 
other facilities (The World Bank 2001: 7). Third, the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Component monitored the 
economic outcomes of restructuring, social aspects 
of out-migration and the evaluation and dissemina-
tion of project impact (The World Bank 2001: 7). It 
purposed to reflect on the project’s impact on northern 
municipalities, migrants, and socio-economic trends 
in general. The evaluation component, being partially 
integrated into the project at its development stage, 
was created to ensure mobility of information, greater 
interaction between the planning and implementation 
phases, as well as between the central office and the 
municipal ones. But as the World Bank administra-
tors interpreted empirical data through an economic 
lens, they ignored important factors standing beyond 
a cost-effective model and actually impacting migra-
tory decisions. Fourth, the Federal Component aimed 
advising the Russian government on legal, economic, 
fiscal and social aspects of northern reorganisation in 
order to further liberalize and deregulate the northern 
economy. Fifth, the Project Management Component 
financed and carried out the programme at both central 
and municipal levels. 
Thus, compared to the Federal Law 125-FZ, the 
World Bank Pilot Project applied complex strategic 
approach as it intended structural changes in socio-
economic environment of the northern territories and 
strengthening neoliberal principles of development.
3.2 Target population
The northern resettlement policy implemented under 
both projects has addressed to economically and so-
cially vulnerable categories those who can not move 
out of the North at their own expenses. According to 
the Federal Law 125-FZ, the right to receive non-re-
payable state housing support belongs to residents of 
the Far North and equivalent territories who moved to 
the region during the Soviet time, before the year 1992. 
The policy focuses on the most insecure social groups 
and defines five priority categories: 1) residents of 
closing communities; 2) disabled; 3) pensioners with 
northern working experience not less than 15 years; 4) 
the unemployed and 5) working population with long 
term northern residency. The law artificially establish-
es a ranking order that gives participants of the first 
group priority over the second one. The main criteria 
for receiving state financial support is willingness to 
relocate, northern residence status, a length of work in 
the North not less than 15 years, and objective need 
in improving housing conditions. In order to prevent 
people from participating in the programmes more 
than ones and creating withdrawing practices, the pro-
gramme restricts receiving migration allowances more 
than once.
On the other hand, the initial version of the World 
Bank project determined specific groups of beneficiar-
ies, including veterans of the second World War, politi-
cal victims, pensioners with 35 years northern work-
ing experience, residents of non-viable settlements6, 
former prisoners of labor camps, people with limited 
abilities, families with disabled children, single moth-
ers and large families with non-adult children (Govern-
ment resolution N 336 from 22 May 2002 Fig. 3-2). 
Describing first implementation phase the leader of the 
6 Non-viable communities in this context understood as settlements and towns experiencing economic decline due to bankruptcy 
of town-forming enterprise, resource depletion or similar events causing unemployment, out-migration and deterioration of 
physical infrastructure, social marginalisation and impoverishment. These communities also considered as non-perspective due 
to their low economic potential.
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Moscow Project Implementation Office commented:
As priority was given to the least mobile catego-
ries of population, the first and the second phase of 
project implementation did not bring planned re-
sults: people simply refused to move out. In order to 
increase population mobility, new criteria for par-
ticipation in the project were brought in. (The World 
Bank expert, Moscow, 19.12.2008)
Two years later, Government resolution N 306 
from 22 June 2004 extended the target group of the Pi-
lot Project to disabled, pensioners and citizens of non-
viable settlements located in the territories selected by 
the project. According to the statistical analysis of peo-
ple signed for participation in the programmes, both 
the federal migration assistance programme and the 
Northern Restructuring Project, the group most active 
in participation in relocation schemes was pensioners 
(The World Bank 2006a). It can be explained by the 
fact that people were coming to the North for work 
with the plan to return after retirement. Russian legis-
lation prescribes those who have worked in the North 
earlier retirement age compared to the rest of Russia: 
fifty years for women and fifty-five for men. It means 
that northern pensioners are still of working-age, mo-
bile and, theoretically, can continue labour activity in 
the region of relocation. 
In the Federal Law 125-FZ, northern pension-
ers hold the third position in the programme queue. 
In practice, this category of participants does not 
benefit financially because it is not prioritised by the 
programme. Pensioners are entitled to migration as-
sistance but the prospect of actually receiving such as-
sistance extends up to many years.
With the purpose to overcome this policy shortage, 
the World Bank Pilot Project has concentrated on pen-
sioners as a priority category. The World Bank quanti-
tative report shows that the most numerous category in 
absolute number of successful migrants, which com-
prises 7,300 participants, is that of pensioners (The 
World Bank 2006b: 5, 10-11). With that, distribution 
Figure 3-2 The official queue of citizens participating in the federal relocation programme in the town of Kovdor 
according to the priority categories, 2008. Source: MOVE INNOCOM project, Florian Stammler 2008.
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of programme participants according to the age criteria 
demonstrates broader prospects stemming from reloca-
tion for the people of mature age that are able to work. 
In all pilot territories, the ratio of successfully reset-
tled participants is higher among those of the age of 
forty and below. The percentage of citizens dropping 
out of the programme increases in the age group over 
sixty, and among participants older than seventy years, 
this ratio reached an relatively high level (The World 
Bank 2006b: 5). This fact can be explained by strong 
attachment to the place, reduced mobility of older pop-
ulation, little knowledge of the Russian legal system 
and real estate, fragile health, long length of residency 
and by other factors which influence migration deci-
sions. The later will be reviewed in greater details in 
the chapter four of this study and partly in the session 
describing implementation problems.
3.3 Implementation arrangements
According to different implementation procedures and 
financial mechanisms, we distinguish three phases 
in development of relocation policy: the first period 
(1992-2002), the second phase (1998-2002), and the 
last period (2002 until the present).
3.3.1 Housing construction scheme
The federal relocation policy started with the presi-
dential decree N 1122 from 23 September 1992 “On 
Measures for Increasing House-building in the Terri-
tory of the Russian Federation for Citizens’ Migration 
from the Far North and Equivalent Regions” Fig. 3-3. 
This decree called for initiation of a state programme 
aimed at building dwellings in central and southern re-
gions for northern resettlers on the principle of shared 
funding. It suggested mobilisation of federal funding, 
regional budgets, corporate social responsibilities and 
personal savings to provide the basis for people’s out-
migration.
As a result, the first relocation programme was 
launched in 1995 (Government resolution N 700 from 
10 July 1995). The responsibility of implementation 
and bringing the programme to the local level was del-
egated to the State Committee for the Development of 
the North (GOSKOMSEVER) which was disbanded 
in spring of 2000 due to the restructuring in Federal 
government. The GOSKOMSEVER controlled the 
construction process as well as the distribution of new-
ly-built dwellings among northern regions. The coordi-
nation of resettlement process at the regional level was 
given in the hands of the local administrations. 
The people who applied for participation in the re-
settlement programme were ranked according to the 
length of their northern work experience and arranged 
into a single queue. Before the year 2002, the mini-
mum length of work required was to be not less than 
10 years. Beneficiaries received a federal grant at the 
rate of 30 percent of commercial house price based on 
the social norm of the dwelling (18 m2 per person). The 
remaining 70 percent could be paid out of the regional 
budget, by city-forming enterprises and the beneficiary 
himself, in varying proportions. This financial mecha-
nism of partial subsidizing was formulated differently 
in different regions.  For example, in YNAO and the 
Kamchatka Region, the regional and federal budgets 
financed resettlement on proportionally equal terms of 
30 percent. The leftover 40 percent of the total sum 
was paid by the programme participants themselves. 
In contrast, the administration of the Murmansk oblast 
implemented a policy based on federal transfers with-
out its own budgetary involvement. Thus, funding of 
resettlement was determined at the cost of residents (70 
percent) and federal allocations (30 percent). 
According to the programme, northern residents 
would receive housing subsidies in addition to their 
northern apartment. Since the federal subsidy did not 
cover the full price of the flat but one-third only, resi-
dents had the right to keep their northern house. The 
mechanism of partial subsidizing was designed to stim-
ulate out-migration and to support those lacking the fi-
nancial ability to move. In practice, many used this as-
sistance for getting apartments in the South rather than 
resettling. They were using federal money for buying 
second dwelling in the “main land” while continuing 
living in the North. This was taken into consideration 
in further developments of the relocation policy.
The housing construction scheme purposed provid-
ing newly-built flats to northern citizens in target areas. 
Very often, residents of one region received apartments 
in the same building. Thus, being members of a com-
munity in the North, they became neighbours in the 
South. Experts in the regional administration repeat-
edly underlined that this collective way of resettlement 
helped people to adjust to new conditions and to de-
velop social capital built on similar experiences and a 
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common past. With that, programme participants could 
not freely choose the place of future residence because 
their migration choice was limited by the regions 
where houses were built. 
In order to illustrate how this scheme was work-
ing in practice let us refer to a fictional case descrip-
tion based on the fieldwork material. Let us imagine a 
family of pensioners Petrovy from the northern town 
of Apatiti who decided moving to Kamishyn located 
in Volgograd Region, because of the warmer climate 
conditions, possibility to have a garden and, most im-
portantly, their children living in the area. They went to 
a consultation at the Apatiti Implementation Unit and 
found out that the closest city which was targeted in 
the relocation programme is Saratov. After discussions 
and advising with the family members in the South, 
Petrovy decided to step in the federal programme and 
Figure 3-3 Resettlement procedure under the housing construction scheme.
started to collect money. As the resettlement project 
was not additionally sponsored neither by regional 
administration nor by town-forming enterprise, Petro-
vy, in addition to the family’s savings, sold their car, 
parking garage and summer cottage to be able to pay 
70 percent of the flat’s price in Saratov. The other 30 
percent of the flat’s price were covered by the federal 
government funds. Three years passed and Petrovy 
received confirmation that their new flat in the South 
was completed, so they can resettle as soon as the of-
ficial papers are ready. But during these three years the 
granddaughter of Petrovy, Olga, became married and 
derived a child. As many other families in Russia Olga 
and her young family are living in the same two-rooms 
flat with the parents in Kamishyn. Therefore, when the 
housing in Saratov was finally built and officially reg-
istered, Petrovy agreed to transfer the ownership of this 
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apartment to Olga, so her family can live separate from 
the parents, while the pensioners Petrovy continued to 
live in the North and visit their relatives ones a year in 
the summer. 
This example shows how participation in relocation 
project became a strategy of extended family Petrovy, 
included four generations, according to the needs and 
priorities of the whole household. Instead of resettle-
ment, Petrovy were using the programme for solving 
housing problem and improving living conditions of 
Olga and her new family.
3.3.2 Guarantee letter scheme
The programme supporting housing construction for 
the northern migrants was in force until 2002. In paral-
lel, a new resettlement law appeared in 1998. The Fed-
eral Law 131-FZ “On Housing Subsidies for Citizens’ 
Migration from the Far North and Equivalent Regions” 
(Federal Law 131-FZ from 25 July 1998) was designed 
to provide migration assistance to economically vul-
nerable categories of the population. The rate of federal 
subsidy under this new framework depended on several 
conditions: a) length of work which also means length 
of residence in the Russian North, b) number of family 
members, c) social norm of housing determined by the 
state at the rate of 33 m2 for a single person, 42 m2 for 
a family of two, and 18 m2 for each family member in 
a family of three or more d) and the cost of housing in 
the region of destination according to the estimations 
of the state. Citizens who worked and/or lived in the 
North between fifteen and twenty years would receive 
state assistance amounting to 80 percent of the total 
value of housing in the recipient area (Table 3-1). 100 
percent subsidy would be awarded to residents of non-
viable communities in the process of closing, or those 
who had worked and/or lived in the region for more 
than thirty-five years.
According to the Federal Law 131-FZ, the estima-
tion of housing subsidy, was based on the normative 
price as defined by the Ministry of Regional Develop-
ment every quarter of a year for each region. There-
fore, housing assistance for northerners was calculated 
according to the state price, which is almost two times 
lower than market value. As in the market, different 
regions have different normative housing prices, cor-
rected every semester by a special state agency. The 
prices are higher in the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg 
and regional centres. Therefore, those applying for 
resettlement to Moscow or St. Petersburg received a 
greater housing subsidy then those applying to relocate 
in towns in rural areas.
Compared to the previous resettlement scheme, 
the grant receivers were free in choosing a region and 
preferred housing. In return for the state subsidy, they 
were obliged to transfer their northern dwelling into 
municipal ownership, in a way, exchange a flat in the 
North for an apartment in the South. Resettlement sub-
sidy was provided in the form of a non-cash payment 
directly transferred to the salesperson or real estate 
agency responsible for drawing up a documents. The 
basis for the money transfer was a purchase contract 
between the beneficiary and the owner of the apart-
ment in the South or the real estate agency. To ensure 
that the northern migrant had financial solvency, the 
local administration provided a guarantee letter for a 
period of three months containing personal data as well 
as information about available funding. The regional 
administration was, in a certain sense, a guarantor to 
the purchase transaction as well as a controlling agen-
cy. The Federal Law 131-FZ assigned decisive power 
to regional administrations and local implementation 
offices, so they could arrange programme participants 
according to the region’s needs and priorities, and reg-
ulate different aspects of the resettlement procedure. 
As in the first scheme, we would like to give a fic-
tional case example helping in understanding how the 
relocation process was organized in practice. This time 
we talk about Andrey and Svetlana Ivanovy and their 
two children staying in one-room flat in an industri-
al northern town. Ivanovy moved to the North from 
the village of Znamenka in Tambov oblast under the 
Table 3-1 Rate of state housing subsidy depending on length of work (length of residence). Source: The Federal 
Law 131-FZ from 25 July 1998.
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Soviet distribution system of institute graduates; they 
were living and working in the North for the last eight-
een years in mining until the company was shut down. 
Andrey and Svetlana have heard from their neighbours 
Sidorovy who moved to the South last year about state 
relocation project. While finding details about the pro-
gramme and preparing all required document, Ivanovy 
visited a real estate agency for a consultation. It provid-
ed them with preliminary information about real estate 
sector in Znamenka as well as market housing prices. 
Based on the terms and conditions of the relocation 
programme and taken into account Ivanovy’s length of 
work in the North, a need in improving living condi-
tions as well as a size of the family, the officer in the 
local administration calculated the amount of housing 
53,373 USD and went to Znamenka in order to look for 
a suitable apartment. After several days of searching 
they finally found a wooden three-bedroom house and 
a small garden with flowering apple and cherry trees. 
Even though the market price of this house was higher 
than the value of the subsidy Ivanovy decided to buy it, 
because it gave them a good feeling of being at home 
and also because they had some money saved during 
their work in the North. 
Ivanovy and the owner of the house Petr concluded 
a purchase contract according to the requirements of 
relocation programme and guided by the administra-
tive stuff of northern implementation office. The con-
tract specified delivery of payment in two steps. The 
first part of the payment was provided from the per-
subsidy in the way explained in Figure 3-4.
Thus, the federal housing assistance for the family 
of Ivanovy in total amounted 1,630,800 RUB or about 
53,373 USD. According to the Federal Law 131-FZ 
Ivanovy were registered in the fourth category of pro-
gramme participants i.e. non-working population. By 
using social contacts and the influence of their family 
member working in the local implementation office, 
Ivanovy managed to jump the queue and move in front 
of citizens who have been applying before Ivanovy and 
waiting for the government subsidy already for several 
years. 
In the spring of the next year Andrey and Svet-
lana were officially informed about receiving hous-
ing subsidy. Following advises and recommendations 
of Sidorovy which also relocated to Tambov Region, 
Ivanovy received an official letter from the regional 
administration guaranteed a subsidy at the amount of 
sonal savings of Ivanovy. After all the official details 
clarifying transfer of the ownership were solved, Petr 
received the second part of payment transferred by 
the northern municipal administration within the fol-
lowing ten days. This second part of the payment was 
initially funded by the federal housing subsidy in the 
prescribed amount. 
The whole summer Ivanovy spent in Znamenka, 
working in the garden and renovating the house. In 
September they came back to the North in order to 
pack belongings and to transfer their ownership right 
of northern flat to the municipal property, as it was de-
fined by the rules of relocation programme. 
3.3.3 Housing certificate scheme
The previous implementation mechanism was replaced 
by the housing certificate scheme, which was applied 
Figure 3-4 Amount of housing subsidy
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in both the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World Bank 
northern project in 2002. According to the definition 
given in the Article 4 of the Federal Law 125-FZ, the 
state housing certificate is a nominal document, con-
firming the citizen’s right to receive a housing subsidy, 
which can be used only for purchasing or building a 
house (Federal Law 125-FZ from 25 October 2002). 
In exchange for a northern flat, participants of reset-
tlement programmes receive a housing subsidy for 
purchasing apartment in the South. As in the guaran-
tee letter scheme, the certificate provides participants 
the opportunity to choose preferred housing and the 
destination of in-migration without previously applied 
restrictions (Fig. 3-5). 
In contrast to previously tested relocation mecha-
nisms, this new scheme develops a system of federal 
control over financial flows and turnover of documen-
tation. The state subsidy is transferred directly to the 
Figure 3-5 Resettlement procedure under the guarantee letter scheme
grant receiver in the form of a non-cash registered 
official document. Since all financial operations are 
managed and controlled by the Sberbank, it suppos-
edly shrinks room for corruptive behaviour among 
officials involved in the implementation process. Es-
tablished procedures for these payments allow neither 
programme officers nor programme participants to use 
allocated subsidies for purposes other than specified. 
Nevertheless, field research shows that beneficiaries 
find different ways to cash certificates and to invest 
available money into something different than reloca-
tion. 
Another difference between the second and the third 
schemes refers to the length of validity. Compared to 
short duration of guarantee letter, the period of housing 
certificate’s validity has increased to nine months that 
gave resettlers more time in choosing apartment and 
preparing the documents. 
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The main critique of two previously implemented 
relocation schemes mentions the issue of transpar-
ency and bureaucratic complexity. Contrastingly, the 
resettlement procedure built upon housing certificate 
applies direct mechanisms for provision of migration 
assistance and builds upon three pillars: state, bank, 
and beneficiary (Fig. 3-6). Through reducing involve-
ment of regional and local administrative officials in 
the resettlement process and putting more responsibili-
ties on individuals and households, the state transforms 
policy and creates vertical links between the federal 
level and the individual level. The role of the regional 
implementation office has been narrowed down to a 
“secretarial duties” meaning collecting required papers 
and documents from the participants, sending them to 
the main office in Moscow, and delivering participants 
housing certificates. The function of local offices under 
the Federal Law 125-FZ is only in taking over apart-
ments from resettled citizens. Compared to previous 
relocation programmes the new scheme leaves very 
limited space for regional interference. 
The housing certificate scheme is not a new instru-
ment of state social subsidizing. It was previously ap-
plied under the government-financed programme for 
retired military officers and victims of the Chernobyl 
disaster. The average rate of housing subsidy under the 
World Bank Pilot Project totals 2,485 USD per person 
against 7,270 USD per person under the federal pro-
gramme (The World Bank 2006: 11).
According to the Federal Law 125-FZ, calculation 
of the housing certificate has been based on the same 
principles described in the previous section and the 
normative prices as defined by the Russian state. Hous-
ing certificates under the World Bank project were 
composed of the total amount of basic social transfers 
paid to each member of the household participating in 
the resettlement project, multiplied by a special social 
coefficient. From 2002 till 2006, the basic individual 
payment amounted to 2,400 USD for Vorkuta and No-
rilsk and 2,180 USD for settlements of the Susuman 
Municipality; in 2008 it was increased to 7,200 USD 
for all three territories. Government resolution N772 
from 22 October 2008 defined different rates of multi-
plication (so called social coefficients) according to the 
size of the family applying for resettlement: single per-
son – 1.9; family of two people – 1.2; family of three 
and more people – 1. The certificate provided under 
the World Bank project could be also used for cover-
ing transportation expenses. In this case, the housing 
subsidy would be decreasing by the amount of ship-
Figure 3-6 Resettlement procedure under the housing certificate scheme
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ping costs.
To conclude, before 2009 the Russian state took 
leading role in organising out-migration, which made 
relocation less bureaucratically complicated for peo-
ple. It faced, nevertheless, complaints related to or-
ganisational problems: in many cases, flats were not 
finished on time, federal subsidies were spent ineffi-
ciently, and local officials exceeded their authorities. 
The new scheme, implemented since 2002, assigned 
participants more responsibilities, including self-
searching for apartments in host region, drawing up 
documents, shipping household belongings, official 
registration in the new place of living, etc. For invalids 
and older pensioners – target groups of the programme 
– participation in the programme became more chal-
lenging because they had to deal with the issues related 
to relocation by themselves. In comparing the previous 
and current approaches, we see that the resettlement 
policy developed from collective resettlement schemes 
in a more “individualistic” direction. The role of the 
state has been reduced to providing housing certifi-
cates, and the duties of applicants have been consider-
ably extended.
3.4 Programme governance
The administrative organisation of the state resettle-
ment programme is based on a vertical mode of gov-
ernance (Fig. 3-7). There is a central implementation 
unit, founded under the roof of the Ministry of Re-
gional Development, as well as regional and municipal 
branches, usually working within the housing com-
mittees of local administrations. The programme is fi-
nanced directly from the federal budgetary funds, and 
then subsidies are allocated to regions and beneficiar-
ies according to the number of applications and funds 
available. The size of the programme’s resources is de-
fined by the Ministry of Economy on an annual basis. 
As it was mentioned, before 2002 northern im-
plementation offices had greater administrative func-
tions and regulatory capacities. Operating within the 
legal framework provided by the federal government, 
regions still had the power to decide on how the pro-
gramme should be realised and what the priorities ac-
cording to the local specifics were. The northern region 
was eligible to modify the normative base that regu-
lated the implementation process in its territory. This 
system of governance, however, was criticised for its 
massive administrative apparatus, lack of transparency, 
corruptive behaviour of officials, return migration and 
high level of mistrust in officials and migration pro-
grammes in general. In 2002, the resettlement policy 
adapted a new scheme that made the implementation 
process more centralised and direct. Regional and mu-
nicipal units became, in a sense, a “technical hand” of 
the federal implementation unit and got deprived of 
their decision making power. The duties of local offices 
were narrowed to consulting citizens about their reset-
tlement opportunities, registering participants, making 
personal files, sending documents to the central bureau 
in Moscow, and ensuring that all procedures were car-
ried out legally.
In comparison, operation of the World Bank project 
has been coordinated by an Inter-Ministerial Working 
Group, including the Ministries of Economic Devel-
opment and Trade, Finance, Labour and Social Devel-
opment; the Government Apparatus; and the Federal 
Centre for Project Finance (The World Bank 2001: 
10) (Fig. 3-8). Since the project addressed multidi-
mensional problems, such as economic and municipal 
restructuring, human mobility, and the social costs of 
transition, it applied principles of interdisciplinary co-
operation at both the federal and municipal level. At 
the municipal level, the project combined interested 
parties who were important for programme imple-
mentation: representatives of local administrations, 
local legislators, major employers, major labour units 
and representatives from the settlements to be closed. 
“The policy changes and restructuring elements of 
Figure 3-7 Administrative structure of the Federal Re-
settlement Programme.
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the project required the support of these stakeholders 
in order for the changes to be successful. Therefore, 
Coordination/Supervisory Councils were established 
on each side” (The World Bank 2001: 10). The main 
function of these units was to have control over project 
realisation and provide general management at the lo-
cal level. 
The technical implementation function at the fed-
eral level belonged to the Project Implementation Unit, 
which reported to the Inter-Ministerial Working Group. 
It also carried out financial management of project 
funds, monitoring and evaluation. Each municipality 
have been participating in the project had its Local 
Project Implementation Unit that was responsible for 
project’s management.
3.5 Policy outcomes
According to the Ministry of Regional Development, 
as of 01 January 2008, there were 530,784 people (or 
215,500 families) in total who had applied for the gov-
ernment house subsidy (Table 3-2). Statistically, this 
means that more than half of the one million northern-
ers wishing to leave the North but they cannot do so 
without financial support from the state. But resettle-
ment programmes do not distinguish between those 
who want to leave and those who want money to im-
prove their material situation.
The relevance of resettlement is not changing and 
the queue is not shortening significantly whether be-
cause demand on relocation is still high in the North or, 
it could also be that more and more people perceive the 
programmes as additional source of revenue. For the 
period 2005 - 2008, the line of people willing to leave 
the North decreased  by 15 percent, from 2006 to 2007 
it decreased by 6.4 percent and from 2007 to 2008 it 
decreased by one percent only (Committee for Prob-
lems of the North and the Far East 2008: 3). In actual 
numbers, this is a decrease from 677,075 people on the 
waiting list in 2005 (or 250,311 families) to 530,784 
in 2008 (215,472 families). Distribution of programme 
participants according to the five priority categories is 
presented in Table 3-2. 
As previously mentioned, The Federal Law N 125-
FZ is carried out under the broader national project 
“Housing”. During the first period (2002-2005) of its 
implementation, 7,100 housing certificates were allo-
cated to northern migrants. In financial figures this is 
about 3,400,000,000 RUB or 112,663,911 USD (Com-
mittee on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 
2008: 3). In 2006, according to the Ministry of Region-
al Development, there were 1,300 federal housing cer-
tificates distributed (Committee on the Northern and 
the Far Eastern problems 2008: 3). The total amount 
of housing subsidies allocated for resettlement dur-
ing the period 2002-2006 reached 6 percent from the 
required amount (Committee on the Northern and the 
Far Eastern problems 2008: 1). The Federal Law N 198 
from 24 July 2007 “On the federal budget for 2008 and 
planning period 2009-2010” specifies 2,4653,30 mil. 
RUB which is equal to 22,000 housing certificates to 
be allocated during the period 2008-2010 (Committee 
on the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 2).
Statistical information provided by the Project Im-
plementation Unit shows that during three waves of 
the World Bank project relocation, more than 3,200 
households (or 7,300 people) were resettled, including 
3,700 residents of Vorkuta city, 888 residents of No-
rilsk and 2,700 people in the Susuman Municipality of 
Magadan oblast (The World Bank 2006a: 10-11). The 
programme expenses on housing subsidies amounted 
to 18,200,000 USD, which is 21.1 percent of the total 
loan. With that, federal budget spending on relocating 
the same quantity of citizens under The Federal Law 
N125 exceeded the costs of the World Bank project by 
three times and amounted to 48,000,000 – 53,200,000 
Figure 3-8 Administrative structure of the World Bank Northern Restructuring Project.
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USD (The World Bank 2006: 11). Considering that the 
amount of a housing subsidy under the Pilot Project 
was on average about 40 percent of the amount of a 
housing subsidy under The Federal Law N 125-FZ 
(The World Bank 2006a: 6), reduction in state expendi-
ture on relocation policy in comparison with estimated 
expenses under The Federal Law N125-FZ amounted 
to about 30,000,000 - 35,000,000 USD (The World 
Bank 2006a: 11). The most popular regions accommo-
dating northern resettlers under the World Bank project 
included the Belgorod Region (9.3 percent of total),7 
the Krasnodar territory (6 percent), the Kirov Region 
(5.5 percent), the Rostov Region (4.6 percent), the Tula 
Region (4.5 percent), the Vladimir Region (4 percent), 
the Nizhny Novgorod Region (3.9 percent), the Voron-
ezh Region (3.4 percent) and the Ivanovo Region (3.3 
percent) (The World Bank 2006a: 14).
As a consequence of the World Bank out-migration 
assistance, municipalities of the territories participat-
ing in the programme obtained 2,023 housing objects 
with a total area of 93,040 m2 at the cost of 13,480,000 
USD (The World Bank 2006: 11). As in the case of 
the state resettlement programme, after receiving the 
housing grant, the beneficiary was obliged to transfer 
the ownership of the apartment in which he lives in 
the North to the municipal property. Available housing 
could be used for solving different social problems in a 
municipality, for instance, providing these apartments 
for citizens living in poor or dangerous housing condi-
tions. The leader of the Project Implementation Unit in 
Moscow concludes:
Realizing the relocation policy caused a syner-
gistic effect which was not considered nor initially 
planned for in the project. First, municipalities re-
ceived additional available dwellings for relocat-
ing people living in dilapidated houses and closing 
satellite-communities. Second, due to reducing ex-
penses on infrastructure, housing and utilities which 
Table 3-2 Number of citizens registered for receiving federal housing subsidies in all regions of the Russian Fed-
eration as of 01 January 2008. Source: The State Duma Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern Problems, 
2008.
7 The destination of Belgorod is preferred by those who moved to the North from the Ukraine. Since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union when the Ukraine became a separate country, they either can not or do not want to go back, so people resettle close 
to the Russian-Ukraine border, but still remain on the Russian side.
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were emptied and demolished, and by concentrating 
the budget on sustaining existing infrastructure, mu-
nicipalities save their resources. (The World Bank 
expert, Moscow, 19.12.2008)
The Northern Restructuring Project was “oriented 
towards social groups who are not on top priority lists 
for granting assistance under state resettlement pro-
grammes, but who are prepared to receive a smaller 
amount of aid without a lengthy waiting period” (The 
World Bank 2006: 13). Relocation under the Pilot 
Project, from the submission of an application to actu-
ally purchasing an apartment in a southern region, has 
taken 11 months. In comparison, the average waiting 
time under the state programme is about 10-15 years 
(The World Bank 2006a: 14). The World Bank experts 
have argued that because of the smaller amount of mi-
gration assistance, the project could encourage people 
towards the low-cost housing market in regional cen-
tres and rural localities. It could also stimulate coop-
eration between migrants, municipal administration 
and the regional employers who co-finance northern 
resettlement. In actual practice, however, it has led to 
rejection of resettlement since the market housing did 
not correlate with the provided subsidy.
When we were interviewing the World Bank ex-
pert, representing the Pilot Project implementation 
unit, in December 2008 he revealed that the World 
Bank project had been extended: 
The Ministry of Economic Development and the 
Ministry of Finance proposed further realisation 
of the social restructuring project and its extension 
to a number of new territories. In the year 2008, 
ten northern entities applied for inclusion into the 
project. It was decided to accept one municipality 
from each applicant region, so that five or six com-
munities can participate in one implementation peri-
od. The exact list of municipalities will be composed 
by the Ministry of Regional Development by agree-
ment with the Ministry of Finance. (The World Bank 
expert, Moscow, 19.12.2008) 
The expansion of the pilot experience was sup-
ported by the northern regions and approved by Gov-
ernment Resolution N772 from 22 October 2008. Soon 
after, however, the World Bank Northern Restructuring 
Project was closed down. Designed as a pilot project, 
it aimed to test relocation mechanism based on hous-
ing certificate scheme. This purpose of the project was 
accomplished. It stimulated an elaboration of new ap-
proach towards spatial allocation of people, which was 
further taken by the federal relocation policies.
To conclude, before 2002, resettlement from the 
Russian North was taken in the form of collective 
targeted relocation. The state provided northern reset-
tlers newly-built apartments in selected regions in the 
South. By this means, the state tried to influence the 
direction of out-migration and population distribution, 
making it easier to control. After 2002, market mecha-
nisms regulating people’s mobility were introduced. It 
significantly shifted federal policy towards individual 
resettlement. People received freedom in choosing 
housing and a region of residence, as well as greater 
responsibilities related to proceeding documents, pur-
chasing a dwelling, transferring their northern apart-
ment to municipality administration, and actually mov-
ing to the South. 
Our analysis reveals an important role of the World 
Bank experts in changing the principles and direction 
of resettlement policy. Being involved in the imple-
mentation and evaluation of the World Bank Northern 
Restructuring Project, they also participated in rede-
signing federal relocation policy (Federal Law 125-FZ 
from 25 October 2002) and expanding the neo-liberal 
perspective on reorganisation of the North. As a conse-
quence, the housing certificate scheme became a prin-
cipal resettlement mechanism in both programmes. 
We argue that the World Bank Pilot Project has be-
come a transnational governmental actor and addressed 
local problems by creating ‘vertical encompassment’, 
similar to the ‘vertical encompassment’ produced by 
the nation state (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). It does not 
necessarily mean that the World Bank as a transnation-
al agency built its hierarchy ‘above’ the nation state; 
rather it operated ‘within’ the Russian power structure. 
In the same way as the national state, it has created a 
network of agencies (implementation offices) operat-
ing at different levels, both federal and local, and has 
formed spatial and scalar hierarchies, theoretically de-
scribed by Ferguson and Gupta. By incorporating itself 
into the existent regime and inventing certain policy 
mechanisms, the World Bank influenced federal reset-
tlement policy and gradually redirected it to a desired 
direction. Thus, the World Bank provided a loan, but 
with this financial support it also has instituted meth-
ods, techniques of northern socio-economic and popu-
lation administrative development based on neoliberal 
principles.
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4 Implementation problems
In attempt to describe main implementation challeng-
es, this chapter particularly discusses the issues related 
to programme underfunding, unequal distribution of 
programme budget between northern regions, imper-
fections of programme design due to underestimated 
diversity of local conditions, people’s responses to the 
programme. It seeks to find out what causes implemen-
tation problems and what the local responses are.
4.1 Programme underfunding
The main challenge slowing down out-migration from 
the North which was commonly mentioned in the in-
terviews as well as government’s reports on relocation 
Table 4-1 Subsidies for resettlement policy under the Federal Law 125-FZ, 1998-2010. * In 2001 allocated subsi-
dies were transferred to the disaster clean-up operations in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). ** Incomplete data, 
because not all regions provided information to the Ministry of Economic Development. Source: The State Duma 
Committee on the Northern and Far Eastern problems, 2008
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policy implementation is continued under-financing. 
According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of 
Regional Development, during the period 2002-2004, 
the programme budget totalled only 3.9 percent of the 
required amount for the same period of time. It means 
that only 1.3 percent of people applied for the state as-
sistance and being registered in the programme waiting 
list actually received relocation certificates.
During the last several years there has been a yearly 
decrease of programme resources allocated. In 1998 
it was 1,200,000,000 RUB or 39,685,534 USD (Ta-
ble 4-1). In 2000 the programme budget changed to 
850,000 000 RUB or 28,108,889 USD (Committee on 
the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 11). 
Alongside with that, housing prices did not stay at the 
same rate. For example, between the fourth quarter of 
2005 and the second quarter of 2006, the average house 
price grew by 17 percent, from 11,650 RUB per m2 to 
13,600 RUB per m2 (Committee on the Northern and 
the Far Eastern problems, 2007: 4). The reductions in 
allocations, as may be supposed, reflect decreased in-
terest of central authorities in northern resettlement as 
well as lowered relevance of relocation problem for the 
Russian northern periphery.
In 2006, the issue of relocation re-established its 
importance for Moscow politicians, which directly 
resulted in a more than two-fold increase in the pro-
gramme budget. As can be seen from Table 4-1, the 
Russian state has ambitious plans to push resettlement 
further. However, the budget increase did not bring sig-
nificant changes in programme realisation. The ques-
tion is: why, with the generally increased funding in 
2006, were only half of the subsidies spent? And why 
were the housing certificates not fully allocated?
The problem of programme underfunding has to be 
viewed in the context of rapidly growing housing pric-
Table 4-2 Amount of housing for northern resettlers, 1998-2008. Source: The State Duma Committee on the North-
ern and the Far Eastern problems, 2008.
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es, which were not properly taken into account by pol-
icy designers. For the period 2007-2008, the increase 
in housing prices reached 26 percent in the Republic of 
Karelia, 33 percent in the Komi Republic, 27 percent 
in the Murmansk Region, 23 percent in the Republic 
of Sakha (Yakutia) and 23 percent in Primorskiy Kray 
(Committee on the Northern and the Far Eastern prob-
lems 2008: 3-4). In 1998, the average housing price in 
Russia was 2,980 RUB per m2. In 1999, it increased 
to 4,427 RUB per m2. Growing annually, it reached 
10,056 RUB per m2 in 2004 and 23,400 RUB per m2 
in 2008 (Committee on the Northern and the Far East-
ern problems 2008: 2). Based on the average rate of 
housing price and the annual programme budget, there 
were 402,700 m2 of dwelling space that could be pur-
chased for relocating northerners in 1998. In 1999 this 
number decreased to 271,100 m2, in 2004 it amounted 
80,700 m2 and only 31,900 m2 in 2008 (Committee on 
the Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008: 4).
4.2 Unequal distribution of programme 
budget 
The second aspect as mentioned by regional officials 
concerns the distribution principle of the programme’s 
financial resources (Fig. 4-1). It is mentioned that the 
budget of the resettlement programme is not equally 
distributed between participating regions and between 
categories of the target population. Regions like the 
Komi Republic, Magadan oblast and the Republic 
of Sakha (Yakutia) receive more funding then other 
northern entities because they are experiencing numer-
ous closures of economically non-viable communities, 
which are classified as the first priority group to be ad-
dressed by the programme. For example, in 2006, the 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) received 5.4 percent of 
the total programme budget and 28.3 percent of total 
funding in 2007 to support 12,344 residents relocat-
ing from seven closing settlements (Committee on the 
Northern and the Far Eastern problems, 2008). 
As it was described in the previous sections, the 
article 2 of the Federal Law 125-FZ defines five cat-
egories of population entitled to apply for state sub-
sidy which, however, are not equally prioritised. As 
our fieldwork material shows, the second priority 
group benefits only when all participants of the first 
group have received a housing certificate. The third 
group - pensioners - takes advantage of the resettle-
ment programme when all applicants of the previous 
group - disabled persons – have received a grant. This 
principle applies to the fourth and fifth categories in 
the same manner. Considering the programme’s under-
funding, it means that the non-working population and 
long-term residents have a small chance to obtain the 
state assistance to which they have the right. Housing 
subsidies are received mainly by residents of closing 
settlements, disabled and, rarely pensioners. 
Figure 4-1 Distribution of federal funding among five 
categories of programme participants
In response to this disproportionate allocation of 
programme resources, different solutions were pro-
posed. The administration of the Taimyr (Dolgano-
Nenets) Autonomous District suggested distributing 
financial flows proportionally between the five target 
categories, so that each group would receive 20 per-
cent of the programme’s total allocations respectively 
(Project of The Federal Law N 184275-4). The State 
Duma Committee on the Northern and Far Eastern 
problems recommended shared distribution of the 
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budget between programme participants based on the 
retention of prioritisation principle (Project of The 
Federal Law N 46124-4). Taking the total programme 
budget as 100 percent, 30 percent would go to the first 
group, 25 percent to the second group, 20 percent to 
the third, 15 percent to the fourth category and 10 per-
cent to the last. In 2006, the Murmansk regional Duma 
proposed to the federal authorities the project of a law 
where the northern regions possess a right to distribute 
programme funding between programme groups ac-
cording to the regional situation and specifics (Project 
of The Federal Law N 327943-4). It was also offered 
to establish a special Federal Law with a separate pro-
gramme budget for citizens living in closing localities, 
so that the programme budget specified for relocation 
problem would not be used for closing economically 
non-viable communities. However, these initiatives 
were not taken into consideration as contradictory to 
existing legislation. 
4.3 Programme design imperfections
Informants in both cases do not consider the pro-
gramme’s failure as a consequence of implementation 
steps but rather the programme’s design itself, its theo-
retical character, structural discrepancy and complexi-
ty. The State Duma Committee on the Northern and Far 
Eastern problems pointed out, among other implemen-
tation challenges, a discrepancy within the provisions 
of The Federal Law 125-FZ. Specifically, the statutory 
wording of the Law’s articles do not correspond with 
the wording of the government resolution clarifying 
procedures as established by the Law, leaving room 
for varying interpretations. For example, according to 
Article 1 of the Federal Law 125-FZ, the queue of pro-
gramme participants is formed on the grounds of the 
length of work in the North. However, paragraph 20 
of the Government resolution N879 from 10 Decem-
ber 2002 defines the principle for forming the queue 
as participation according to the number and date of 
submitted application. 
Resettlement programmes were planned in the 
way that participation in them demanded time, practi-
cal knowledge about the real estate sector and Russian 
legislation, skills in purchasing and selling, mobility, 
and substantial patience to go through bureaucratic 
obstacles. The relocation under both certificate letters 
scheme and housing certificate scheme has had com-
plicated and time-demanding procedure of drawing up 
a purchase contract. The expert in Kovdor, comment-
ing on the relocation programmes, says:
The difficult thing was in drawing up documents, 
because there were very specific requirements set 
up by our regional administration. But people were 
coming through all these organisational formalities. 
They were sending us the copy of purchase contract 
by fax and we were advising them. (Expert, Kovdor, 
interview was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2006)
Another issue, mentioned in the interviews is the 
fact that, according to the law, the transfer of owner-
ship rights is needed to be done before actual payment. 
The officer in Apatiti explains:
Generally, there are not many real estate agen-
cies that agree to work with these certificates. Who 
sells the flat without getting money before? There-
fore, there is a problem. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 
2008)
4.4 Underestimated diversity of local con-
ditions
Despite the fact that all three pilot cities of Vorkuta, 
Norilsk and Susuman belong to the Russian Far North 
periphery and have similar development problems, the 
implementation of the World Bank project illustrates 
different challenges and different results in each case. 
The World Bank project was implemented with 
greater success in Vorkuta and the Susuman Municipal-
ity. People were induced to leave by the declining so-
cio-economic environment and by extensive promotion 
of the resettlement programme, including individual 
work with participants and supplemental payments to 
the housing subsidy allocated by the Susuman munici-
pal administration (The World Bank: 2006). In the Su-
suman Municipality, realisation of the project achieved 
56 percent or 3,348 resettled people from the planned 
6,002, and in Vorkuta it accomplished 97 percent or 
6,233 people from 6,422. In Norilsk, the pilot project 
was not as effective as planned. A relatively favourable 
socio-economic environment, plus a working system 
of northern benefits and social welfare programmes be-
came strong pull factors for people to stay in the North. 
In spite of additional funding allocated from the local 
budget, implementation of the programme in Norilsk 
reached 8 percent of the intended level, or 1,155 actu-
ally relocated citizens against the planned 15,105. (The 
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World Bank 2006: 6). Among other factors influencing 
implementation results there are: lack of cooperation 
between local project implementation units and muni-
cipal government and insufficient individual work with 
the programme beneficiaries (The World Bank 2010).
4.5 People’s responses to the programme
The field research, conducted in the Murmansk oblast 
and YNAO, shows how state measures aimed redesign-
ing the socio-demographic landscape of the North be-
came re-interpreted in the process of implementation. 
People have responded to the policies in both explicit 
and implicit ways through refusing relocation, back-
ward migration and developing withdrawing activities. 
The evidence from our case study contributes to the 
theoretical argument that resettlement project as an in-
stitutional process produced a space for unintended con-
sequences (de Wet 2009). “This clearly suggests that 
institutional objectives are not in alignment with indi-
vidual needs and aspirations” (Shrestha 1987: 329).
4.5.1 Refusal to participate in the pro-
gramme
Because of growing housing prices, inflation and the 
significant difference between the market price and 
the normative price used for calculating housing cer-
tificates, in more and more cases people can not find 
an apartment in their preferred destination that can be 
covered by received state subsidy. 
Very often the price of housing in the region in 
which they want to resettle is higher than the amount of 
migration assistance they receive. Practically, it means 
that participants would need to pay in excess of the cer-
tificate. But since relocation policy focuses on socially 
vulnerable categories, it is difficult for people to make 
additional payments, especially if the grant receivers 
do not have family or relatives who are able to support 
them financially.  As fieldwork material demonstrates, 
beneficiaries refuse housing certificates and stay in the 
North even if they wish to move to a different area, or 
they start to create financial tricks. The officer in Ap-
atiti’s implementation unit comments: 
Last year certificates were allocated only for 
disabled. Still, there were not many willing. People 
were not stepping in the programme, although we 
were sending letters and offering citizens to partici-
pate in the programme. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 
2008)
People refuse certificates. First, because the val-
ue of certificate is not enough for purchase housing 
in the region they intend to relocate. The second rea-
son is that the procedure is very complicated. (Ex-
pert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolotova 
in 2007)
There is a very similar tendency which has devel-
oped under the World Bank Pilot Project. In the period 
from 2002 to 2006, 48.6 percent of programme par-
ticipants (3,470 households) quit the programme. The 
main reason for rejection was named as “non-applica-
tion of housing certificate” (The World Bank 2006a: 4). 
Since the basic part of the social subsidy was small and 
did not reflect the growing housing prices, it did not 
allow northern migrants to purchase a preferred apart-
ment in the market. Moreover, the duration of the cer-
tificate is nine months and it can not be extended. Grant 
holders are restricted in time to find a suitable flat in 
the South and to execute the necessary documentation. 
At a more general level, refusal of participation 
leads to a default on programme performance and 
non-fulfilment of planned objectives. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Russian government increased subsi-
dies for northern resettlement in later years, the actual 
number of certificate applications decreased, and so 
decreased the number of resettled residents. Observ-
ing the amount of finances for a programme does not 
tell us much about policy success. Rather, it is impor-
tant to look at how participants respond to the state’s 
measures and what the real practices standing behind 
statistics and bureaucratic procedures are.
4.5.2 Local creative strategies
Vertical allocation of programme funding to selected 
categories, prioritising long-term residents, complicat-
ed programme rules and extended responsibilities of 
participants along with underestimated  role of attach-
ment to the place, social relationships in the commu-
nity, the law of cumulative inertia influencing people’s 
mobility, have been resulted in participant’s refusal to 
leave the North and return migration.
Many citizens do not leave. Mostly, they do not 
relocate, because the certificates have been received 
by disabled persons, especially in the latter years. 
Before we were giving subsidies to pensioners and 
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others [eligible for receiving federal relocation as-
sistance] and they were leaving. Many were leav-
ing. Nowadays, beneficiaries of the programme are 
disabled of the first and second group; half of them 
are bed bounded and, understandably, certificates 
are received by their children, if not grandchildren 
while they continue to live in the North as before. 
(Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla Bolo-
tova in 2007)
Many of those participants who agree with given 
conditions still do not follow the programme’s objec-
tive, but develop withdraw strategies and reinterpre-
tations because the resettlement programme is not 
tailored according to their practical needs. There are 
several examples we discovered while conducting 
extensive research in Murmansk oblast and YNAO. 
Some of these cases were described by municipal and 
regional administrative officials, which show that lo-
cal state agencies are aware of the profit-seeking prac-
tices developed by participants. In order to show real 
people’s tactics, we would like to give an example of 
fictional family of two pensioners living in the town of 
Apatiti in Murmansk oblast. Let us assume that both 
pensioners came to the North as young professionals 
under the Komsomol appeal and worked there in the 
mining industry for twenty-three years. Three years 
ago, they decided to leave the North and hence applied 
to the state resettlement programme. The grandchildren 
of this couple study at the university in Voronezh, 
therefore they decided to migrate to Voronezh city to 
be closer to the family. Since relations between genera-
tions in Russian society play a significant role, in many 
cases parents prefer to live close to their children and 
the other way around, so they can more easily support 
and help one another.
Their length of work in the North entitles this fam-
ily to federal subsidy at the rate of 85 percent. Based 
on calculations of the Ministry of Regional Develop-
ment, the average housing price in the fourth quarter 
of 2009 is: 
23,600 RUB per m2 in Voronezh oblast,
42,950 RUB per m2 in the Moscow Region, 
73,800 RUB per m2 in Moscow city and
44,300 RUB per m2 in St. Petersburg city (Ministry 
order N 433 from 30 September 2009). 
According to the Russian law, the social norm of 
housing for a family of two is 42 m2. Thus, the federal 
housing assistance for this family amounts to 842,520 
RUB or 27,427 USD. In contrast, a two-room flat of 
38-41 m2 in secondary market in a residential district 
of Voronezh city costs 1,360,000-1,400,000 RUB or 
44,273-45,575 USD (“Iz ruk v ruki” 2009). Obviously, 
if the family members do not have considerable sav-
ings, they would not be able to purchase housing in 
their preferred destination since the difference between 
the state certificate and the real market price of housing 
is about forty percent. This is the situation that almost 
every resettling individual or household faces with.
There are two options the exampled family has. 
First, they could resettle to a small town or village in 
the Voronezh Region, where housing prices are lower. 
The second option would be to sign for resettlement to 
the Moscow Region, Moscow city, or St. Petersburg in-
stead of Voronezh. In this case, their housing certificate 
would increase to 1,533,315 RUB, 2,634,660 RUB and 
1,581,510 RUB accordingly. Then the family would 
find a dwelling in their declared region, let us assume 
in St. Petersburg, purchase it, process the certificate, 
sell the presently bought apartment in St. Petersburg 
and buy another one in Voronezh or another preferred 
area. Alternatively, they could cash in their certificate 
at a real estate agency at a cost of certain percent of 
the total amount. Our interviewees in both case studies 
mentioned different rate of the payment for real estate 
bureau’s services, namely from seven to ten percent.
Another strategy would be if this elderly couple 
bought an apartment from their distant relatives liv-
ing in St. Petersburg, realised the certificate and reg-
istered the flat back in favour of the relatives. With 
the received money, the family would buy a dwelling 
in Voronezh. Technically, the purpose of the policy is 
reached: people move out the North and buy an apart-
ment in the region where they would like to settle.
It is also so that the pensioners could live in the 
same apartment with their adult children. When the 
elders receive a certificate, they would have to return 
their flat in the North to the municipality, and the chil-
dren would be left without housing, although they were 
born, are needed and employed in the North. What the 
beneficiaries would do is cash in their certificate at an 
agency, and with that money purchase a cheaper flat in 
the North for the children and another one in the South 
for the parents.
Still, very often those who apply to the programme 
do not consider resettlement an option at all. After 
cashing in the state certificate, they move back to the 
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North, buy a flat in the same region of previous resi-
dence and use the rest of the money to live, buy a car, or 
other family needs. Either the family can buy a smaller 
apartment in the North, plus another flat for their adult 
children or to rent out, either in the North or in a dif-
ferent area. Return migration is one of the unintended 
programme results. Return movement is commonly 
pointed out in the Murmansk Region and less often in 
YNAO. An expert from the town of Apatiti says:
Mostly they are all here, those who received cer-
tificates. They all come back. You can even remember 
how they look; most of them live here [in Apatiti]. 
<…> We do not force them to go. They received this 
subsidy certificate, but it does not mean that they 
have no right to live here. The prerequisites are ful-
filled and so be it. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)
Another interesting aspect mentioned in interviews 
is that people participate in the state programme, and 
create strategies and tricks encouraged not by individual 
interest but by household needs, particularly the needs 
of younger generations like children and grandchildren. 
Parents participate in the relocation programmes, get 
housing in the South in their name, and give this hous-
ing to their children, while they themselves prefer to 
stay in the North (Bolotova & Stammler 2010).
Participation in the programme makes sense if the 
amount of federal subsidy is higher than the market 
value of the northern apartment a family lives in. Oth-
erwise, people would sell their northern housing on the 
market and buy another one in their preferred destina-
tion. It shows, therefore, a different relevance of re-
settlement programmes in different regions as well as 
towns:
We have Kirovsk next to Apatiti. Housing costs 
two times less there compared to Apatiti, therefore 
it is more beneficial for them [to participate in the 
resettlement programme], and they have more appli-
cants. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)
Participation in the federal programme demands 
physical resources, business skills and knowledge of 
the housing market and support from the family to pre-
pare the required documents and to go through all the 
formalities, especially if the grant receiver is old-aged 
and/or is in poor health:
Certainly, there is a lot of fuss and trouble. Old 
pensioners come to submit an application and I ask 
them: Do you have anyone to deal with this? You 
would need to go to Murmansk to obtain a certifi-
cate, then to go there [place of destination], to live 
somewhere there while searching for housing. This 
is, of course, difficult. Formerly, people received a 
flat, they went there [place of destination] and eve-
rything was prepared, all documents were prepared, 
they would need to register the flat in their name and 
reside there. With the certificate, it is complicated 
for older pensioners; it is unlikely that they can do 
anything by themselves if they have nobody [to help 
them]. (Expert, Apatiti, 20 October 2008)
Experts from the Murmansk administration point-
ed out that because of old age and poor knowledge of 
Russian legislation, programme participants without 
families can become a victim of profit-seeking persons, 
often, social workers taking care of single pensioners 
and invalids:
They convince an old-aged pensioner to transfer 
the right to participate in the relocation programme 
from the pensioner’s name to their own name. But 
when the social worker receives the property rights, 
he basically leaves the pensioner without housing, 
basically in the street. (Expert, Murmansk, 06 No-
vember 2008)
In addition, relocation programmes create a space 
for both legal and illegal activities of real estate firms. 
My informants in regional administration confirmed 
that real estate agency managers systematically try to 
bribe them or share the profit from grey activity. Real 
estate companies promise officers a fee for each trans-
action if they promote their agency among programme 
beneficiaries. 
To summarise, the analysis of this chapter reveals 
a very complex set of interactions between the state as 
multi-faced actor and the social agents - participants of 
relocation programmes. It shows that even if the policy 
is rationally designed and works perfectly on paper, 
it does not mean that it works in practice in the same 
manner: people do not always follow the patterns as 
defined by the state planners. Those who do not want to 
resettle do not leave the North; and it makes no differ-
ence how much money authorities allocate for the pro-
gramme. The main reason for them to participate in the 
resettlement project is to obtain a housing subsidy. This 
raises the question of how to distinguish those who are 
in need of state assistance and truly want to move out 
of the North from those who want to advance their liv-
ing conditions at the expense of the government.
We argue that an improvement of relocation project 
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outcomes require a paradigm change. Russian state 
should be flexible enough to hear the people’s voices 
and to adapt to their needs, rather than imposing re-
forms driven by economic calculations.
5 Analyzing reasons of limited 
implementation results
The main question which will be discussed in the chap-
ter is why resettlement policies have had little success 
and what measures should be taken to improve per-
formance of relocation projects? This question was 
partly touched upon in the previous sections which pre-
sented results and implementation challenges of both 
Federal relocation programme and the World Bank 
Northern Restructuring Project. This chapter analyses 
the causes for the programme’s poor outcomes and un-
expected consequences that enables us to contribute to 
general insights into the viability of northern industrial 
city communities as well as to think on policy sugges-
tions for improvement. Empirical findings from field 
research conducted in Murmansk Oblast and YNAO 
demonstrate the lack of feedback mechanisms between 
programme designers and local implementing institu-
tions. It reveals the importance of regional diversity 
within the Russian North and a gap between centrally 
planned policy schemes and local concerns and prac-
tices.
The state resettlement programme in the Rus-
sian North was introduced in the middle of the 1990s 
as an answer to the changing political-economic en-
vironment. Its purpose was resettling economically 
non-productive population, and, as a result, to solve 
the problem of northern overpopulation. Elaboration 
of relocation policies were brought into line with the 
post-Soviet northern restructuring reforms aimed at 
rationalizing spatial allocation of people according to 
neoliberal principles. 
Our study demonstrates, nevertheless, that the ob-
jectives of population planning were not fulfilled and 
brought only a minor impact on both population change 
in the Russian North and northern development. The 
programmes do not work as they were intended by 
their authors due to numerous reasons, namely: lack 
of regional involvement in policy-planning as well as 
feedback mechanisms between programme-designers 
and implementing institutions, lack of local know-
ledge, misconceptions of northerners’ will to relocate, 
unprofessional assessment of financial needs, inflex-
ible mechanisms of policy implementation, underes-
timated social and cultural factors influencing migra-
tion decision as well as diversity of regional conditions 
creating different demand for relocation, lack of trust 
between the state and the people. These causes have 
resulted, first, from an inconsistency between the cen-
tral government, which developed the resettlement 
programme, and the regional institutions that actually 
implemented the programme’s procedures and, second, 
from complex relations between the state in the face 
of administrative officials and programme participants.
 
5.1 State-state dimension
The resettlement programmes analyzed in this work 
were initially developed by the federal authorities in 
order to restructure the northern periphery both eco-
nomically and demographically and to decrease the 
burden of budget spending on northern subsidies. The 
policy was transferred to the northern regions for im-
plementation through establishing regional units within 
the body of already existing structures - regional ad-
ministrations. The network of regional implementation 
bureau have had a particular function of regulating re-
location within the territory and coordinating the work 
of municipal and district offices. The Russian state 
reproduced itself at the local level by creating repre-
sentative agencies (implementation offices) and spe-
cific bureaucratic practices (implementation-related 
procedures), making the power hierarchy spatial. It has 
constituted a branched tree of implementation entities 
that provide the basis for “vertical encompassment of 
the state” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002).
The northern regions responded to the federal pol-
icy in different ways: by lobbying for amendments to 
the Federal Law 125-FZ, promoting northern interests, 
co-financing relocation from the regional budgets, and 
by developing additional regional resettlement pro-
grammes. The Committee on Northern and Far Eastern 
Problems and the Committee for the North and Indig-
enous Peoples represent northern territories and their 
interests in the State Duma. Together with the regions, 
they worked on improving performance of relocation 
projects and initiated a re-examination of the govern-
ment approach. Still, regional attempts have not caused 
a significant impact to policy changes. Suggestions 
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brought forward by the territories did not find sup-
port at the national level, mainly because the proposed 
changes demanded greater federal spending, which is 
inconsistent with the official position of “equalising” 
Russian regions.  This reflects principal contradiction 
within the northern development approach: on the one 
hand the Russian North is perceived by central authori-
ties as an integrated part of regional development, on 
the other hand it still applies the system of northern 
benefits elaborated under the Soviet welfare regime. 
The resettlement policy in the Russian North is a 
top-down process, giving very little space for regional 
interference and decision-making power. According to 
the implementation mechanism applied by the Federal 
Law 125-FZ, northern entities got deprived of the right 
to adjust the law and regulate resettlement based on 
regional needs. The regional units have a rather tech-
nical function narrowed to consulting citizens, listing 
programme participants, examination and collection of 
required documents and delivering them to the bureau 
in Moscow. 
Fewer duties and responsibilities rest on us now; 
currently we only receive documents and send them 
on. We do not have a commission; do not take local 
regulations, nothing like that. But it appears to be 
more complicated to work under new rules. Record-
keeping is more complicated. How many people have 
received a certificate this year? I am not able to tell 
you. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken by Alla 
Bolotova in 2007)
The centralised mode of programme administration 
hinders information exchange between different levels 
of the state body and generates a gap separating pro-
gramme-planning and implementation into two pro-
cesses loosely-coupled with one another. The structural 
problem results from such an institutional disintegra-
tion, lack of cooperation, feedback mechanisms and 
transparent information. 
The resettlement policy was uniformly applied to 
all northern districts assuming they have similar char-
acteristics and facing similar challenges of transition. 
Our empirical findings give evidence that in spite of re-
gional similarities relocation policies have had differ-
ent relevance; federally sponsored relocation projects 
in different territories were used for different purpos-
es, like closing economically non-viable settlements 
through prioritised subsidising the first category of par-
ticipants, relocation of surplus population, improving 
living conditions of the remaining northern population, 
or benefits to local bureaucrats.
One can assume that the relevance of relocation 
would be higher in economically declining and/or 
remote regions. And, by contrast, resettlement poli-
cies do not bring expected results in areas with bet-
ter development prospects, greater physical links with 
European Russia and stronger attachment to the place 
(Bolotova & Stammler 2010, Stammler 2010). How-
ever, this assumption does not always reflect the ac-
tual processes on the ground. Relocation is not equally 
relevant for both cases: Murmansk oblast and Tyumen 
oblast. We can see this from how much local budget 
was involved in co-financing resettlement, how easy 
or difficult it was to get access to the information about 
programme realisation, how local officials perceived 
resettlement, and how often it was mentioned in the 
local mass media.
In Murmansk oblast, the resettlement policy has 
been realised at the scale determined by the federal 
government. The regional administration has not spon-
sored out-migration in addition to federal budget allo-
cations, but used available sources to assist population 
in out-migration. Contrastingly, relocation issue drew 
more attention in municipal and regional administra-
tions in YNAO. The district actively provided regional 
funding along with national subsidies. This was al-
located in the framework of a regional cooperation 
project ‘Sotrudnichestvo’ between two regions in the 
North and one not belonging to the North (southern part 
of Tyumen Oblast). An economic explanation of such 
different perspectives would stress the material well-
being in YNAO. Due to increasing world demand in 
energy, high oil and gas prices, and the energy reserves 
concentrated on the Yamal peninsula, YNAO has more 
revenue which can be invested into resettlement, com-
pared to Murmansk. Another point is a difference in 
geographical location and infrastructural development. 
Compared to Murmansk oblast, YNAO is perceived as 
a more remote, colder and more peripheral area with 
an underdeveloped road and rail network. It is more 
expensive for the local budget to maintain urban life 
there. In order to reduce the burden of social obliga-
tions and to prevent overpopulation of northern towns, 
the local administration found that it is cheaper to relo-
cate non-working, economically “expensive” residents 
rather than support them in the North. One government 
official in the town of Novy Urengoy says:
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We do not plan Novy Urengoy to be expanded; it 
has to remain within currently existing city bounda-
ries. Those people that are not involved in the eco-
nomic sector should relocate to the South. At the 
same time, after long-term living in the North irre-
versible processes start in the human body. There-
fore, it is necessary to create conditions and give a 
choice, so people decide themselves whether they 
want to move or to stay. (Local government official, 
Novy Urengoy, 06 December 2008)
Relocation should be considered as an invest-
ment project. We also should consider intra-regional 
options for resettlement, for example, to the south 
of Tyumen oblast (Local government official, Novy 
Urengoy, 06 December 2008)
On the other hand, in a situation of strong return-
migration to the Murmansk Oblast, as our interviewed 
experts working with relocation programmes commonly 
evidence, the regional administration might have had 
a reasonable incentive not to subsidize resettlement, 
as it did not generate the intended effect of depopulat-
ing the territory. This does not explain, however, why 
programme participants chose to stay in Murmansk 
Oblast, which is economically less prosperous than 
YNAO, and, contrastingly, much easier leave the well-
provisioned towns of YNAO.8 Apparently, factors in-
fluencing the decision of residents of northern industri-
al towns to stay there under harsh climatic conditions, 
withstanding the large trend of relocation to the South 
supported by the Russian government, are not limited 
to financial factors. 
At the personal level, often social, physiological 
and cultural motives become more important than cost-
benefit calculations. People follow complex processes 
in their decision-making, weighing factors such as 
social well-being, friend and kinship networks, place 
attachment, health, preferences for particular natural 
environments, habits acquired throughout their life, 
all influencing economic consideration. Place-specific 
social capital based on social relationship in the com-
munity appeared to be both push and pull reason in 
determining personal motives to stay or to move out 
of the Russian North (Round 2005, Thompson 2008, 
Heleniak 2009, Bolotova & Stammler 2010). Incom-
ers, who arrived there for work and decided to settle 
permanently, connected with the place and have dis-
covered a new homeland in the North. This is espe-
cially true for the long-term residents who moved to 
the Far North at the very beginning of its development. 
Old-timers - the main beneficiary group of resettlement 
policy - resist relocation as they have established strong 
ties in the North and have lost the social capital that 
attached them to their previous place of residence. In 
contrast, “persons leaving the North were often those 
with few ties to the region and were most often pulled 
to regions of origin, where they had considerable social 
ties” (Heleniak 2009a: 55). They stayed in the North 
as long as it was economically beneficial, with a view 
to return back home to their family and friends. But it 
is not only the social and individual networks that root 
people in the North, but also an emotional attachment 
to the particular environment, memories and personal 
histories. 
While interviewing government officials in Mur-
mansk Oblast and YNAO we got an impression that 
return migration among beneficiaries of relocation 
projects has greater scale in the first case; the attach-
ment to the place in the Murmansk oblast appeared to 
be stronger than in YNAO which can be explained by 
the history of populating these territories. YNAO still 
is a region of newcomers: only 25.4 percent of the pop-
ulation has lived there since birth, against 73 percent 
of in-migrated people. At the beginning of the nineties 
the average length of residency in YNAO was from 
six to nine years and only 2.2 percent of citizens have 
lived there twenty or more years (Heleniak 2009a: 40). 
In Murmansk Oblast old-timers composes one fifth of 
all residents: 47.9 percent residents were born there 
and 52.1 percent in-migrated from elsewhere (Hele-
niak 2009a: 45). Industrial development and large-
scale populating of the Murmansk Oblast started in 
the 1930s. For the needs of the manufacturing sector 
the Soviet government created a great influx of man-
power to the region. Labour policy in Murmansk oblast 
8 There is no statistical prove for a higher return migration to Murmansk oblast compared to YNAO, since this data have not 
been recorded in the regional centers at the first place. However, the question regarding backward mobility was included in the 
questioner and was discussed with administrative officials in both regions. Our conclusion, therefore, is based on expert’s com-
mentaries and information extracted from the interviews.
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mainly relied on a permanently settled working force 
serving city-forming enterprises. On the other hand, 
exploitation of mineral resources in YNAO started 
only in the 1970-1980s and relies more on the labour 
of commuting workers. Even though the contemporary 
landscape of YNAO is shaped by industrial towns, 
circulation of labour flows, high population mobility 
and comparatively short length of residence in the re-
gion have slowed down the process of attachment to 
the area among non-indigenous incomers. According 
to the law of cumulative inertia in migration theory, 
attachment to the place increases with time spent in the 
area, so the longer a person lives in the place, the less 
likely he or she is to decide to migrate. Attachment to 
the region and a sense of community might be weak 
in such regions composed of so many of newcomers, 
like YNAO. This assumption still can be questioned 
by the anthropological observations made by Florian 
Stammler and Alla Bolotova who indicate strong place 
attachment among those who moved away but keep 
strong connections with the North such as, for exam-
ple, YNAO diasporas (zemlyachestva) in Moscow, Pe-
tersburg, Tyumen. Based on in-depth interviews with 
former residents of industrial cities and those, who 
remain in the periphery, the scholars conclude that 
community-feeling is extremely strong because of the 
experience of building places up jointly is still so much 
alive in people’s minds, gluing them together (Bolo-
tova & Stammler 2010). 
Another important issue to be mentioned is that 
implementation mechanisms applied in relocation 
programmes have not reflected the actual economic 
processes. For instance, according to the Federal Law 
125-FZ, housing subsidies are calculated based on the 
prices determined by the state, which are significantly 
below the market rate. In practical terms, this means 
that the value of a housing certificate is not enough to 
buy an apartment in the market and the person has to 
use his private savings or family savings. But since the 
target group of the programme is the socially vulner-
able population with little financial ability, very often 
people reject resettling and stay in the North, even if 
they are willing to leave. On the other hand, those who 
agree with the programme rules submit for resettlement 
to Moscow or St. Petersburg. Housing prices there are 
higher than average and therefore the value of the cer-
tificate is as high as possible. Meanwhile, few northern-
ers really wish to move to Moscow or St. Petersburg; 
many do not want to leave the northern region at all 
(Zhelnina 2009). As examples from the field show, the 
money received from cashing in housing certificates is 
often spent on purchasing a flat or a house for resettling 
parents or children in the preferred region, for purchas-
ing a bigger apartment in the North, or for children’s or 
grandchildren’s education. Thus, the existing legisla-
tion and its prescribed resettlement procedure activated 
the mechanism of withdrawing compensation from the 
state as compensation for long years of working in the 
North. This mechanism was not planned for by the 
state itself, but resulted from the gumption and enter-
prising of northern residents (Zhelnina 2009). 
Our field research reveals that administrative offi-
cials from the local implementation offices are well-
informed about people’s tricks and return migration. 
Surprisingly, it was local officials who told us about 
withdrawing strategies of the participants and various 
mechanisms of cashing-in certificates, which were de-
scribed in detail in the previous chapter.
Yes, the programme is not used correctly. It is 
also difficult to say, because the people worked, they 
got a long length of work, they have the right to get 
an apartment and they have the right to use it how 
they want. (Expert, Kovdor, interview was taken by 
Alla Bolotova in 2006)
It happens that people moving out of the North 
return back. There is a recent example. A Woman 
migrated to Rostov Region under the relocation 
programme and now she writes to the administra-
tion that she wants to move back. She agrees on any 
housing conditions in the North, just to live there. 
(Regional government official (b), Salekhard, 12 Oc-
tober 2008)
The fact that beneficiaries use allocated subsidies 
in their own ways rather than for relocation was not 
taken by governmental officials as serious infringe-
ment of the programme’s conditions. At the local level, 
the human right to free movement and settlement was 
prioritised over policy objectives.
We can not relocate people from here by force. 
We provided them a certificate; they transferred their 
northern apartment to municipal property. Even 
though they moved back, bought five new flats and 
continue to live here. We do not resettle anyone from 
here forcedly. (Expert, Apatiti, interview was taken 
by Alla Bolotova in 2007)
It was officially recognised that northern resettle-
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ment projects have not worked in the way they were 
planned (The World Bank 2006, Committee on the 
Northern and the Far Eastern problems 2008). But 
the reason for poor policy outcomes, as seen by local 
authorities, was not associated with practical misinter-
pretations of the programmes. Both programme part-
icipants and northern administrations criticise Moscow 
politicians for making wrong steps at the stage of pol-
icy-designing and loose coupling with the real market 
processes and regional needs. 
This example reveals the double identity of the 
state officials: local authorities descending federal 
order in one word without division to the community 
have a strong local identity as northerners that make 
them more concerned about well-being of the region as 
opposed to keeping within the structures imposed by 
the state. Again, the position of local elites has another 
- corruptive - side resulting from the lack of public con-
trol and the state’s incapability to perform efficiently 
and maintain coherence between different governing 
bodies. 
Thus, our analysis contributes empirically to the the-
oretical argument that the state is not a monolithic unit 
coherent within its structure, but consists of multifaceted 
practices developed by state bureaucrats at federal, re-
gional and municipal levels. The state is perceived as 
intervening in a top-down manner into communities 
through creating vertical network of institutions (Fer-
guson & Gupta 2002), aimed to implement govern-
ment regulations and ensuring the functioning of a re-
location regime. Because of insignificant involvement 
in policy-making, northern authorities refer to these 
regulations as externally imposed by Moscow politi-
cians and being unsuitable for regional context.
Estrangement between the federal and the regional 
institutions and internal disintegration within the verti-
cal axis of governance unintentionally produces space 
for financial manipulations and corruptive cases. Re-
location policy was misshaped in the course of im-
plementation and has become what overstretched lo-
cal officials make of it (de Wet 2009). It is the very 
complexity of the resettlement process that results in 
its taking on a life of its own, with outcomes that its 
implementers cannot control, or only to a very limited 
degree. It is in the ways in which the complexities of 
the resettlement project as a process limit the state’s 
control over resettlement outcomes, over what happens, 
that the resettlement process, and thus the state,  may 
be said to ‘evoke agency’ (de Wet 2009). 
People developed various tricks and strategies in 
response to the state’s attempts to reorganise life in the 
Northern periphery economically. In a broader sense 
those tricks can be considered as a signal for policy 
makers to adjust the programmes according to prac-
tical knowledge accumulated in the process of policy 
implementation. Here we come to the next point – the 
lack of evaluation and information exchange between 
state agencies. The Russian state does not have a com-
prehensive picture of what is happening on the grass-
root level. For instance, there are no officially proven 
statistics on how many people actually left the North 
after receiving a subsidy and how many of them moved 
back to the North and why. An administrative official 
in the town of Apatiti says:
I remember that before Moscow [programme 
implementation office] required us [regional imple-
mentation units] to provide information on who left 
the North under relocation programme and who did 
not. We started to collect data on who received hous-
ing subsidy, who left and who moved back. But then 
everybody gave up and things stayed as they are. [If 
people] left, so [they] left; [if people] did not leave, 
so [they] did not leave. (Expert, Apatiti, interview 
was taken by Alla Bolotova in 2007)
The absence of transparent information on policy 
implementation and feedback mechanisms limits the 
capacity of the state to improve current policy. 
The examination of state-induced relocation in the 
Russian North touches upon characteristics generally 
relevant to state theory, including multi-dimensional 
relations between formal order and informal practices, 
planning and implementation, simplification and com-
plexity, centre and locality. It shows that creating new 
patterns of population mobility and placement goes 
beyond administratively-invented instructions and 
schemes. “By themselves, the simplified rules can nev-
er generate a functioning community, city, or economy. 
Formal order, to be more explicit, is always to some 
degree parasitic on informal processes, which the for-
mal scheme does not recognize, without which it could 
not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain” 
(Scott 1998: 310).
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5.2 State-society dimension
A relation based on social trust between the state and 
the citizens is a crucial element in successful social 
restructuring. Lack of social involvement, representa-
tion of people’s interests and social control over policy 
implementation processes can provoke negligence and 
corruptive behaviour in local officials when the federal 
transfers allocated for relocation programmes are mis-
allocated or used highly ineffectively. For example, in 
the case of Zaozersk, widely discussed in Murmansk 
regional newspapers, the resettlement programme 
budget was partly used for paying off debt obligations, 
3 million RUR, which were spent for the mayor’s elec-
tion campaign in 2004. The other part of the federal 
allocation, about 5,700,000 RUR, “disappeared in the 
air” (Petuhov 2008). 
Moreover, budgetary losses have been caused by 
juridical negligence on the part of regional administra-
tions. In the mid 1990s, when relocation was carried 
out through construction of housing for northern mi-
grants, there were several cases when a construction 
firm responsible for building northern houses did not 
fulfil its contractual obligations. For instance, in one 
region a construction company illegally re-sold newly 
built northern apartments; in another case the company 
received money but the flats were not constructed 
at all. In addition, distribution of housing subsidies 
among programme participants in many cases has not 
followed the official queue, lined up according to the 
length of work in the North. There were cases when 
parents and relatives of governmental officials re-
ceived housing assistance in the first place while other 
participants had to wait for their turn for more than ten 
years (Chubatuk 2006). 
In some regions, special commissions have been 
established in order to encourage a dialogue between 
local administrations and the representatives of local 
communities as well as to exercise control over policy 
implementation. These commissions have been organ-
ised under the roof of municipal administrations and 
appeared to be rather formal institutions with limited 
decision-making power. Still, there is a niche for a 
society to influence policy-making through self-or-
ganised initiative groups, collective measures, lobby-
ing, discussions in the mass media, etc. Why then are 
cases of grass-roots activists taking decisive power and 
bargaining for resettlement conditions a seldom rather 
than common phenomenon in Russia? We emphasise a 
combination of two factors to explain the passivity of 
social groups as a collective actor in Russia. 
An ethnographic survey conducted by Niobe 
Thompson shows the “dependency mindset” of the 
average Northern resident, who still believes in the 
idea of a moral economy of sacrifice and entitlement 
(Thompson 2004: 77). Long-term northern citizens see 
their residence in the North as “service to the mother-
land”, which has to be compensated by material and 
non-material benefits. Such an “expectative” position, 
in a way, continues the Soviet pattern of state-society 
relations, when the former, by attracting people to work 
and live in the harsh northern conditions, entered into a 
“moral agreement” with them. People ended up in the 
North because of the Soviet relocation policy, therefore 
they expect the state to help them return. The moral 
obligations of the state were nullified with the collapse 
of the Soviet system; the successor state applied differ-
ent methods and principles in population management. 
But for the people themselves, it does not matter that 
the contractual party has disappeared. The expectation, 
at least in discourse, that the government is responsible 
for social caring, still exists. This psychological atti-
tude makes people seek help from the state and causes 
unequal relations between the people and the state if 
the former behave as if they depend on the latter.
On the other hand, northerners are not dynamic in 
lobbying their interests and controlling programme im-
plementation, perhaps because resettlement from the 
North is not a primary issue. The intention is rather to 
withdraw state funding for other private purposes. Par-
ticipants use the resettlement programme as an excuse 
to manipulate the government in their own interests. 
The phenomenon of how people use policies and re-
sources in manipulating the Russian state was first de-
scribed by Caroline Humphrey in the example of the 
Soviet collective farm. She calls it “manipulable re-
sources” (Humphrey 1998). The existence of creative 
agencies explains our next argument concerning the 
state’s misinterpretation of northerners’ will to move. 
As  any other social engineering initiatives, the 
Russian resettlement programmes were created for ab-
stract citizens standardised in their need without tak-
ing into account the following: who are these people 
to whom funding was provided, and what is the his-
tory of northern residents and northern communities 
in general, why did people come to the North in the 
first place, and why did they not leave after the period 
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they initially planned to spend there finished? By fo-
cusing on economic characteristics of programme par-
ticipants, such as material status and economic posi-
tion in the society, relocation policies have considered 
resettlers as economic actors underestimated in their 
willingness to move. According to the Murmansk re-
gional newspapers, 30-40 percent of those who receive 
state-subsidised housing in central Russia immediately 
sells it and buys an apartment in the same region they 
were living in previously and effectually do not move 
from the North. Twenty percent of participants keep 
their received housing as a summer cottage. And 50-
60 percent of participants actually resettle. For exam-
ple, in Olenegorsk, in a five-year period, 64 percent of 
residents who participated in the resettlement project 
stayed to live on the Kola Peninsula (Sheremey 2002). 
This gives us a reason to assume that people apply 
for the programme not so much because they want to 
leave the North, but to use available state subsidies and 
raise the living standards of the household. Participa-
tion in the resettlement programmes is not necessar-
ily reasoned by resettlement plans, rather by pursuit 
of family welfare. Recipients of migration assistance 
use government subsidies for purposes other than those 
specified in The Federal Law 125-FZ. 
According to the 1989 census, more than 60 percent 
of the northern population was not born in the region. 
“For many in the North, it was a place to spend a tour 
or career, with retirement to the mainland (materik)” 
(Heleniak 2009a: 32). They viewed their residence as 
short-term, yet stayed there permanently, dedicated 
their life to the North, and developed social connec-
tions and a sense of belonging in the place. This was 
especially true of the early migrants, who helped to 
construct much of the region’s infrastructure, and devel-
oped a collective bond through this shared struggle under 
harsh climatic conditions (Heleniak 2009a: 32). They 
came to the North when there was no proper housing, 
transport infrastructure, or public services. New towns 
were growing from scratch and only because of man-
power and intense work, enthusiasm and solidarity 
did they transform from workers’ temporary camps 
into viable communities. With time, former migrants 
identified with the hostile northern place through the 
joint experience of constructing new towns and build-
ing up industries, through landscaping a common liv-
ing space, becoming familiarised with the northern 
environment, and creating a chain of relations within a 
community. They established intimate relations to their 
built and un-built environment, which attached them to 
the North (Stammler 2010). This is the practical face 
of a Soviet mode of governance that is built upon the 
centralised regulation of human resources provisioned 
for remote resource bases.
Many retired individuals wish to remain in the 
North that they perceive as home. Even if people 
relocate to the South, quite often they move back. 
What holds people in the North and why do they re-
turn soon after resettling? There are several reasons, 
similarly confirmed by scholars studying resettlement 
in the Russian North (Thompson 2004, Bolotova & 
Stammler 2010). 
First, it is commonly mentioned that different cli-
matic and environmental conditions in the South often 
impact adversely on northerners’ health. People experi-
ence problems of “backward adaptation”, such as aller-
gic reactions and deterioration of health. Respondents 
bring examples of when, shortly after relocating to the 
South, their acquaintances die there. The narratives I 
have heard from local residents make me think that the 
southern climate’s negative effect on health whether it 
is proven or not is a very important issue for north-
erners that believe in climate impact. This issue must 
be taken into consideration when analysing migratory 
behaviour.    
Second, since people have defined their lives 
through work and family resettling to the new place, 
they meet with professional and social needlessness. 
Several scholars mention that it is particularly difficult 
to find something meaningful to do in the South, espe-
cially in terms of employment (Bolotova & Stammler 
2010). The lack of social networking and established 
contacts including relatives, friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances, impedes adaptation to new conditions. 
The majority of the elderly population leaving in the 
North is migrants in the first or second generation. They 
created the history of the Far North by being there at the 
beginning of its industrial and urban regional develop-
ment. Today, many newcomers are retired, but they are 
respectfully treated as heroes and honorary freemen. In 
the North, they hold a privileged status, providing them 
access to services and social resources that they would 
rarely obtain in the South. Thus, social capital and so-
cial importance, an opportunity for self-realisation, and 
personal history are tightly connected to the history of 
the region and retain people in the North.
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The third reason very much relates to the previous 
one, since it emphasises physiological discomfort in 
the new social environment, nostalgia to the spirit of 
northern collectivity among long-term residents and 
hostility against “rich” northerners: 
“People in the North are more open and sup-
portive than in the mainland.” (Expert, Salekhard, 
12 December 2008)
“Society in the North is different; relations between 
people are built on trust and support. He can easily 
loan you money without asking what for. He can take 
you 250 km away to the tundra if your car is broken. 
Such [relations] do not exist in the mainland.” (Ex-
pert, Salekhard, 12 December 2008)
“People [in the South] look with jealousy and 
hostility at our resettling citizens. They think that if 
people came from the North and received a state-
sponsored flat, they are in a better position, they are 
rich.” (Expert, Kovdor, interview was taken by Alla 
Bolotova in 2006)
‘Rootedness’ and attachment to the place are under-
estimated when analysing the efficiency of relocation 
programmes by state authorities, especially for non-
working pensioners. Originally targeted relocation 
candidates choose to stay in the North, while hand-
ing over flats and other benefits of the relocation pro-
grammes to their children in hope for better chances 
in education or employment elsewhere (Bolotova & 
Stammler 2010). As in any other region, northern resi-
dents are divided between those who would be willing 
to resettle and those who would not leave the North 
even if it improved their living conditions. Tim Hele-
niak points out that many of the migration assistance 
programmes have failed or been ineffective because 
they did not fully take into consideration migration se-
lectivity among different groups in the North (Heleniak 
2009a: 55).
While conducting our field research we often heard 
local people saying: “Who is waiting for us there?” The 
process of adaptation proceeds better in a place with an 
extensive migrant network. The migrant community in 
the South, in a sense, reconstructs the social environ-
ment that resettlers used to have in their home region. 
Once people depart, they continue to be in contact with 
colleagues and friends remaining in the North, and to 
exchange information about life opportunities, differ-
ent resettlement options and practicalities. 
Taking the argument of a migration network fur-
ther, one can come to the idea of collective resettle-
ment – relocating a whole community rather than 
giving individuals the freedom to choose a place of 
residence - as an alternative policy. A communal relo-
cation scheme was applied in Chukotka over the years 
2001-2003. “This was the first programme in post-So-
viet Russia to offer a full resettlement package on a 
voluntary basis to all long-term residents” (Thompson 
2002: 271). “The programme was sponsored by Chu-
kotka’s governor, Roman Abramovich, and intended 
to relocate a relatively large number of residents in a 
short period of time so to create a more compact but 
economically active population, based in fewer loca-
tions that are easier to supply with a more concentrated 
system of regional infrastructure (hospitals, schools, 
energy generation, airports)” (Thompson 2002: 276). 
The procedure of resettlement was built on the same 
principle as the federal scheme at the stage of housing 
construction. What differs in the case of Chukotka is 
that the resettling residents were assisted at all stages 
of resettlement, from processing the documentation 
to moving into a new apartment. Programme partici-
pants transferred the ownership of their northern flat 
to local authorities and received equivalent ones in the 
South in the same building with other fellow citizens. 
In addition to housing, participants were provided with 
transportation money, shipping for their belongings, 
and support  services.  As a result,  neighbourhoods of 
Chukotka’s resettled residents appeared in Voronezh, 
Tula, Omsk, and other locations. “The process of adap-
tation is difficult, but participants have benefited from 
the “colony” pattern of resettlement, whereby com-
munities are preserved in a single destination location, 
often in new “micro-regions” built expressly for this 
purpose” (Thompson 2004: 77). Thus, Chukotka resi-
dents in Voronezh or Tula were not merely migrants, 
but a ‘mirror Chukotka’ in the South.
Even with positive outcomes, collective relocation 
has not become the main resettlement principle all over 
the Russian Far North. First, because providing a full 
resettlement package is hardly a manageable task for 
the state. Second, it involves the sensitive problem of 
human rights incidental to all social engineering poli-
cies, as people become limited in their freedom as to 
what place to move and where to live. In spite of the 
fact that resettlement is not forced, choice of residence 
appears to be not completely free, but predefined by 
policy decisions and resulting in unintended conse-
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quences. Communal resettlement could work if all 
members collectively agree to move into one place, 
which is apparently unlikely in practice. Nevertheless, 
the state should consider different options for resettle-
ment, both communal and individual, even if it is more 
complicated to realise. 
The example of Chukotka’s resettlement brings 
us to the discussion on the viability of communities. 
Among other factors making community coherent and 
sustained, it is important to stress the social dimen-
sion of viability, the social capital that glues members 
of community together. The latter includes a strong 
local culture, socio-cultural linkages and joint expe-
riences. Social infrastructure, therefore, is a crucial 
pre-condition of a viable community. We apply the 
concept of community viability to resettling residents, 
but the same is true for the communities remaining in 
the North: northern societies are stronger where there 
is a good sense of community and a feeling of close-
ness, belonging and solidarity among those habitants 
who stay in the North (Bolotova & Stammler 2010). 
Through taking a community social value into account 
when making plans for restructuring the state produces 
the basis for viable economic and social development 
of the region.
To conclude, by introducing resettlement pro-
grammes in parallel with in-migration measures, the 
Russian state, to some extent, has attempted to reshape 
the demographic landscape of the North. It has been 
clearly defined what type of people the state needs in 
the North and why: working-age, healthy labourers, 
employed in the resource-extraction and construction 
industries, which stimulate regional growth. The North 
needs people who can contribute to the economic 
growth of the region, and national wealth in general, 
since it is very much reliant on arctic mineral wealth. 
Economically passive, socially vulnerable members 
of the population past the age of production, invalids, 
and the unemployed should be encouraged to relocate. 
From there it is obvious that the Russian state applies 
an economic perspective towards settling and mobil-
ity. Regulation of migration processes arises from the 
necessity of regional economy in labour resources, the 
interests of national security, and economic develop-
ment in general. In both in-migration and relocation 
policies, the state uses a system of economic incen-
tives as driving-in and driving-out mechanisms. It pro-
vides people with economically-favourable conditions 
that, in theory, should influence their migration deci-
sion. However, a major mis-assumption of the central 
government as well as the neo-liberal paradigm is that 
people act only in an economically rational way. A pol-
icy that is designed mainly along financial lines may 
therefore be unrealistic. The resettlement policy, in 
the way it was designed and implemented, has failed. 
It appeared wasteful of federal budget funds, since it 
did not reach its planned goals. The Federal centre’s 
trust in the local administrations’ ability to successfully 
manage the resettlement process was lost; this resulted 
in strengthening centralisation, direct financing of pro-
gramme participants through the housing certificate 
scheme, and reducing regional involvement in policy 
implementation. It also did not fulfil the expectations 
of regions and participants, and discredited the state in 
the eyes of the community. State policy does not reflect 
the motives behind economically driven logic, lived 
experiences, and regional diversity. One can say that 
programme participants sighing for resettlement feel 
a sort of moral entitlement to trick the state because 
the latter failed to deliver on its promises, designing 
policies that do not match the people’s practical needs. 
Therefore people do not feel obliged to follow poli-
cies that are too distant from their real life needs and 
see their only way to improve their situation in re-
channeling resources to where they make most sense 
for them. From another point of view, even if the state 
would design policies according to the needs of people, 
without social trust it would not reach a desired suc-
cess. The state-society relationship requires a funda-
mental transformation of perception of the state in the 
view of regions from an external superstructure, im-
posed on them in a top-down manner to an institution 
with which people can identify.
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Conclusion
In the period from 1930 to 1980, the North was one of 
the main priorities of the Soviet state’s development 
policy. The strategy of northern development was built 
upon the centralized redistribution of both human and 
financial resources to the northern territories, aimed at 
the industrial development of the North and exploita-
tion of mineral wealth to bear export revenues for the 
national budget. These objectives were achieved by the 
planned populating of the North, both voluntary and 
forced, and building up northern towns. As a result of 
Soviet demographic engineering, during this relatively 
short period of time, a large number of people moved 
to the North to live and work there on a permanent ba-
sis.
Liberalisation of the economic and political spheres 
in the early 1990s significantly transformed the state’s 
approach to its northern periphery. New democratic 
government underlined the importance of the cir-
cumpolar edge, but took a different angle on its demo-
graphic composition. The federal state perceived its 
northern territories, in the first instance, as a resource 
base contributing to the country’s economic growth 
and as a geopolitical outpost, protecting and securing 
national interests in arctic resources (Medvedev 2008). 
In this view, permanently inhabited northern cities 
retain their importance as a fortress of state power in 
the Arctic region and centres of further exploitation of 
northern mineral wealth. On the other hand, previous 
state-planning and extensive subsidising changed to 
a development strategy that relied on profit-oriented 
cost-cutting measures, including restructuring north-
ern industries, downsizing northern settlements, elimi-
nating “unpromising communities”, and facilitating 
out-migration. Current development measures focus 
on rescaling the demographic geography of the North 
according to the economic viability principle, insuf-
ficiently taking into account socio-cultural factors. 
Since the late 1990s, the federal government has con-
tinuously reduced public expenses including special 
northern benefits which was one of the main motiva-
tions for coming to the North and has moved towards 
the rationalisation of population distribution to and 
from the Northern periphery. The post-Soviet principle 
of population distribution has claimed transition from 
the policy of “residency in the North” to the policy 
of “presence of population in the North” (The World 
Bank 2001). 
Our study has shown that the current approach of 
the federal government towards population distribution 
is not simplistically geared to ‘depopulate’ the area, but 
more to regulate the population structure through cre-
ating economic incentives pulling in and pushing out 
migration flows. The important question arising from 
the regulatory perspective on demographic changes is: 
What population is ‘welcome’ to reside in the North 
and who should leave? The Russian government makes 
this distinction clear: those who cannot contribute to 
economic growth should be encouraged to move. “The 
intention of the resettlement projects was to increase 
the proportion of young, healthy, and working-age 
residents to the retired or disabled, and thus to low so-
cial costs of the state, appeared to be producing an op-
posite effect, as this and previous research confirms” 
(Thompson 2004: 78).
The paradox is that the state has neoliberal goal fol-
lowing substantial decrease of northern subsidies and 
gradual withdrawal from influencing population distri-
bution by letting ‘the market forces’ do it. But in order 
to reach the objective, it actually applies very similar 
subsidy policy and social engineering measures elab-
orated during the Soviet time. In order to encourage 
population mobility, two federal resettlement projects 
were introduced: the state relocation programme re-
alized under the Federal Law 125-FZ and the World 
Bank Northern Restructuring Project applied in three 
selected arctic regions.
What does the implementation tell us about the 
similarity and diversity of these relocation strategies? 
Both programmes concentrate on residents of closing 
settlements, disabled, pensioners and non-working 
citizens, those who ‘create a burden on northern budg-
ets’ and, therefore, should be relocated. At the current 
stage, the resettlement process is carried out through 
a housing certificate scheme that allows people to 
choose a place of destination and type of housing ac-
cording to the individual’s preferences and needs. With 
that, compared to previous resettlement mechanisms, 
certificate subsidy requires more work and individual 
responsibilities for beneficiaries and less involvement 
of local implementation offices into the process. 
The difference in programmes’ approaches is that 
the World Bank Pilot Project set a broader agenda than 
depopulating the northern territory. It was positioned 
as a strategic, political project aimed at introducing 
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new principles of reorganising northern municipalities 
towards economic efficiency and changing northern 
development approach in general. And at least in one 
sphere it reached its objective. The World Bank project 
has had a significant impact on how the federal resettle-
ment policy was transforming, as the latter has adopted 
the certificate scheme designed and tested in practice 
under the World Bank Pilot Project. The expansion of 
social and economic restructuring schemes over a larg-
er number of northern communities demonstrates the 
intention of Moscow political elites to generalise the 
neo-liberal approach and to apply market mechanisms 
in population distribution on a country’s scale. The 
problem is, however, that both relocation approaches 
are too mechanistic. The attempts of the state to arti-
ficially ‘engineer’ the social structure did not meet its 
objective and caused an insignificant impact on either 
population change or northern development in general. 
The northern resettlement policy has not worked as it 
was initially aimed. 
The problems negatively affecting the policy out-
come resulted from inapplicability of neo-liberal prin-
ciples to the northern territories which were industri-
alized and populated under the Soviet development 
scheme. The role of the state in maintaining socio-
economic stability in the northern frontier as well as 
people’s expectations from the state is still high in 
the North. Our study shows that northerners rely on 
the state in helping them to resettle since it brought 
them to the North in the first place. However, when 
they get migration assistance in many cases benefi-
ciaries use the subsidies for the different purpose. In 
practice, the decision to migrate is not simply planned 
in accordance with the logic of neo-classical econom-
ics. It includes determinants poorly considered by 
policy planners, such as accumulated social capital, 
personal experiences, and memories attaching people 
to the place. Even having signed up for a relocation 
programme, many do not consider resettlement as an 
option and stay in the North, in that place that once 
became a home. The overestimated willingness of par-
ticular groups of northerners to relocate is one of the 
mentioned impacts that make relocation policy less ef-
fective. Purely economistic solutions, therefore, work 
against the programme and need to be reviewed. 
“Theoretical” character of the policy mecha-
nisms, elaborated in isolation from actual practices, 
has generated structural problems and caused failure 
of administrative initiatives. Evidently, market-based 
implementation arrangements have not corresponded 
with the actual processes happening in the market, ag-
gravated by continuous under-financing, lack of clarity 
in the programme design, incorrect assessment of the 
financial needs of resettling northerners, long waiting 
in queues and complicated participation rules. The 
programmes intended to increase population mobil-
ity prioritized less-mobile population groups and dis-
advantaged those capable of and, perhaps, willing to 
leave. Thus, for a migration assisted scheme to suc-
ceed, it should target those who are capable of rebuild-
ing their lives in a new region (Round 2005: 720). The 
neo-liberal schemes ignore local specifics and the so-
cio-cultural aspects standing behind development, try-
ing to simplify the diversity of life to cost-benefit rela-
tions. Ignorance of regional characteristics negatively 
impacts on the programmes’ success and increase the 
gap between policy design and actual implementation. 
Thus, one important conclusion which we would like 
to emphasise is that unsuccessful realisation of reset-
tlement policy results from a discrepancy between 
planning and implementation.
The analysis of the state-induced resettlement 
policy in the Russian North has shown the lack of 
comprehensive understanding within the state of how 
its northern periphery should be developed. Our case 
study reveals different “faces” of the Russian state at 
the central, regional and municipal levels. Interesting-
ly, each of these units has its own priorities for devel-
opment and different perceptions on what the Russian 
North is about. This finding has repercussions on the 
anthropology of the state insofar as the states should 
be theoretically revisited as a multifaceted rather than 
a unified actor.  
The relevance of resettlement is different in differ-
ent areas, however, the inflexibility and general charac-
ter of the federal projects limit their capacity to reflect 
the local specificity and regional diversity that was il-
lustrated in the example of the Murmansk oblast and 
YNAO. Restricted involvement of regional and munic-
ipal authorities in policy-planning, the lack of feedback 
mechanisms and poor cooperation between different 
levels of state agencies involved in relocation creates a 
gap between the core (policy-planners) and the periph-
eries (policy-implementers). Resettlement policy in the 
Russian North has been a top-down process, leaving a 
limited space for regional interference. Apparently, this 
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centralised system of administration does not reflect 
regional position; as a result, it makes resettlement 
policy alien to the needs of regions and beneficiaries. 
One option of bringing programmes closer to the target 
population would be through delegating the decisive 
power to the regions, allowing them to determine how 
the programme should function in their territory and 
adjusting relocation schemes according to the local 
context. And, secondly, through stimulating a coopera-
tive dialog and information exchange between north-
ern administrations and federal authorities, providing a 
solid foundation for policy-planning. Reformulating a 
thesis of James Scott, we argue that the knowledge of 
actual processes and local responses has to be properly 
considered while planning social changes (Scott 1998). 
This approach, though initially more time consuming 
and costly, can prevent long term economic and social 
costs by taking into account the need and views of resi-
dents rather than depending on outside pressures and 
physical characteristics of an area for policy (Kecz-
merski & Sorter 1984).
The decision to migrate is not simply planned in 
accordance with the logic of neo-classical economics. 
It includes determinants poorly considered by policy 
planners, such as accumulated social capital, personal 
experiences, and memories attaching people to the 
place. Their “identities and histories are all deeply em-
bedded in the region and they are unsure whether they 
would be able to build a life in a new location” (Round 
2005: 723). 
The factors shaping migratory behaviour and in-
fluencing on decision to move or to stay are complex 
and cannot be narrowed down to a general framework 
or theory. Moreover, they closely interact with other 
complex processes related to policy formation and im-
plementation. It is essential, therefore, for social scien-
tists as well as policy-makers to examine these factors 
in connection with local context and actual social dy-
namics in order to achieve more balanced and realistic 
policies. In order to achieve not only economically but 
social and culturally healthy communities, the state 
needs to go beyond quantitative economic analysis and 
to consider the diversity of factors and contexts and 
reflect on local responses being inherent outcomes of 
policy-making. 
Concluding, we would like to look at whether the 
resettlement project can be classified as a result of in-
dividual choice or of structural constraint. By impos-
ing different programs, the Russian government en-
courages the migration of socially vulnerable groups 
out of the North. Russian northern relocation projects 
stand for a policy which considers population groups 
as passive elements “moved by the state” due to eco-
nomic, military and geopolitical interests. By using 
structuralist arguments Russian government tried to 
regulate human mobility; in this sense populating and 
depopulating territories is a consequence of particular 
state needs (Government resolution N700 from 10 July 
1995).  According to Castells (2004: 209), migrants are 
not just isolated individuals who react to market stimu-
li and bureaucratic rules, but social beings who seek to 
achieve better outcomes for themselves, their families 
and their communities through actively shaping the 
migratory process. Administrative resettlement was re-
proached by northern beneficiaries explicitly in courts 
and local mass media and, most commonly, implic-
itly through strategies and tricks aimed at withdraw-
ing subsidies from the state. Our field research shows 
how active and creative programme participants were 
in developing reinterpretations of official schemes in 
order to improve their own living conditions. Grass-
roots responses developed by people demonstrate that 
migration, if not physically forced by the state, is still 
a private choice made by the relocation candidates and 
their families, rather than a result of structural induce-
ment. They individually decide on a degree of interac-
tion with the structures of the migration regime, and, 
moreover, use these structures, whenever it is possi-
ble, to suit their own interests (Pilkington & Fisakli 
1999: 96). Our fieldwork materials show strategies of 
proactive migrants who seek better living conditions 
for themselves, and, more importantly, their families, 
no matter how much the state tries to ‘induce’ it. The 
decision to relocate depends on various conditions that 
can play as both push and pull factors, including the so-
cio-economic situation in the location, access to social 
welfare programs and medical care, how secure people 
feel in the North, where the family members (children) 
are, whether they have social capital in a place other 
than the North, attachment to the place, how compli-
cated the procedure of preparing documents for reset-
tlement programs is, etc.
In order to improve relocation project’s outcomes, 
policy reform requires several changes. First, we sug-
gest greater realism in the formulation of policy goals. 
As we demonstrated, this large scale top-down ap-
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proach taken by federal authorities does not work in 
practice. Probably, it would bring better results if it 
would be applied in selected number of northern re-
gions according to their needs and socio-economic con-
ditions. Moreover, northern relocation policy should be 
constantly reviewed and adjusted to the coming chal-
lenges. It should take into consideration people’s re-
sponses and responses from the local implementation 
offices. By reinforcing the feedback mechanisms and 
adapting relocation policy in line with actual practices 
and regional interests, the Russian state may gradually 
change the perception of the state as an external struc-
ture, imposed from above. 
Second, we believe that successful achievement of 
policy goals depends to a certain extent on social trust 
between the state and the citizens (Sztompka 1999). As 
we have seen in our case study, the lack of social trust 
may lead to misuse of policy objectives and unintend-
ed withdrawing practices negatively contributing to 
policy success. In order to overcome this shortage we 
propose necessary flexibility of the state when it comes 
to long term planning. Third, it is important to consider 
paradigm change at  every level of government hier-
archy: the duty of the state is to serve its citizens and 
not the other way around, when people move after the 
changing interests of the state, first to the North under 
the Soviet ideological call, and then from the North un-
der the neo-liberal economic regime. 
Finally, when initiating social-engineering projects 
it is important to keep in mind that the principles of 
northern development go beyond resource extraction 
and national economic interests. Besides resources, the 
Russian Far North is also about formed communities 
and about people committed their life to the North. 
Many of them discovered a home there.
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Annex I: Summary: Переселение из 
районов Российского Севера: анализ 
миграционных программ и их реализа-
ции
Данное исследование является одним из резуль-
татов проекта «Локальность, мобильность и 
устойчивость в северных индустриальных го-
родах» (MOVE INNOCOM). Проект поддержан 
Академией Наук Финляндии, при содействии Ев-
ропейского Научного Фонда (European Science 
Foundation), и одобрен  как проект Междуна-
родного Полярного года (International Polar Year) 
№436. На протяжении последних четырех лет 
сотрудники проекта MOVE INNOCOM проводи-
ли качественные социологические и антрополо-
гические исследования в Мурманской области и 
Ямало-Ненецком Автономном Округе, послужив-
шие эмпирическим базисом для анализа процессов 
мобильности и закрепления жителей индустри-
альных городов Севера России. В частности, 
эта работа представляет политический и эко-
номический взгляд на демографическое и терри-
ториальное развитие Российского Севера через 
комплексный анализ программ административ-
ного переселения и их реализации в регионах. В 
данной работе детально рассматриваются две 
программы переселения, а именно: Федераль-
ный закон № 125-ФЗ «О жилищных субсидиях 
гражданам, выезжающим из районов Крайнего 
Севера и приравненных к ним местностей» от 
25 октября 2002 и его предыдущие редакции, а 
также «Пилотный проект реструктурирования 
районов Крайнего Севера», реализуемый на заем 
Мирового Банка.
Масштабная индустриализация, а вместе с ней 
заселение северных районов, началась в тридца-
тых годах двадцатого века и была напрямую свя-
зана с плановой экономикой и административными 
подходами к развитию территорий. Для освоения 
природных богатств Советское правительство пу-
тем принуждения (ГУЛАГ, переселение народов) и 
поощрения (система экономических и социальных 
привилегий) привлекало на Север население из 
других регионов. Вокруг производственных цен-
тров строились новые города и поселки, в которых 
приезжие рабочие и переселенцы жили на постоян-
ной основе. Такие города становились «проводни-
ками» рабочей силы и инфраструктурными центра-
ми для северной добывающей промышленности. В 
период с 1955 по 1975 годы без малого восемьсот 
новых городов было основано в рамках гигантско-
го Советского проекта освоения северного края 
(Engel 2007: 285).
Значимость северного направления была обу-
словлена не только национальным экономическим 
интересом, но и стремлением центральных властей 
объединить регионы в единое пространство, тем 
самым легитимировав свое право на территорию. 
В этом смысле Северные города выполняли функ-
цию форпостов, обеспечивающие национальную 
безопасность и Союзные геополитические интере-
сы. Идеологическая составляющая, определившая 
характер экстенсивного индустриального развития 
Севера, опиралась на положение Фридриха Эн-
гельса о необходимости равномерного распреде-
ления производственных и трудовых ресурсов по 
всей территории страны (Hill & Gaddy 2003). Одна-
ко модернизация северных районов не была страте-
гически продуманным планом; напротив, освоение 
территорий явилось результатом геологических от-
крытий, именно они заставляли промышленность 
и население продвигаться все дальше и дальше на 
Север и Восток. Для того чтобы контролировать 
миграционный поток населения, в отношении се-
верных территорий на государственном уровне 
проводилась особая социально-экономическая по-
литика, учитывающая специфику этого региона. 
Система северных привилегий предусматривала 
высокую оплату труда, централизованное снабже-
ние, специальные северные льготы, компенсацию 
расходов при выезде в отпуск, северный коэффици-
ент с первого дня работы (Kozlinskaya 2009). Эти 
зоны преимущественно были закрытыми, и туда 
можно было въехать только по специальным пропу-
скам. Даже билеты на самолет или поезд продавали 
только в том случае, если у человека была «север-
ная прописка», либо приглашение от организации, 
либо гостевой вызов от родственников - северян. 
Распад Советского Союза, рыночные ре-
формы 90-х и сопровождающий их социально-
экономический кризис обусловили изменение 
государственного подхода к развитию северных 
регионов. С одной стороны понимание Севера как 
ресурсного резерва и донора остается прежней 
(Medvedev 2008). В это же время советские ме-
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ханизмы ведения хозяйства в условиях рыночной 
экономики показали свою неэффективность. Как в 
регионах, так и на федеральном уровне подчерки-
вается необходимость поиска новых, экономически 
оправданных подходов к освоению северных при-
родных запасов. 
Так главы северных регионов  предлагают раз-
вивать Север, опираясь на уже существующую 
систему постоянных поселений. Север должен 
стать органичной частью единого экономическо-
го пространства страны через развитие не только 
сырьевых отраслей, но и производств глубокой 
переработки местных ресурсов, через повышение 
уровня социально-экономической жизни северных 
территорий. Представители такого подхода под-
черкивают значимость государственных субсидий 
и специализированных северных программ, под-
держивающих жителей Севера.
Такая модель развития вызывает критику по-
следователей неолиберальных идей (Pivovarov 
1995, 2002, Hill & Gaddy 2003, The World Bank 
2001). Ее суть сводится к тому, что для достижения 
стабильного экономического роста России, регио-
нальное развитие страны должно быть экономиче-
ски эффективным и рационально спланированным. 
Движущей силой такого подхода выступает рыноч-
ная экономика с ее принципами конкурентности 
и продуктивности. Идеологи северной реструкту-
ризации предлагают осваивать экономику региона 
через максимальное сокращение расходов  на не-
промышленные отрасли и переселение избыточной 
части северного населения в европейскую часть 
России (The World Bank 2001). Главный аргумент, 
выдвигаемый сторонниками рыночной логики: Се-
вер – это дорого. По расчетам Гадди и Хилл цена 
русского холода составляет примерно 1,5-2,5 % 
от годового ВВП страны (Hill & Gaddy 2003: 53). 
Из-за высоких транспортных расходов, трудностей 
эффективного межрегионального взаимодействия, 
суровых климатических условий экономическую 
деятельность России, как и человеческие ресур-
сы, необходимо концентрировать  в центральных 
и южных районах, и переходить к выборочному, 
тщательно продуманному освоению сравнительно 
немногих районов Севера, богатых нефтью, газом, 
золотом, алмазами и другими ресурсами общего-
сударственной важности. Основное же внимание 
должно быть направлено на дальнейшее развитие 
урбанизированных старопромышленных районов 
европейской части России, потенциал которых еще 
далеко не исчерпан (Pivovarov 2002, Hill & Gaddy 
2003). 
Одним из инструментов государственной поли-
тики на Севере являются программы переселения, 
предполагающие административное регулирова-
ние демографических процессов через стимули-
рование мобильности определенных групп населе-
ния. Цель таких миграционных программ  – дать 
возможность пенсионерам, инвалидам, нерабочему 
населению и старожилам выехать в центральные и 
южные районы страны и этим сократить государ-
ственные расходы на их обеспечение, которые в че-
тыре раза больше на Севере, чем в средней полосе 
России (Hill & Gaddy 2003). По мнению авторов 
программ, политика переселения призвана решить 
проблему перенаселенности северных территорий 
и оптимизировать численность жителей северных 
городов в соответствие с нуждами предприятий, 
работающих в регионе, а также экономической 
целесообразностью. С точки зрения федеральных 
властей на Севере должно оставаться экономи-
чески активное население, содействующее росту 
благосостояния региона. С этой целью необходимо 
административно воздействовать на процессы рас-
селения и миграции, регулируя выезд нетрудоспо-
собного населения из районов Крайнего Севера и 
приравненных к ним местностей, и привлекать на 
Север высококвалифицированных специалистов 
(Government resolution N 700 from 10 July 1995). 
В результате такого социального проектирования, 
должна обеспечиваться необходимая ротация на-
селения.
Политика переселения решает и другой вопрос. 
В результате проведенных реформ денежные сбе-
режения, накопленные за годы работы на Севере, 
оказались обесцененными. Многие граждане ли-
шились возможности выезда в благоприятные для 
проживания регионы России за счет собственных 
средств. С этой точки зрения программы пересе-
ления выступают гарантом государственных обя-
зательств по поддержке незащищенных групп на-
селения и обеспечению северян жильем. Принятие 
таких решений, однако, не всегда соответствует 
бюджетным возможностям государства, что сни-
жает не только уровень обеспечения социальных 
гарантий, но и степень доверия граждан к ним 
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(Committee for Problems of the North and the Far East 
2008).
С 1995 года в РФ действовали различные про-
граммы переселения, например, федеральная це-
левая программа «Строительство на территории 
Российской Федерации жилья для граждан, вы-
езжающих из районов Крайнего Севера и прирав-
ненных к ним местностей», «Жилище» и другие. В 
конце 90-х годов новым инструментом реализации 
политики переселения стал Федеральный закон 
от 25 июля 1998г. N 131 «О жилищных субсидиях 
гражданам, выезжающим из районов Крайнего Се-
вера и приравненных к ним местностей». В 2002 
году была приняла новая его редакция – Федераль-
ный закон N 125 от 25 октября 2002 г. На совре-
менном этапе политика переселения финансиру-
ется и реализуется в рамках федерального проекта 
«Жилище»; параллельно с ним в период с 2002 
(Government resolution N 336 from 22 May 2002) по 
2009 год в трех областях Российского Севера реа-
лизовывался «Пилотный проект реструктурирова-
ния районов Крайнего Севера» на заем Мирового 
Банка. Так как наше исследование и сбор данных 
проводился в период реализации обеих программ, 
их анализ, представленный в данной работе, опи-
сан в настоящем времени, однако, для фактической 
правдивости, важно отметить, что проект Мирово-
го Банка был официально закрыт 30 сентября 2009 
года (The World Bank 2010).
Обе программы, рассмотренные в данном ис-
следовании, нацелены на одну целевую аудиторию 
- жителей закрывающихся поселений, инвалидов, 
пенсионеров и безработных граждан, то есть соци-
ально незащищенные и неработающие слои насе-
ления, которые напрямую не участвуют в создании 
экономического капитала региона, но нуждаются в 
поддержке со стороны местных администраций. На 
современном этапе обе программы осуществляют 
переселение через выдачу жилищного сертифика-
та, который позволяет участнику программы при-
обрести жилье в центральных и южных регионах 
страны. Величина государственной субсидии уста-
навливается в зависимости от того, в какой именно 
регион хочет переехать получатель. По сравнению 
с более ранними проектами административного 
переселения жилищный сертификат дает большую 
свободу в выборе нового места жительства. Вместе 
с тем, он налагает значительные обязательства по 
организации переезда на самого участника, такие 
как, например, поиск жилья в регионе вселения, за-
ключение договора купли-продажи и другие. Обя-
зательным при переселении является сдача «север-
ной» квартиры в муниципальную собственность, 
что, по мнению разработчиков программ, должно 
помогать северным администрациям решать во-
просы населения, нуждающимся в улучшении 
жилищных условиях. Например, такие квартиры 
могут быть переданы семьям, проживающим на 
Севере в ветхом и аварийном жилье, молодым се-
мьям и другим льготным категориям граждан.
Разница в подходах к переселению между Фе-
деральным Законом N125-ФЗ и Проектом Мирово-
го Банка в том, что последний не ограничивается 
исключительно проблемой переселения, он ста-
вит своей целью реструктуризировать северные 
сообщества социально и экономически. Проект 
был заявлен как стратегический, цель которого 
- принципиально изменить государственный под-
ход к освоению Севера, исходя из объективных 
принципов рыночной экономики, эффективности и 
бюджетной оправданности. Можно сказать, что, до 
некоторой степени, проект Мирового банка оказал 
влияние на трансформацию политики переселения, 
регулируемой Федеральным законом N125-ФЗ. 
Так, механизм переселения через выдачу участни-
ку программы жилищного сертификата, был раз-
работан экспертами Мирового Банка, опробован 
на практике в трех регионах Российского Севера 
(Воркуте, Норильске и Сусуманском районе Ма-
гаданской области) и позже перенят федеральны-
ми властями. В результате, подход экономической 
эффективности (cost - efficiency approach) в рас-
пределении населения на территории страны и ап-
пелирование к рыночным механизмам и стимулам 
миграционного поведения был перенят федераль-
ными властями. Проблема заключается, однако, в 
том, что оба проекта оказались механистическими. 
Попытка искусственно перекроить социальную 
структуру уже сложившихся сообществ посред-
ством выселения экономически пассивных групп 
населения и привлечения на север трудоспособ-
ного населения не достигла поставленной цели. В 
ходе реализации политика переселения привела к 
незначительным результатам. Так, в период с 2002 
по 2006 годы в рамках Федерального Закона – 125 
было переселено 8400 семей, что является 6 про-
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центов от всех желающих, стоящих в очереди на 
переселение – 215,472 семей или 530,784 человек 
(Committee for Problems of the North and the Far East 
2008: 1). За три года активной реализации проекта 
Мирового Банка была оказана помощь в переселе-
нии 3200 северных семей (The World Bank 2006: 
10-11). Эксперты отмечают, что при существую-
щих темпах финансирования программ переселе-
ния понадобится 150 лет для того, чтобы помочь 
переехать всем, кто ожидает своей  очереди на по-
лучение жилищного сертификата.
Недофинансирование программ – это одна 
из самых часто упоминаемых причин, негативно 
влияющих на темпы реализации проектов. Дру-
гая сложность – в несоответствии нелиберальных 
принципов экономической географии российского 
Севера, индустриально обустроенного и заселен-
ного некоренным населением методами плановой 
экономики. Роль государства в поддержании ста-
бильности северных монопрофильных экономик, 
а также социальные ожидания населения все еще 
высоки на Севере. Наше исследование показывает, 
что северяне полагаются на государственную под-
держку в переселении их на «большую землю», так 
как именно государственные экономические инте-
ресы стали причиной их приезда на Север. Однако, 
когда участники программ получают сертификаты, 
не все из них покидают ставший родным Север. 
Многие грантополучатели используют государ-
ственную жилищную субсидию для удовлетворе-
ния первоочередных потребностей семьи, часто не 
связанных с переселением. «Люди не столько пы-
таются уехать с Севера, сколько занимаются прира-
щением – пытаются и сами не прогадать, и детям, и 
внукам что-то выкроить» (Zhelnina 2009). 
На практике, решение уехать с Севера или 
остаться формируется в зависимости от многих 
факторов, среди которых социальный капитал и 
социальные отношения, опыт, накопленный в про-
цессе строительства города и «обживания» из-
начально неприветливого места, воспоминания, 
связывающие человека с Севером, могут явиться 
гораздо более значимой причиной, чем экономи-
ческая мотивация. Идентичность и истории людей 
глубоко связаны с регионом, его индустриальным 
становлением, поэтому многие из тех, кто посвя-
тил свою жизнь освоению Севера, не видят своей 
жизни за его пределами. Это подтверждают много-
численные биографические истории северян, со-
бранные и проанализированные сотрудниками про-
екта MOVE INNOCOM (Bolotova & Stammler 2010, 
Stammler 2010). Априори принимаемая готовность 
северян уехать с Севера и пренебрежение неэконо-
мическими факторами, влияющими на миграцию и 
на реализацию политики переселения в целом, не-
гативно сказывается на эффективности последней: 
государство выделяет жилищный сертификат для 
переезда граждан в более теплые климатические 
зоны, но сколько северян в действительности уеха-
ло - остается открытым вопросом. Таким образом, 
исключительно экономическая логика, принятая 
для планирования программ переселения в итоге 
оборачивается против целей, которые выдвигаются 
программами.
Неуспех переселения является следствием рас-
хождения между планированием (policy design) и 
актуальными процессами (policy implementation). 
Теоретический характер механизмов реализации 
политики переселения, разработанных в отрыве 
от реальных практик, стал причиной структурных 
проблем. Например, основанный на рыночной ло-
гике принцип переселения через обналичивание 
жилищного сертификата, не соответствует процес-
сам, движущим рынком недвижимости. Эксперты 
разного уровня подтверждают, что сумма жилищ-
ного сертификата, которая высчитывается с учетом 
средней государственной, а не рыночной стоимо-
сти квадратного метра жилья в том или ином регио-
не, является недостаточной для реальной покупки 
квартиры. Поэтому большинство северян указыва-
ют в своих заявлениях заведомо ложный регион, 
чаще всего это Москва или Санкт-Петербург, в ко-
торых стоимость квадратного метра самая высокая, 
а поэтому и сумма сертификата в итоге получается 
выше. Обналичить сертификат и получить «жи-
вые» деньги за вычетом комиссионных помогают 
переселенцам московские и петербургские агент-
ства недвижимости. Полученные деньги северяне 
могут использовать для покупки дома или кварти-
ры в регионах, там, где они действительно хотели 
бы жить. Такой некорректный расчет жилищной 
субсидии отягчается постоянным недофинансиро-
ванием программ, многолетним ожиданием в оче-
редях и сложными правилами участия в проектах 
переселения. 
Цель политики переселения в том, чтобы уве-
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личить мобильность населения, но ставит своим 
приоритетом наименее мобильные слои населения, 
так как чаще всего получают сертификаты инвали-
ды и пенсионеры с многолетним северным стажем 
работы, и не поддерживает выезд тех, кто наиболее 
способен и, возможно, желает уехать. Поэтому для 
достижения успеха в переселении, разработчикам 
программ необходимо дать возможность выехать 
тем, кто способен построить жизнь и адаптировать-
ся в новом месте жительства (Round 2005). 
Значимость переселения и успешность его реа-
лизации неодинакова в разных регионах. Негиб-
кость и общий характер программ не позволяет 
учитывать специфику конкретного региона и его 
реальных потребностей для административного 
регулирования численности населения. Так, тер-
ритории экономически и пространственно более 
связанные со старопромышленными областями, 
регионы с более давней историей индустриально-
го развития и заселения, а также стабильной эко-
номикой, могут представляться комфортными для 
проживания в глазах местных жителей, несмотря 
на неблагоприятные климатические условия. Для 
таких областей, в которых значительный процент 
участников программ предпочитает оставаться в 
регионе, переселение оказывается «манипулятив-
ным ресурсом» (Humphrey 1998), дополнительным 
источником федеральных субсидий, даже если они 
используются не по прямому назначению. Это под-
тверждает пример Мурманской области. Эксперты, 
которых мы интервьюировали в Мурманской обла-
сти, говорят об обратной миграции; многие, полу-
чившие жилищные сертификаты для переселения, 
предпочитают оставаться в регионе, используя 
программные деньги на другие цели. Об этом же 
сообщают местные СМИ (Sheremey 2002, Zavyalov 
2006), по данным которых 30-40 процентов из чис-
ла получивших жилищную субсидию в короткие 
сроки продают купленную в центральном регионе 
квартиру и возвращаются на Север, на прежнее ме-
сто жительства. Двадцать процентов используют 
новое жилье лишь в летнее время как дачу. И толь-
ко 50-60 процентов участников программ действи-
тельно переезжают (Sheremey 2002). В то время как 
в ЯНАО случаи, связанные с «возвращением на Се-
вер», упоминались скорее как единичные примеры, 
исключение из общего правила. Несмотря на отсут-
ствие официальной статистической информации 
подтверждающей или опровергающей это наблю-
дение, и тот факт, что наши выводы основаны на 
экспертных интервью и историях самих жителей, 
обратная миграция представляется нам важным от-
ветом (response), который необходимо учитывать 
для успешной реализации политики переселения 
в том или ином регионе. Это тот сигнал, который 
общество посылает государству в ответ на админи-
стративные решения. 
Анализ административных мер, направленных 
на переселение избыточного населения из северных 
районов также показал, что внутри властной вер-
тикали не существует единого понимания, каким 
образом должен развиваться Север. Каждый уро-
вень (федеральный, региональный или местный) 
выделяет свой приоритет для развития северных 
областей и свое понимание, что такое Север. Такая 
неоднозначность оценок относительно северного 
развития, высказываемых российской политиче-
ской элитой, подтверждает тезис о многогранности 
института государства и дополняет теорию антро-
пологии государства (anthropology of the state) эмпи-
рическим материалом. Другое теоретический аргу-
мент, сделанный нашим исследованием, дополняет 
научную дискуссию о движущей силе миграций и 
отвечает на вопрос, является ли переселение след-
ствием индивидуального выбора или структурного 
принуждения к смене места жительства (Pilkington 
& Fisakli 1999). Проекты административного пере-
селения нацелены на рациональное регулирование 
численности и мобильности жителей, а так же про-
цессы их расселения (Government resolution N700 
from 10 July 1995), исходя из экономических и гео-
политических интересов страны. По мысли авто-
ров программ, стимулирование миграции экономи-
чески неактивного и пожилого населения должно 
способствовать «обновлению» состава населения 
северных сообществ. В этом смысле, программы 
переселения являются механизмами социального 
проектирования (social engineering) северных со-
обществ, а миграция – вынужденным ответом на-
селения на меняющиеся приоритеты государства. 
Процессы естественной, стихийной мобильности 
противопоставляются управляемому регулирова-
нию миграции, и роль государства в этом процессе, 
по мнению авторов программ переселения, являет-
ся определяющей (Government resolution N700 from 
10 July 1995).
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Реальные же процессы показывают, что пере-
селенцы не только активно принимают участие в 
формировании миграционных стратегий, но ис-
пользуют программы для извлечения большей 
выгоды для своих семей, обходя установленные 
законом предписания. Таким образом, миграция, 
если она не является принудительной, остается 
выбором переселенцев и их семей гораздо в боль-
шей степени, чем результатом структурных изме-
нений. Переселенцы лично решают о степени их 
взаимодействия со структурами, определяющими 
миграционный режим, более того, они используют 
эти структуры, где это возможно, в своих личных 
интересах (Pilkington & Fisakli 1999: 96). Решение 
о переезде напрямую зависит от многих условий, 
которые могут выступать подталкивающими (push) 
или притягивающими (pull) факторами: социально-
экономическая ситуация в северном регионе и 
регионе переселения, доступ к социальным про-
граммам и качественным медицинским услугам, 
место проживания детей и внуков, наличие или от-
сутствие социального капитала в регионе вселения, 
бюрократические сложности, связанные с участи-
ем в программах переселения. 
В заключение, анализ реализации политики 
переселения предлагает некоторые общие реко-
мендации, которые могли бы быть полезными для 
разработки будущих проектов, направленных на 
регулирование процессов мобильности и развитие 
северной территории в целом. Для формирования 
не только экономически, но социально-культурно 
устойчивых сообществ, при планировании со-
циально ориентированных проектов государству 
необходимо руководствоваться подходами, выхо-
дящими за рамки расчетов. Сбалансированная и 
реалистичная государственная политика должна 
учитывать местную специфику и неэкономиче-
ские факторы, влияющие на миграционное поведе-
ние, а также ответные сигналы, которые посылает 
государству общество. Минимальное участие в 
программном планировании региональных и му-
ниципальных администраций, слабый механизм 
обратной связи и недостаточная кооперация между 
разными уровнями власти, курирующими пересе-
ление, создает разрыв между  центром (отвечающий 
за планирование проектов) и северными регионами 
(осуществляющих реализацию переселения). Для 
преодоления структурной разобщенности между 
органами власти, важно обеспечить эффективную 
коммуникацию и доставку информации из регио-
нов в центральные органы. Политика должна быть 
спланирована исходя из реальных нужд северян и 
их интересов, а также максимально отражать со-
временные рыночные процессы. Подводя итог, 
необходимо отметить, что результативность по-
литики переселения и достижение программных 
целей напрямую зависит от подхода, принятого 
государством в отношении будущего развития се-
верных территорий, и от того на сколько после-
довательно этот подход реализуется на практике. 
Поэтому, с нашей точки зрения, важно выработать 
единый сценарий развития Севера, учитывающий 
особенности регионов, в рамках которого будет 
осуществляться поиск и освоение человеческих и 
нематериальных ресурсов, а так же планирование 
социально-экономических изменений.
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Annex II: List of experts interviewed
Murmansk region
1. Local Government Official
 Institution: Municipal administration of Apatiti
 Date of interview: 20 October 2008
 Place: Apatiti
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
2. Regional Government Official
 Institution: Regional administration of Murmansk oblast’
 Date of interview: 06 November 2008
 Place: Murmansk
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
3. Regional Government Official
 Institution: Regional administration of Murmansk oblast’
 Date of interview: 06 November 2008
 Place: Murmansk
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
4. Local Government Official
 Institution: Municipal administration of Kovdor
 Date of interview: 15 September 2007
 Place: Kovdor
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Alla Bolotova
 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomus Okrug
5. Local Government Official (a)
 Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
 Date of interview: 27 November 2008
 Place: Novy Urengoy
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
6. Local Government Official (b)
 Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
 Date of interview: 27 November 2008
 Place: Novy Urengoy
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
7. Local Government Official
 Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
 Date of interview: 06 December 2008
 Place: Novy Urengoy
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
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8. Local Government Official (a)
 Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy 
 Date of interview: 07 December 2008
 Place: Novy Urengoy
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
9. Local Government Official (b)
 Institution: Municipal administration of Novy Urengoy
 Date of interview: 07 December 2008
 Place: Novy Urengoy
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
10. Regional Government Official (a)
 Institution: Regional administration of YNAO
 Date of interview: 12 December 2008
 Place: Salekhard
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
11. Regional Government Official (b)
 Institution: Regional administration of YNAO
 Date of interview: 12 December 2008
 Place: Salekhard
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
 Moscow city
12. Regional Government Official
 Institution: Representative office of YNAO in Moscow
 Date of interview: 15 December 2008
 Place: Moscow city
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
13. The World Bank expert
 Institution: The Word Bank Unit in Moscow
 Date of interview: 16 December 2008
 Place: Moscow city
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
14. The World Bank expert
 Institution: The World Bank project implementation Unit in Moscow
 Date of interview: 19 December 2008
 Place: Moscow city
 Method: Semi-structured interview
 Interviewer: Elena Nuykina
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